The difference in how UAE and EW law controls Gharar (risk) and so Riba in a construction contract in the Emirate of Dubai, UAE. by Crawley, Shaun Edward
  
 
AUTHOR: 
 
 
TITLE:  
 
 
YEAR:  
 
 
OpenAIR citation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OpenAIR takedown statement: 
 
 This work is made freely 
available under open 
access. 
 
 
 
 
This ƚŚĞƐŝƐ is distributed under a CC ____________ license. 
____________________________________________________ 
 
Section 6 of the “Repository policy for OpenAIR @ RGU” (available from http://www.rgu.ac.uk/staff-and-current-
students/library/library-policies/repository-policies) provides guidance on the criteria under which RGU will 
consider withdrawing material from OpenAIR. If you believe that this item is subject to any of these criteria, or for 
any other reason should not be held on OpenAIR, then please contact openair-help@rgu.ac.uk with the details of 
the item and the nature of your complaint. 
This work was submitted to- and approved by Robert Gordon University in partial fulfilment of the following degree: 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
Thesis Title: The Difference in how UAE and EW Law controls Gharar 
(Risk) and so Riba in a Construction Contract in the Emirate of Dubai, 
UAE  
 
Author: Shaun Edward Crawley 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the 
Robert Gordon University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
There was no collaborating establishment or funding provided 
 
February 2017   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 of 273 
 
Abstract 
This research critically analyses and compares how the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE)1 Law and English and Welsh (EW) Law regulates obligations in a 
contract, for a thing that is to come into existence in the future, namely a 
construction contract. Uncertainty/speculation as to how an obligation is to be 
performed in UAE Law is termed gharar. The word that is synonymous with 
this terminology in EW Law is “risk”. The extent of gharar or ‘risk’ (these 
terms are used on an interchangeable basis in this thesis) in an obligation 
plays a fundamental role in the profitability of a construction contract. Where 
losses become unacceptable, particularly for the Contractor, a dispute will 
arise. These circumstances may be in conflict with UAE Law, which obligates 
parties to a contract to ensure circulation of wealth by maintaining the 
anticipated profit to be made from a contract. This analysis also reviews how 
the level of gharar or ‘risk’ can be increased by operation of two types of 
provision that are included in standard forms of construction contract such as 
the International Federation of Consulting Engineers, Geneva, Switzerland 
(FIDIC) Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering 
Works Designed by the Employer 1st Ed. 1999 (FIDIC99). The first is a 
provision that releases the Employer from liability where the Contractor does 
not give timely notice of an Employer’s act of prevention. The second is a 
provision giving the Employer a discretion to act in an opportunistic manner, 
and exempt or limit his liability. It considers how FIDIC99 should be applied to 
control gharar or ‘risk’ in a positive way. It also identifies similarities between 
how UAE Law controls gharar and that of the notion of parties’ reasonable 
expectations in contract Law (herein referred to as parties’ expectations), and 
how relational contracts operate to ensure parties achieve their expectations. 
Keywords 
Construction, gharar, risk, certainty, riba, unjust enrichment, implied terms, 
exemption and discretionary clauses, penalties, forfeiture, FIDIC.  
 
 
                                      
1 Through the Civil Code Federal Law #5 of 1985 as amended by Federal Law #1, 1987 (UCC). 
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Preamble 
 
1. What this thesis demonstrates 
This thesis demonstrates the differences in how UAE and EW Law 
control what is termed gharar2 in UAE Law, and what is considered as 
‘risk’ in EW Law in a contract of mutual obligations for a thing that 
comes into existence in the future, namely a construction contract, in 
the Emirate of Dubai. 
In UAE Law the Civil Code Federal Law #5 of 1985, as amended by 
Federal Law #1, 1987 (UCC), is the legislation which regulates 
contractual relations in the UAE and so the Emirate of Dubai. This 
legislation enacts the Holy Law of Islam, also termed Islamic Sharī’a or 
fiqh3, (the terms Islamic Sharī’a/fiqh are used on an interchangeable 
basis in this thesis). Fiqh has two prohibitions, the gharar and riba4 
prohibitions, which parties to a construction contract must obey. These 
prohibitions, as illustrated in this thesis, are incorporated into the UCC.  
The aim of the gharar prohibition is to prevent what in fiqh is termed 
misappropriation, which in this thesis is referred to as ‘unfair gain’ (with 
the exception of section 1.4 below) that results from a party 
                                      
2 Gharar translates to hazard, speculation, risk or uncertainly - Saleh, N., A.O. (1986); Unlawful Gain and 
Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, and Islamic Banking. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp 49-
55; Comair-Obeid, N., A.O. (1996), The Law of Business Contracts in the Arab Middle East; Kluwer Law 
International, Arab & Islamic Law Series, The Hague, The Netherlands, pp. 57-64; Rayner, S.E., A.O. 
(1991); The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law, Graham & Trotman,  London, UK, pp. 289-297; Schacht, 
S., A.O. (1964, reprinted 1982), An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 
146-147; Hammond, C.G., A.O. (2005) FIDIC An Analysis of International Construction Contracts, Saudi 
Arabia, Kluwer Law International and the International Bar Association, pp. 262-264; Crone, P., A.O. 
(1987) Roman Provincial and Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, p 18; Ballantyne 
W.M. (1985-1986), ‘The Shari’a: A Speech to the IBA Conference in Cairo, on Arab Comparative and 
Commercial Law, 15-18 February 1987, Arab Law Quarterly (ALQ), pp. 12-28.  
3 Ballantyne W.M. (1985-1986), ‘The New Civil Code of the United Arab Emirates: A Further Reassertion of 
the Sharī’a’, Arab Law Quarterly (ALQ), pp. 245-264; Kamali, M. H., A.O. (2006, reprinted 2008), Principle 
of Islamic Jurisprudence, The Islamic Text Society, Cambridge, UK. p. 1; Fyzee A.A.A. A.O. (1949 4th 
Edition 2008); Outlines of Muhammadan Law ,Oxford University Press, New Delhi, India, p. 1; Schacht, op 
cit., n. 2, p. 1; Khadduri, M. & Liebesny, H.J, A.O. (1955), Law in the Middle East Vol. 1, The Middle East 
Institute, Washington DC, USA, pp.85-86; Coulson, N.J. A.O. (1964 reprinted 2007) A History of Islamic 
Law, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, pp. 75-85;  
4 Riba translates to unlawful gain or excess or illicit profit - Saleh, op cit., n. 2, p. 13; Comair-Obeid, op 
cit., n. 2, p. 51; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 266-269; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, p. 145; Hammond op cit., n. 2, 
pp. 262-263. 
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speculating, caused by a lack of knowledge as to what is required to 
discharge an obligation5.  
Fiqh considers gharar a root cause of a dispute in a contract6. An 
obligation lacking in precision prevents a party having adequate control 
over how to perform an obligation. In the context of a construction 
contract the obligation is the delivery of a structure. To do this there 
must be no speculation in any attributes which form the basis of the 
contract that causes the Contractor to lose control of his mode of 
performance7. Where there is speculation then the contract price or 
countervalue8 is either enough, not enough, or too much. This is the 
same as gambling which is forbidden9 in fiqh. The Contractor either 
makes the anticipated profit, a loss, or an excessive profit, which if the 
latter the Employer will resent.  
The excessive loss or benefit being the unfair gain. In either instance, 
one of the party’s feels cheated and so regrets entering into the 
agreement resulting in a dispute between the parties10. Consequently, 
for a valid construction contract to come into existence in UAE Law, the 
services/goods provided must be equivalent to the countervalue paid. 
This equivalence ensures circulation of wealth, a primary aim of fiqh11, 
and which is an obligation under article 3, UCC. 
The way the UCC controls gharar is there has to be precision in all 
attributes of the contract so there can only be nominal speculation as to 
what an obligation entails, i.e. the risk intrinsic to a contract must be 
                                      
5 Ibn Rushd, M., translated by Prof. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Reviewed by Prof. Mohammed Abdul Rauf, 
A.O. (1996), The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer Vol II, Bidāyat al-Mujitahid wa Nihāyat al-Muqtasid, Garnet 
Publishing, Reading, UK, p. 179. 
6 Whelan, J., A.O. (2011), UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary - 2010. London, UK: 
Thomson Reuters (Legal) Ltd, p. 110, Art. 203 commentary; Imam Malik, Al-Muwatta "The Approved," 
Book 31. 
7 Coulson, N.J. A.O. (1984) Commercial Law in the Gulf Sates The Islamic Tradition, Graham & Trotman, 
London, UK, p. 45. 
8 The term commutative contract used in the translation of article 203, UCC illustrates that parties to a 
transaction are to give and receive the equivalent hence the term countervalue.  
9 Vogel, F. E. & Hayes, S.L., A.O. (1998 Reprinted 2006); Islamic Law and Finance Religion, Risk, and 
Return. Liedden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV. p. 63; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 40-42; 
Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 291-292; Saleh, op cit., n. 2, pp. 53-54; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, p. 146. 
10 Imam Malik, op cit., n. 6, Book 31; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 24. 
11 Shimizu H., Philosophy of the Islamic Law of Contract a Comparative Study of Contractual Justice; IMES 
–I.U.J Working Papers Series #15, the Institute of Eastern Studies 1989; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 
26-27; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 269, 273 -292; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 40-42. Ibn Rushd, op cit., n. 
5, p. 180; Qur’anic verse II:276-6. 
Page 6 of 273 
 
nominal12. This in turn ensures the benefit (profit) gained by the parties 
from a transaction is equivalent, i.e. the countervalue paid corresponds 
to the true value of the thing bought so neither party makes an 
excessive profit13. To disobey either of these prohibitions makes the 
contract void in UAE Law14. 
The author of this thesis proposes a novel definition of gharar in respect 
of a Contractor in the present day construction environment in Dubai 
as: 
“…uncertainty caused by insufficient knowledge resulting in 
speculation as to what a Contractor’s obligations are in order to 
control and prevent the unfair gain by an Employer 
(appropriation of the goods/services (quality, type and quantity 
of work to be done, and mode of performance)), needed to 
complete the structure by the stipulated delivery date to the 
design stated in the Contract…” 
The flow chart presented in Figure 1 illustrates how gharar manifests 
itself: 
Figure 1 – Flow Chart as to how gharar manifests 
 
The aim of the riba prohibition is to prevent any excess gain (profit) by 
a party from a contract15. Such gain in fiqh is unethical/immoral and so 
illicit. Riba arises where the contract entered into is unbalanced. The 
form of the unbalance is that party A can control his liability towards 
party B, or is able to exert some influence over party B to decide party 
                                      
12 Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 78 & 93; Saleh, op cit., n. 2, pp. 50-52; Coulson, op cit., n. 7, pp. 44-
45; Ibn Rushd, op cit., n. 5, p. 179.  
13 Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 55-56; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 78 & 93; Saleh, op cit., n. 2, pp. 
50-52. 
14 Whelan op cit., n. 6, Art. 203; Imam Malik, op cit., n. 6. 
15 Coulson, op cit., n. 7,  p. 43; Saleh, op cit., n. 2, p. 13; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 51, 55, 56; 
Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 267-273; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, p. 145.  
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B’s rights. In either circumstance, this allows party A to increase its 
profit at the expense of party B16.  
Riba manifests in a construction contract where gharar, in the form of 
an Employer’s act of prevention, causes the Contractor to lose control 
of its mode of performance and so its ability to deliver by the agreed 
date. The Employer, despite causing the delay, can exempt or limit his 
liability by operation of a time-bar or discretionary clause17. This allows 
him to exploit the Contractor to make an unfair gain.  
The author of this thesis proposes a novel definition of riba in respect of 
a Contractor in the present day construction environment in Dubai as: 
“…the Employer, by having the ability to control the rights of the 
Contractor, may exploit the Contractor to gain some form of 
excess profit/gain…” 
The flow chart presented in Figure 2 illustrates how riba manifests 
itself: 
Figure 2 – Flow chart as to how riba manifests 
 
 As demonstrated, in UAE Law there is a duty to control gharar and its 
effect as it can lead to an unfair gain, riba.  
The control of ‘risk’ in EW Law is different. EW Law abides by the 
doctrine of freedom of contract18. Consequently, parties to a contract 
are at liberty to decide the terms of their bargains. However, the 
downside is that parties to the contract consciously or unconsciously 
accept the risk associated with the obligations they have to discharge. 
In EW Law, where it is demonstrated that the risk falls to a party either 
                                      
16 Schacht, op cit., n. 2, p. 145; Coulson, op cit., n. 7, pp. 43-44; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, p. 38-39; Comair-
Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 51; Money lenders exploited the position of the holder of the debt as when the debt 
was due and it could not be paid the money lender demanded payment or that the interest be doubled - 
Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 73 & 82; Hammond op cit., n. 2, pp. 262-264. 
17 Coulson, op cit., n. 7,  pp. 53-54; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 101-102. 
18 Peel, E., A.O. (2003 reprinted 2012), The Law of Contract 12 Ed., Thompson Reuters (Legal) Ltd., pp. 2-
3. 
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expressly or by implication19, the party has to accept the loss or gain 
associated with it. Whether a gain or loss, the same situation arises as 
under fiqh, one of the party’s regrets entering into the contract.  
Parties can therefore include in their contract notice requirements or 
discretionary clauses that exempt or limit the liability of party A 
towards party B, or which allows party A to control party B’s rights and 
obligations. This is on the proviso that the provision(s) does not offend 
the rules against penalties or forfeiture20, or contravene the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA). If any of these forms or relief are/is 
demonstrated to apply, then the party suffering the loss can claim 
redress. 
In saying this, EW Law, by the use of implied terms, can control the 
balance of the contract by assigning risk to the party most suited to 
handle it, provided such risk is not expressly assigned21. The implied 
terms which provide such control for a construction contract are those 
of fairness, reasonableness and efficacy, such as a party will do nothing 
to impede the others performance, ‘the prevention principle’22. It also 
has the contra proferentem rule to control notice and discretionary 
clauses. The combined effect of these controls in EW Law promotes the 
concept that contracts be carried out in good faith, and so mirrors, to 
some extent, the objectives of the gharar and riba prohibitions as 
demonstrated in this thesis.  
                                      
19 Collins, H., Implied Terms: The Foundation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Current Legal Problems, Vol. 
67 (2014) pp. 297-331; Atkins Chambers Ltd A.O. (2010) HUDSON’S Building and Engineering Contracts, 
Thomson Reuters (Legal) Ltd., London, UK., pp. 43-46; Peel, op cit., n. 18, p. 2; Crossly v Faithful & Gould 
Holdings Ltd [2004] 4 All E.R. 447. 
20 Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] A.C. 827; Makdessi v Cavendish Square 
Holdings BV [2015] UKSC 67; Lord Wilberforce determined that a time bar provision was an exemption 
clause “…I treat the words ‘exceptions clause’ as covering broadly such clauses as profess to exclude or 
limit, either quantitatively or as to the time within which action must be taken, the right of the injured 
party to bring an action for damages…” Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime SA v NV 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 A.C. 361; Makdessi v Cavnedish Square Holdings BV [2015] UKSC 
67; ParkingEye Limited v Beavis, [2015] EWCA Civ 402; Elliot, R. F. Penalties: a brief guide to three recent 
revolutions, Const. L.J. 32(6), 644-658. 
21 Peel, op cit., n. 18, p. 223.  
22 Collins, op cit., n. 19; Mackay v. Dick (1881) 6 A.C. 251; Barque Quilpé Ltd v. Brown [1904] 2 K.B. 264, 
at 274; The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64 CA; Mona Oil Equipment & Supply Co Ltd v. Rhodesia Railways Ltd, 
[1949] 2 All E.R. 1014. 
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EW Law, by the use of implied terms, is reflecting to some extent 
concepts of parties’ expectations and relational contracts23. These 
methods of contracting, as recorded in this thesis, mirror a primary aim 
of fiqh, that of circulation of wealth, as the aim is to promote a 
balanced contract so a win/win scenario is achieved. For this to happen 
in EW Law parties to the contract must make a conscious effort as to 
whether or not an act or provision will detract from the other party’s 
interests. This reflects the same moral approach required by fiqh in the 
performance of a contract.  
Thus, as presented in this thesis, there are similarities in the 
underlining aims in EW and UAE Law to ensure equity in a contract 
through:  
1) EW Law concepts equivalent to good faith in a contract; and  
2) The Courts interpretation of parties’ expectations and relational 
contracts under EW Law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
23 McKendrick, E., A.O. (2005) Contract Law, Texts, Cases and Materials 2ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford UK. pp. 400-403; Chan, A.P., Chan D.W., J.F., Yeung A.O. (2010) Relational Contracting for 
Construction Excellence, Principles, Practice and Case Studies, Spons Press, Oxon, UK; Bakri, A.S, Ingirige, 
B and Amaratubga, D., Key Issues for Implementing Knowledge Management in Relational Contracting 
Project Settings, School of Built Environment, University of Salford, UK.   
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2. Intellectual Isolation 
The gharar and riba definitions above are novel. The reason, as 
illustrated by Crone24, is that Islamic studies have been in ‘intellectual 
isolation’ since the First World War. Saleh confirms this, although he 
does record that during the 1970-1980’s greater attention by the West 
was given to Islamic Sharī’a but subsequently declined25.  
Gulf Arab States, such as Yemen, Kuwait, UAE26, Bahrain and Qatar, 
have declared in their Constitution that Islamic Sharī’a will be the 
primary source of Law27.    
Islamic Sharī’a/fiqh is the corpus of the doctrines of Law as evolved 
through the classical theory of Islamic Law28. These doctrines developed 
prior to the 10th century, with further development curtailed as the 
Jurists, (pious Islamic scholars of the schools of Islamic Jurisprudence 
who developed the doctrines of fiqh from the primary sources, the 
Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet), considered that such doctrines 
could no longer be advanced29. The sources of fiqh is the Qur’an and 
the Sunnah of the Prophet. Consequently, as fiqh is derived from the 
commands of Allah they cannot be challenged and have to be followed 
without question. This in turn limits the autonomy of parties’ in the Law 
of contract. 
Due to this ‘intellectual isolation’ there has been a lack of understanding 
of fiqh (although the Organisation of Islamic Conference has made 
efforts to address this30). This isolation has led to a lack of knowledge 
as to how such doctrines are to be interpreted and applied in respect of 
                                      
24 Crone, op cit., n. 2, p. 1. 
25 Saleh, S., A.O. (2006) Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland. Oregon USA, p. 1. 
26 Ballantyne W.M. (1985-1986), ‘The New Civil Code of the United Arab Emirates: A Further Reassertion 
of the Sharī’a’, Arab Law Quarterly (ALQ), pp. 245-264; all of these States are Sunni’s. 
27 Saleh op cit., n. 25, p. 4 - Yemen Article 3, Kuwait Article 2, UAE Article 7, Bahrain Article 2 and Qatar 
Article 1. 
28 Rayner, op cit., n. 2, p. 20; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, pp. 75-85; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 57-68; Khadduri 
& Liebesny, op cit., n. 3, pp. 87-91; Liebesny H.J., A.O. (1975), The Law of the Near and Middle East, State 
University of New York Press, New York, USA, pp. 12-19 & 21-26; Fyzee, op cit., n. 3 , p. 11. 
29 Coulson, op. cit., n. 3, pp. 81-82; Rayner, op. cit., n. 2, p. 22; Schacht, op. cit., n. 2, pp. 69-73; The 
four Sunni schools were that of Ibn Maliki, Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Al Shafici and Ibn Hanifa. 
30 Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, p. 48. 
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the relevant articles of the UCC that govern the formation and 
performance of a construction contract.   
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3. Justification for this research 
As recorded by Coulson, the UAE Courts, when determining a case, will 
apply the principles of Islamic Sharī’a. In order to understand the sub-
stantive Law which applies, it is necessary to ascertain from the rele-
vant texts31 the basis of these principles and to have a knowledge of Is-
lamic Jurisprudence. He further states, that without such knowledge, 
Islamic Sharī’a is inaccessible and this is the reason for western busi-
ness persons and lawyers approaching the subject of Islamic Sharī’a 
with “…a naturally exaggerated apprehension of the unknown…”32. For 
the same reason Ballantyne states there is a “…lamentable, if under-
standable, ignorance, even an aversion to [understanding] Islamic Sha-
ri’a among Western Lawyers…”33 This thesis seeks to shine a light on 
how certain of these principles apply in a particular context. 
In addition, Comair-Obed records that parties, when Islamic Sharī’a is 
the basis of the Law governing the contract, are uncertain as to wheth-
er they can unreservedly determine the provisions of their contracts or 
whether they are restrained, not only by legislation but by specific Is-
lamic Sharī’a requisites. This question is answered by Professor Schacht 
who records that as a result of the ethical control which Islamic Sharī’a 
places on legal transactions, such freedom of contract is limited34. This 
thesis will assist parties to UAE construction contracts to understand 
how UAE construction contracts are affected by certain Sharī’a princi-
ples.  
There are two principal Sharī’a prohibitions, gharar and riba, which 
must not be infringed upon in respect of a construction contract, and 
for which the UCC incorporates measures to prevent infringement. 
However, without the background knowledge as to the origins of the 
relevant doctrines upon which these prohibitions are based, there is a 
lack of understanding as to how and what is behind the aim of the rele-
vant articles of the UCC which can be considered to apply to a construc-
                                      
31 The Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet. 
32 Coulson, op. cit., n. 3, pp. 5-6. 
33 Ballantyne op cit., n. 2. 
34 Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. xi. 
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tion contract. These doctrines are that there has to be precision as to 
what an obligation entails, and that contract provisions cannot increase 
the profit of one party without providing a benefit to the other35.  
This lack of appreciation of the influence that Islamic Sharī’a has on 
contractual rights and obligations is considered a major cause of 
disputes arising in construction contracts in the UAE. This is illustrated 
in the next section and demonstrates that often parties to a 
construction contract have no knowledge of how the UCC regulates 
their legal relationship. 
A purpose of this thesis is to address this lack of knowledge as it effects 
the formation of the contract and the application of discretionary and 
notice clauses. Both of these types of clauses are found in standard 
forms of construction contracts such as FIDIC99, allowing an 
opportunistic Employer to increase his profit. 
It is appreciated by the author that parties to a construction contract at 
present often conduct their transactions in a manner that at best is in 
ignorance, or at worse, deliberately contravene the obligations placed 
on them by the UCC, and that eventually parties do resolve any 
disputes that may arise in respect of their contract through negotiation. 
However, this does not detract from their obligation to comply with the 
requirements of the UCC. Compliance with these requirements, as 
demonstrated in this thesis, would, in the opinion of the author, 
minimise construction disputes by balancing the contract and ensuring 
the benefits gained are equivalent. This is particularly important now 
that Gulf Arab states are seeing a strong resurgence of Islamic Sharī’a 
as illustrated by Ballantyne36.    
 
 
 
                                      
35 El-Ahdab J. (A.O. 2011), Arbitration with Arab Countries, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, p.22   
36 Ballantyne op cit., n.2. 
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4. Aim of the thesis  
The aim of this thesis is to illustrate that the UCC has enacted the 
gharar and riba prohibitions into the Legalisation by setting out: 
1. Specific obligations which the parties must abide by at the 
formation of the contract; and 
2. Parties’ obligations and rights when performing the contract. 
To achieve this aim a comparative approach has been adopted by 
distinguishing how UAE and EW Law addresses gharar (risk) in a 
construction contract, with particular regard to a Contractor.  
The investigation reflects these differences by contrasting the sources 
of the Law of the two jurisdictions and the differing approaches in 
applying the Law. In doing this, it illustrates that EW Law has 
developed certain doctrines, inter alia that of implied terms, the contra 
proferentem rule, to balance risk where the parties have not expressly 
apportioned it in their agreement. Failure to apportion such risk 
expressly allows the EW Courts to use such doctrines to re-balance the 
risk where the EW Courts considers it equitable to do so. The more 
defined the scope of the risk, the more limited is the ability of the EW 
Courts to apply such doctrines. Consequently, there is a greater 
potential for a Contractor not to be reimbursed for resources provided, 
thereby causing the equivalence of the contract to be lost. The 
exception to this is unjust enrichment as this concept only applies 
where no contract exists in EW Law.    
Conversely, the UAE applies a nominate contract system so the 
contracting parties must comply with obligations placed on them by the 
general and specific articles of the UCC that apply to their kind of 
contract. To interpret correctly the requirements of the UCC a 
knowledge of fiqh is requisite for two reasons: 1) in order to grasp the 
meaning of the text of the UCC articles; and 2) to ensure that the 
gharar and riba prohibitions are not disobeyed. Consequently, the texts 
of the articles of the UCC cannot be taken at face value but must be 
interpreted based on the objectives of these injunctions, the aim of 
Page 15 of 273 
 
which is to ensure that obligations that arise from a contract only 
contain nominal gharar so the equivalence of the contract is ensured. At 
the same time, the riba prohibition prevents any form of profiteering 
and applies whether or not the parties have entered into a contract. 
This requirement is imposed through the text of articles 1, 2 and 3 of 
the UCC. 
The need to have a background knowledge of fiqh is similar to that in 
EW Law that requires knowledge of relevant and current case law in 
order to understand how and when terms can be implied to a contract, 
and how doctrines such as the contra proferentem rule and unjust 
enrichment apply to determine how risk/gharar will be allocated. This 
approach in EW Law is understood, whereas due to the religious nature 
of fiqh there is uncertainty as to who can research and apply the 
doctrines. This is evident by parties’ reluctance to revert to the UCC as 
a basis to support their argument for a right to compensation.  
This is further compounded by the use of standard forms of 
construction contract, whether they are altered or not by Employers, as 
parties see the provisions of the contract as the primary source of their 
rights and obligations and not the requirements of the UCC. Thus, a 
primary objective of the examination carried out in this thesis is to 
demonstrate that the UCC obligates parties to apply the provisions of 
the contract in a manner that is consistent with the obligations placed 
on them by fiqh, through the relevant articles of the UCC, by 
interpreting them in a manner that does not disobey the gharar and 
riba prohibitions as required by article 2, UCC.          
Establishing this allows the author to illustrate how two types of 
provisions (namely notice and discretionary clauses incorporated into a 
standard form of construction contract such as FIDIC99), are to be 
operated in EW, and UAE Law. The examination reflects how such 
clauses may be operated as exemption or limitation clause in EW Law 
allowing an Employer to benefit from his own breach. Whereas if these 
clauses are operated in such a manner in UAE Law they would violate 
the aims of the gharar/riba prohibitions. This again is a primary 
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objective of the thesis, with the investigation continuing to illustrate 
how circumstances evolve allowing an Employer to use notice and 
discretionary clauses as to exempt or limit liability.    
In examining this, the thesis demonstrates that the contracting parties 
are obligated, by the UCC, to avoid violating the said prohibitions, not 
only to have to perform the contract in a manner consistent with good 
faith but also their pre-contract negotiations. This again illustrates a 
distinction between EW and UAE Law, as although EW Law does not 
prima facie recognise the doctrine of good faith, it does not allow acts 
of bad faith which would include that of an Employer benefitting from 
his own breach. However, the examination demonstrates that in the 
case of a construction contract, where a Contractor fails to abide by the 
notice clause in EW Law, an Employer can prima facie benefit from his 
breach. It also examines how the circumstances which arise both prior 
to and during the contractual performance (causing the gharar and riba 
prohibitions to be violated) can be addressed through the operation of 
FIDIC99.          
This in turn leads to investigating two contractual approaches which 
parties can adopt to ensure their contract is performed in a manner 
consistent with good faith. These approaches are: 1) parties’ 
expectations; and 2) relational contracts. These approaches, although 
different, require parties to act in a manner that not only protects their 
own interests, but that of the other party where they do not conflict 
with the aim of the contract.  
This is considered by examining the operation of notice and 
discretionary clauses in FIDIC99. The notice clause is reviewed first by 
analysing the legality of its operation. The comparative analysis 
illustrates that EW Law seeks to ensure that notice clauses are fair in 
their operation but does not prevent them being exemption clauses, 
whilst demonstrating that in the UAE such clauses must comply with 
the Law, and once issued, the defaulting party cannot be exempt from 
compensating the injured party.    
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The thesis concludes by analysing the different forms that discretionary 
clauses take in FIDIC99 and how they operate. The comparative 
analysis considers what obligations are placed on the party holding the 
discretion, both in EW and UAE Law, and how such obligations can be 
controlled. It is clear that UAE Law enforces a stricter control of such 
clauses, not only through the good faith obligation placed on the 
contracting parties, but by enacting specific requirements to prevent 
any unfair gain from any inappropriate operation. It also reflects how 
the contractual relationship in parties’ expectations and relational 
contracts require an Employer to operate such clauses, confirming that 
these contractual approaches are consistent with how construction 
contracts are to be performed in the UAE. 
This thesis seeks to modernise the understanding of how fiqh is to be 
applied in regulating each parties’ obligations and rights to a 
construction contract, by providing novel but Islamic compliant 
interpretations for the relevant articles of the UCC which regulate a 
construction contract in respect of these two prohibitions.    
The author has already succeeded in applying these novel 
interpretations for the gharar and riba prohibitions in resolving disputes 
in the State of Qatar on two major projects on behalf of an Arab 
company who have confirmed the basis of these prohibitions. In 
addition to this the author prepared a referral for arbitration to the ICC 
for a loss and disruption claim applying the said definitions for gharar 
and riba which is now subject to arbitration. The research by the 
author, when preparing the statement of claim for these projects, found 
that the Qatar Court of Cessation ruling 89/2007(14) illustrates that 
these prohibitions apply to all contracts. The author has acted as a 
tribunal appointed Expert in Arbitrations in the Emirate of Dubai, UAE to 
provide opinions in the valuing of quantum and the operation of 
contract provisions. In these circumstances the tribunal comprised of 
Arabic members who referred to the UCC, and gave the decision in a 
manner consistent with the interpretations set out in this document.    
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Figure 3 below, presents the number of construction disputes referred 
to Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) during the period 2007 
to 2013. This increased six-fold from 77 to 440 during the period 2007 
- 2011. The value of the disputes between 2007 and 2013 was in the 
region of US$65m37.  
Figure 3 – No. of Construction Disputes Registered with DIAC 
2007-2013 
 
 
 
In addition to or as a precursor to arbitration, other methods used to 
resolve disputes included direct negotiations and engaging 
intermediaries to negotiate a settlement38, which if the dispute was with 
a government entity of the Emirate of Dubai would be by referring the 
dispute to the Ruler’s Court of the Emirate of Dubai. If these methods 
failed, then parties reverted to litigation39.  
The main issues in these disputes were changes, extra work and 
contract ambiguities (incomplete drawings, poor design management, 
and incomplete contract documentation etc.), causing gharar to be 
                                       
37 “Construction disputes in Middle East drag on” The Nation 21 May 2013. 
38 Zaneldin, Essam, Construction Claims in the United Arab Emirates: Types, Causes, and Frequency, 
Association of Researchers in Construction Management, Vol 2, pp. 813-822; Ren Z., Atout M. and Jones 
J., Root Causes of Construction Project Delays in Dubai, Built Environment Division, Glamorgan University, 
Pontypridd, Wales, UK, p. 751; Top Five Causes of Contract Delays, Arabianindustry.com/construction, 23 
February 2014. 
39 Zaneldin, op cit., n. 38; Ren, Atout & Jones J., op cit., n. 38. 
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present in the design which effected affected the Contractor’s mode of 
performance, period for delivery and price. In addition to these causes 
were other Employer’s acts of prevention such as late instructions and 
delayed handover of Site40. This data provides evidence that Jurists 
were correct when they determined that gharar is the core reason for a 
dispute to arise41.  
The essence of these disputes was generally the reduction in the agreed 
time the Contractor had to build the structure. This in turn leads to a 
dispute over who was responsible for the Contractor failing to meet the 
agreed delivery date, the price or countervalue (note, these terms are 
used on an interchangeable basis in this thesis) to be paid by the 
Employer, and whether the Employer had a right to deduct damages.  
Although EW Law has no control as to the form a construction contract 
will take, it is interesting to note that the traditional methods42 
developed in EW Law to procure a structure, Measure and Value (M&V) 
or Lump Sum (LS) contracts, provide the level of precision required by 
Jurists as set out in the UCC. This thesis explains why this is so and 
therefore why such methods can be considered Islamic compliant.  
Figure 4 reinforces this. This figure presents data compiled from 
seventy questionnaires, issued to Contractors to identify the most 
common standard form of construction contract used in the Emirate of 
Dubai. The most common standard form was the Conditions of Contract 
for Works of Civil Engineering Construction 4th Edition (1992) (FIDIC4) 
as published by the International Federation of Consulting Engineers, 
Geneva, Switzerland (FIDIC).  
 
 
 
 
                                      
40 Zaneldin, op cit., n. 38; Ren, Atout & Jones J., op cit., n. 38.  
41 Whelan op cit., n. 6, p. 110, Art. 203 commentary. 
42 Ren, Atout & Jones J., op cit., n. 38; Atkins Chambers Ltd op cit., n. 19, pp.760-769; Furst, S., & 
Ramsey, V., A.O. (2006) Keating on Construction Contracts, Sweet & Maxwell, London UK, pp. 119-121; 
Baker, E., Mellors, B., Chalmers, S., & Lavers, Anthony., A.O. (2009) FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 5th 
Ed., Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London & New York, UK & USA, pp. 58-60.  
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Figure 4 - Percentage of Projects where FIDIC4 was used 
 
The primary use for this standard form of contract is M&V contracts, but 
with amendments is useable with LS contracts. During the research 
stage of this thesis, parties to new construction contracts started 
switching to the latest version of the FIDIC form of contract provisions 
which is specifically for use with M&V and LS contracts. This standard 
form was the Conditions of Contract for Building and Engineering Works 
designed by the Employer 1st Edition 1999, the New Red Book 
(FIDIC99). 
The questionnaire exercise also highlighted that whilst the language of 
the Contract is English, article 18 UCC applies the doctrine of Lex Situs, 
i.e. the governing Law for real property in the UAE, and the agreements 
stating the governing Law is that of the UAE. The author’s extensive 
experience in working in dispute resolution in the construction industry 
in Dubai is that parties interpret and apply FIDIC99 in accordance with 
EW Law as there is a prevalence of literature in this respect43. It should 
be noted, that as the UAE is a Muslim State, it is mandatory that parties 
to a contract abide by the Holy Law of Islam44 and therefore the 
obligations placed on them by the UCC. 
 
                                       
43 Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 42; Glover, J., & Hughes, S., A.O. (2006), Understanding 
the New Red Book a Clause by Clause Commentary, Sweet & Maxwell. London, UK; Totterdill, B. W., A.O. 
(2001), FIDIC user’s guide a practical guide to the 1999 red book, Thomas Telford Ltd, London UK; Bunni, 
N, G, A.O. (2005), The FIDIC Forms of Contract 3rd Ed., Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, UK; 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/s/ref=nb_sb_ss_c_2_5?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-
keywords=fidic&sprefix=FIDIC%2Caps%2C269. 
44 Article 27, UCC provides it shall not be lawful to apply principles of law that are contrary to Islamic 
Shari’a or public policy or morals in the UAE, Ballantyne, op cit., n. 27. 
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5. Notice and discretionary clauses 
In both M&V and LS contracts the Employer is obligated to provide a full 
design and not to delay the Contractor’s performance45. Where the 
Employer fails to discharge these obligations, delaying the Contractor’s 
performance, the Employer in EW Law can avoid liability.  
The reason for this is that standard forms of construction contract such 
as FIDIC99 contains two clauses which allow the Employer, through his 
agent the Engineer, to control the Contractor’s rights.  
The first is a notice clause which obligates the Contractor to notify the 
Employer of an Employer’s act which delays the Contractor’s 
performance within a strict timeframe. Failure to issue such notice 
within the said timeframe releases the Employer from liability46.  
The second is discretionary clauses which allow the Engineer to decide 
the level of compensation due to the Contractor which results from the 
Employer’s acts of prevention47.  
The aleatory (profitability is dependent on the outcome of an uncertain 
event or contingency) nature of these clauses is analogous to gambling, 
in that the control the Contractor needs to maintain the anticipated 
profit now rests with the Employer48. Thus, both of these clauses 
provide great potential for unfair gain by an Employer. 
Consequently, as there is potential for these clauses to be operated in 
an opportunistic manner by the Employer, they are repugnant to 
Islamic Sharī’a as they go against the ethics and morals imposed on 
                                      
45Atkins Chambers Ltd op cit., n. 19, pp. 760-769; Furst & Ramsey op cit., n. 37, pp. 119-121; Baker, 
Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 58-60; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, p. 74.  
46 An example of such clause is Sub-Clause 20.1 FIDIC99; Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 
42, pp. 316-322; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 377-379; City Inn Ltd v. Shepherd Construction Ltd 
2003 SLT 885; Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd (No.2) [2007] EWHC 447 
(TCC); B.L.R. 195; Steria Limited v. Sigma Wireless Communications Limited [2008] B.L.R. 79; 118 Con. 
L.R. 177 [2008] C.I.L.L 2544 QBD (TCC). 
47 An example of such clause is Sub-Clause 3.5, FIDIC99; Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 
42, pp. 286-289 & 294 -301; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 65-68; Totterdill, op cit., n. 38, pp. 90-
96. 
48 Coulson, op cit., n. 7, p. 44; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 100-102; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 
37; Ibn Rushd, op cit., n. 5, p. 155. 
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parties by the gharar and riba prohibitions49 as defined above, and so 
against the Law of the UAE.  
For this reason, party agreed provisions have to be interpreted in a 
manner to avoid or prevent contravening the gharar and riba 
prohibitions; otherwise such provision(s) has to be severed from the 
contract50 to keep the contract valid.     
To illustrate this and demonstrate how the UCC has enacted the gharar 
and riba prohibitions into the Law this thesis establishes: 
1) How the operation of these two types of provision in UAE Law can 
cause gharar and riba to be present in a construction contract;  
2) Why the interpretation and construction of these provisions in EW 
Law allows gharar and riba to be present in a construction 
contract; and  
3) How these provisions are to be applied in UAE Law so they do not 
infringe these prohibitions.  
By establishing how these types of provision can cause gharar and riba 
to be present in a contract, it also illustrates that the intention of these 
prohibitions are that each party derives the anticipated benefit from the 
contract which has similar aims of parties’ expectations in contract law 
and relational contracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
49 Ballantyne W.M., (1988), ‘The Second Coulson Memorial Lecture: Back to the Sharīa’, Arab Law 
Quarterly (ALQ), pp. 317-328 which as illustrated at page 325 both Gharar and Riba are considered 
repugnant to fiqh.  
50 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, art. 31, 52, 206 & 210; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 43-55; Coulson, op cit., n. 
7, pp. 50-55; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 100-102. Ibn Rushd, op cit., n. 5, pp. 192-194. 
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6. Structure of the thesis and findings 
Part 1 Background to the development of UAE Law – this part 
examines and establishes: 
1) That the primary sources of Islamic Sharī’a are the basis of the 
gharar and riba prohibitions; the effect these prohibitions have on 
parties’ rights and obligations, which form the basis for the novel 
definitions for these prohibitions and which are to prevent gharar 
being inherent to a contract allowing an excessive benefit being 
made; the morals that these prohibitions enforce, put into the 
context of EW Law by examining the concepts of an unconscionable 
bargain and unjust enrichment, and how these prohibitions are 
enacted into the UCC to apply in the modern construction 
environment;  
2) How the legal requirements, developed by the Jurists to prevent 
parties contravening the gharar and riba prohibitions, control the 
types of transaction which makeup the nominate contract system 
in the UCC. The analysis establishes, (taking cognizance of the 
novel definitions proposed by the author), the effect the gharar and 
riba prohibitions have on the interpretation of the specific articles 
of the nominate contract system that apply to a construction 
contract. From the analysis it is demonstrated that there are two 
permissible methods of procurement for a construction contract 
since they provide the precision required under UAE Law for a 
Contractor to control his mode of performance, and to ensure 
delivery by the agreed date. These methods are M&V and LS.  It 
also sets out the methodology applied to identify when such 
articles enact these prohibitions; 
3) The effect of the gharar and riba prohibitions on the interpretation 
and application of the general articles of the UCC in relation to a 
construction contract. The examination again takes cognizance of 
the novel definitions for the gharar prohibition, as proposed by the 
author, which are considered to apply to a construction contract 
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using the same methodology applied in respect of the specific 
articles that apply to a construction contract; and 
4) The methods applied to illustrate that the interpretation of the 
English translation of the UCC are accurate.  
The analysis demonstrates there is a fundamental difference in the 
principles upon which EW Law is based and that of UAE Law. The 
difference is that EW Law is discovered by the Courts from the 
provisions parties agree to apply to their contract. Such decisions of the 
EW Courts set the precedents to be followed. In UAE Law it is derived 
from the preordained Laws of Allah and his Prophet. Man cannot 
challenge these Laws. Thus, any provision that the parties agree which 
contradicts these prohibitions has no effect. Hence, unlike EW Law 
(where freedom of contract allows parties to decide their own 
provisions), such a power is limited under UAE Law. 
Part 2 – Gharar,riba and the influence of English Law - this part 
examines and establishes: 
1) How, due to the influence of the English language, EW Law has 
become the main reference point for the construction, 
understanding and interpreting of contract provisions. This in turn 
has resulted in parties being unaware of the obligations that arise 
in UAE Law in respect of the construction, interpretation and 
applications of such provisions, particularly notice and 
discretionary clauses. These two clauses cause gharar and riba to 
become intrinsic to a construction contract and so create great 
potential for unfair gain by an Employer;  
2) How the application of notice and discretionary clauses, based on 
the current approach in EW Law, conflict with the aims of the 
gharar and riba prohibitions. Where such provisions are applied in 
an opportunistic manner they could be reclassified as 
exemption/exclusion of liability clauses. Consequently, EW 
principles that regulate the use of such clauses should apply where 
they are used. Where these principles are applied to the use of 
such provisions, there are strong similarities between the 
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prevention principle in EW Law and the doctrines upon which the 
gharar and riba prohibitions are based; and 
3) There are differences in the application of the concepts of fair 
dealing and good faith in EW and UAE Law. The ability to apply 
principles of fair dealing and good faith in EW Law is dependent on 
how parties have agreed to apportion the ‘risk’ (gharar). The 
effect of this is that in EW Law, what would be considered an 
implied right or obligation can and is often negated. Consequently, 
there is plenty of potential for the gharar and riba prohibitions in 
EW Law to be infringed. Whereas, good faith in UAE Law is a legal 
requirement and has to be abided by. The examination also 
illustrates that parties’ expectations and the concept of relational 
contracts, when applied to a construction contract, have strong 
similarities as to how a contract of mutual obligations should be 
performed in UAE Law. 
This is to illustrate that there is a fairer or moral approach available to 
parties to operate their contract which will avoid a dispute by ensuring 
that each party attains the anticipated benefit (profit) from the bargain.   
Part 3 – How gharar and riba are being neglected in UAE 
construction contracts - this part examines and establishes: 
1) That gharar becomes intrinsic to a construction contract due to 
an incomplete design, ambiguities in the Employer’s 
requirements, late instructions/variations proving the design was 
deficient, and Employer’s acts which impede the Contractor’s 
mode of performance and so cause disputes to arise in a 
construction contract; and  
2) Which articles of the Law are not being complied with, and the 
effect non-compliance has on a contract. The examination takes 
cognizance of the novel definitions proposed for the gharar 
prohibition and presents the obligations that the Employer is 
failing to perform. It illustrates how this allows gharar to 
manifest, what obligations the Employer has, and the rights of 
the Contractor in such circumstance. It also provides a 
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comparison of the principles of UAE Law and the EW Law’s 
parties’ expectations in relational contracts. The comparison 
demonstrates that the parties’ expectations and relational 
contracts reflect the morals that UAE Law promotes in the 
performance of a contract of mutual obligations. 
Part 4 – How to fix the neglect of the effect of these prohibitions 
- this part examines and establishes: 
1) There are two methods available to negate the effect of the 
gharar prohibition and the potential for riba. The first is through 
the Contractor’s obligation to prepare a Programme of Works. 
This document presents the Contractor’s mode of performance, 
which in turn informs the Employer of his input so he does not 
delay the Contractor’s performance. In UAE Law this document 
forms part of the contract documents and allows the parties to 
identify when gharar has manifested and what is needed to 
remove its effect. The second is the Contractor’s right to notify 
the Employer that his acts will, or are, preventing the 
Contractor’s performance, thereby allowing gharar to infect the 
contract. Such notice under UAE Law is a notice for specific 
performance, which if the Employer fails to comply with makes 
him liable to compensate the Contractor; and  
2) Where gharar has infected the contract, the parties, by following 
the mechanism set out in the contract provisions can negate 
gharar and so the potential for riba by compensating the 
Contractor accordingly. This requires that any notice or 
discretionary clause, for which this thesis considers the clauses in 
FIDIC99 as an example, are to be applied so they do not operate 
as an exclusion of liability clause thereby contravening the riba 
prohibition. This in turn ensures that the requirements of article 
206 UCC are satisfied, with the provisions being interpreted in a 
manner that allows their application to prevent gharar and riba 
infecting the contract. 
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Part 5 – Findings and Conclusion  
The findings from the analysis concludes that there is a fundamental 
difference in the formation and performance of a construction contract 
between these two jurisdictions; and that parties’ expectations and 
relational contracts reflect the manner in which UAE Law obliges parties 
to perform a construction contract.  
In addition to the above, the author of this thesis recommends that 
further research be carried out in the following areas: 
1) How the level of business efficacy applied in parties’ expectations 
and relational contracts can be developed in a manner that 
ensures parties comply with these approaches to contracting, 
taking cognizance of the gharar and riba prohibitions, so that a 
balanced set of contract provisions are adopted by the 
contracting parties; and 
2) Design and build methods of procurement that can be developed 
to obtain a level of certainty equivalent to that of traditional 
methods of procurement, as defined in this thesis, to minimise 
the risk of disputes. 
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7. Contribution to the body of knowledge  
This thesis gives parties an insight as to how the gharar and riba 
prohibitions, that are considered unethical/immoral to fiqh and so 
against the morals of the UAE, are being overlooked when parties enter 
into a construction contract. The reason for the oversight is due to a 
lack of knowledge as to how the articles of the UCC were derived from 
their principle source, Islamic Sharī’a, and that they are to be applied in 
a manner that does not contravene these prohibitions. 
The contribution to knowledge this thesis makes is it illustrates: 
1) That the UCC enacts fiqh into legislation and in doing so obligates 
the contracting parties to abide by the gharar and riba prohibitions if 
a valid construction contract in the UAE is to come into existence. 
This is because these prohibitions are considered immoral in fiqh 
and so the morals and public policy of the UAE.  
2) Parties to a construction contract are unaware of how these two 
prohibitions operate to regulate parties’ rights and obligations from 
inception, the preparation of design and contract provisions, parties’ 
obligations during negotiations, contract formation and during the 
performance of their contract so the structure satisfies the Employ-
er’s expectations and that the true countervalue is paid.  
3) To enlighten parties as to how these prohibitions do this the author 
proposes novel definitions as to what these prohibitions mean in the 
modern day construction environment. In addition the author pro-
poses the prohibition test, a test which parties can use to identify 
how the relevant articles of the UCC that apply to a construction 
contract are to be interpreted so parties do not contravene the re-
quirements of such articles.    
4) There are two permitted forms of construction contract that can be 
termed Islamic compliant, M&V and LS which includes fast track var-
iants of these forms procurement, Management Contracting and 
Construction Management.  
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5) That standard forms of construction contract such as FIDIC99, if ap-
plied based on EW Law where the substantive Law is that of the 
UAE, then parties will contravene the obligations placed on them by 
the UCC. The two forms of provision that contravene these prohibi-
tions are notice and discretionary clauses. The reason is they can be 
operated as exemption or limitation of liability clauses, causing an 
imbalance in the equivalence of the benefits gained by each party to 
the contract. This is a direct contravention of article 3 of the UCC. 
6) That notice and discretionary provisions in such standard forms of 
construction contract such as FIDIC99, should be operated in a 
manner that protects the legitimate interests of the Employer. Thus, 
a notice clause that allows an Employer to exempt himself from lia-
bility towards the Contractor as the Contractor failed to issue timely 
notice of the Contractor’s right for compensation will, in UAE Law 
contravene the riba prohibition. In EW Law such a notice clause for 
the same reasons may be considered a penalty clause and so should 
be subject to the rules against penalties or forfeiture. Discretionary 
clauses which give the Employer the right to decide a Contractor’s 
obligations and rights may be operated in a manner by an Employer 
to obtain additional services/goods for free, or may be operated to 
release or limit an Employer from liability towards the Contractor. 
Hence, such a clause will disobey the gharar and riba prohibition in 
UAE Law and may be subject to rules against penalties or forfeiture 
in EW Law.  
7) UAE Law has specific articles that are aimed at an Employer operat-
ing notice and discretionary clauses in a manner which is not detri-
mental to a Contractor, and that no clause can release the Employer 
from being liable to compensate the Contractor provided the re-
quirements of the applicable articles of the UCC have been complied 
with;   
8) Parties in UAE Law have an obligation to perform their contract in a 
manner consistent with good faith. Hence, this obligation reinforces 
the requirement that the Employer operate notice and discretionary 
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clauses in a manner that protects his legitimate interests. Such obli-
gation requires parties perform their contracts to reflect business ef-
ficacy, particularly that of cooperation, and that each of the con-
tracting parties take account of the implicit understandings of the 
other as to how the provisions of their contract are to operate. This 
plays a fundamental role in the performance of a construction con-
tract.  
9) How standard forms of construction contract, such as FIDIC99, 
compliment the applicable articles of the UCC, and how the clauses 
of FIDIC99 that are considered in this thesis are to be operated to 
remove gharar and so the potential for riba infecting the contract 
which are: 1) in UAE Law the Programme of Works is a fundamental 
element for a valid construction contract to come into existence and 
is a primary document for removing gharar and riba; 2) how notice 
and discretionary clauses included in FIDIC99 are to be operated. 
10) There are two types of contractual approach in EW Law that can be 
considered to comply with how the UCC require the parties to a con-
struction contract perform their contract. These are: parties’ expec-
tations in contract law and 2) relational contracts. Alliance contract-
ing would also be another option.  
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Table of Abbreviations 
UCC : United Arab Emirates Civil Code, Federal Law #5 of 1985 as 
amended by Federal Law #1 of 1987. 
LCP : Law of Commercial Procedure, Federal Law #18 of 1993. 
FIDIC99 : FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and 
Engineering Works Designed by the Employer 1st Ed. 1999. 
Additional 
Work 
 
: 
An increase in the quantity of work for which there is a work 
item included in the BoQ. 
BoQ or Bill of 
Quantities 
 
: 
Document that sets out the quantity of work which the 
Contractor has to do to construct the structure. The form that 
this document takes is to describe an item of work to be 
done, ‘work item’, against which a quantity is stated with a 
unit of measurement also being stated, i.e. linear metre (lm), 
square metre (m2), cubic metre (m3) or number (No.). The 
Contractor inserts the rate it requires to be paid for each work 
item, which by multiplying the rate against the quantity gives 
a total sum for each work item. These totals are added 
together to arrive at the total Countervalue for building the 
structure. Such work items include Site Administration costs. 
Countervalue/ 
Price 
 
: 
The amount paid by the Employer to the Contractor which 
reflects the equivalent benefit gained by each of the parties to 
the transaction.  
Extra work : Work for which there is no work item and so no unit quantity 
of work included in the BoQ51. 
Lump Sum 
Contract 
 
: 
Contracts where the design is fully detailed and the BoQ has 
been prepared, which in order to correct a design defect the 
Employer is obliged to instruct a variation. 
                                      
51 Chappell. D., Marshall. D., Powell-Smith. V., Cavender. S., A.O. (2001) Building Contract Dictionary 3rd 
edn; Blackwell Science Ltd, Oxford, UK. 
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Table of Abbreviations Continued  
Jurists : Pious Islamic scholars of the schools of Islamic Jurisprudence 
who developed the doctrines of fiqh from the primary sources 
the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet. The four Sunni 
schools were that of Ibn Maliki, Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Al Shafici and 
Ibn Hanifa. 
Nominate 
Contracts 
 
: 
A system which has been enacted in the UCC to control the 
different types of transactions which parties can enter into, in 
order they do not contravene the gharar and riba prohibitions 
which is achieved by setting out essential elements that have 
to be satisfied for a valid contract to come into existence.  
Programme of 
Works 
 
: 
An activity over time schedule which depicts all activities 
required to build the structure in sequence with their 
associated durations which as a result of the logic links 
demonstrates a critical path of activities, which if any of 
these activities are delayed then the stipulated delivery date 
for the structure will not be met.  
Re-
measurable 
Contract 
 
 
: 
A construction contract where the countervalue due to the 
Contractor is calculated by measuring the quantity of work 
actually done and substituting these quantities for those in 
the initial BoQ. 
Site 
administrative 
costs 
 
 
: 
Costs for resources required to administer the building of the 
structure which are directly related to the time required for 
delivery. 
Variation : A definition used in a construction contract to describe an 
addition or omission to the Scope of Work which is defined in 
the contract provisions. 
Works/ 
Structure 
 
: 
A definition used in a construction contract to describe the 
Scope of Work to be done by the Contractor for which the 
Employer provides a design. 
Page 37 of 273 
 
Glossary of Terms of Sharī’a 
Al-Qūwat Al-
Qāhira 
 
: 
 
A somewhat wider concept of force majeure. 
Badal : Literal meaning an exchange, that which is given in 
exchange fiqh requires the value of the exchange be 
equivalent in the benefit gained by each of the parties 
otherwise the contract will be of an aleatory nature and so 
be void. This is achieved in modern society by using the 
medium of money which translates to countervalue. 
Fiqh : The corpus of the theory of all Laws evolved from the 
classical theory of Islamic Law as developed by the 
Scholars of Islamic Jurisprudence, the basis of Islamic 
Sharī’a, the Holy Law of Islam. 
Gharar  : Uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge due to the 
contracting parties failing to fully identify parties’ 
obligations which arise from their contract that allows one 
party to make an unfair gain at the expense of the other. 
Ijtihad : Innovative reasoning by exercising one’s own judgement by 
a variety of mental processes of which analogical reasoning 
is central, but also includes consensus, personal/juristic 
preference and having regard for public interest. 
Istihsān : Discretionary opinions to exercise equity by juristic 
preference. 
Istishāb :  To keep the status quo where the present circumstance is 
fair. 
Istișlāh :  Consideration for public interest. 
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Glossary of Terms of Sharī’a Continued 
Qiyās : Analogical reasoning in its widest sense. 
Riba : 1) Any unjustified increase of capital for which no 
compensation is given, with such gain materialising in a 
usurious manner; 2) enrichment without justification; 3) 
receiving monetary advantage without giving a 
countervalue; and 4) profiteering of all kinds. 
Sunnah of the 
Prophet 
 
: 
Records the normative custom/living of the Prophet 
Mohammed (pbuh) as illustrated by his beliefs, what he 
approved tacitly or implied by his conduct and teachings 
which established rules/principles in respect of what the 
Qur’an had not revealed or was silent on, or upon which the 
Qur’an was ambiguous. 
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Part 1 Background to the development of UAE Law 
1.1  Introduction 
This Part examines the primary sources of Islamic Sharī’a upon which 
the pious Jurists developed the doctrines of gharar and riba, and how 
these prohibitions are enacted into the UCC and establishes in:  
1. Subsection 1.1.1 - Primary Sources of Islamic Sharī’a – 
that the primary sources of Islamic Sharī’a are divine, and so the 
doctrines of fiqh take precedence over laws made by man. It 
records that analogy was applied to develop the legal doctrines 
of fiqh from these divine sources. This in turn means the 
doctrines are also immutable, obligating the parties to a contract 
to abide by the gharar and riba prohibitions;  
2. Subsection 1.1.2 - Gharar and Riba – what the effect of the 
definitions, given by Jurists to the gharar and riba prohibitions 
have on parties’ rights and obligations in contractual 
relationships. To ensure the equivalence of the contract all 
obligations must be fully defined. To prevent gharar and riba 
being intrinsic to a contract Jurists adopted a nominate contract 
system which has to be complied with at contract formation. 
Consequently, contract provisions must be balanced to prevent 
gharar/riba infecting the contract during its performance, that 
the contemporary definitions proposed by the author in respect 
of the gharar and riba prohibitions are valid and that they play 
an important role in interpreting how parties’ rights  and 
obligations are to be discharged in respect of a construction 
contract; and  
3. Subsection 1.1.3 - Gharar, riba and the morals they 
enforce put into context with EW Law – that there are 
similarities between the morals that the gharar and riba 
prohibitions enforce in the Law of contract in the UAE, and the 
concept of an unconscionable bargain and unjust enrichment in 
EW Law, despite a fundamental difference in the basis of the 
principles upon which these concepts were developed; and    
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4. Subsection 1.1.4 - Incorporation of the Gharar and Riba 
prohibitions into the UCC – how the gharar and riba 
prohibitions have been incorporated into the UCC, taking priority 
over man-made contract provisions as UAE legislation is derived 
from Islamic Sharī’a, and so compliance with the prohibitions are 
mandatory.  
The above analysis demonstrates there is a fundamental difference 
between EW and UAE Law. The premise of EW Law is committed to 
freedom of contract and therefore the Courts are unwilling to intervene 
to redress the balance of obligations where the parties have agreed the 
terms of their transaction unless certain restrictions are satisfied. Whilst 
the aim of fiqh is to ensure ethical control of transactions to prevent 
such unfair or illicit gain by minimising speculation, and the control of 
provisions which can be applied in an opportunistic manner.  
The balance of Part 1 examines the articles of the UCC, taking note of 
the proposed definitions by the author of the gharar and riba 
prohibitions, which set out the parties’ rignts and obligations under the 
nominate contract system, and articles which apply in general terms to 
a construction contract, and establishes in:  
Section 1.2 - The Nominate Contract System – what the parties’ 
obligations are to allow a valid construction contract to come into 
existence. The primary requirement is that parties have control of their 
obligations. For a construction contract, this requires that the structure 
is fully described so the Contractor has a complete knowledge of all 
obligations that will be required to deliver the structure by the agreed 
date; and 
Section 1.3 - General articles of the UCC that apply to a 
construction contract – what the parties’ rights and obligations are to 
prevent gharar and riba from becoming inherent to a construction 
contract, and what their obligations are to prevent gharar/riba from 
manifesting in their contract. One of the primary ways that this is to be 
done is by making parties perform their obligations and rights, which 
arise from the contract, in a manner consistent with good faith, and 
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that ambiguities or subjective requirements be interpreted in favour of 
the Contractor. This obligation and the maximum mandatory period of 
ten (10) years where the contract is of a commercial nature and two 
(2) years where it is of a civil nature to make a claim, coupled to the 
effect of the gharar and riba prohibitions, have a profound impact in 
ensuring contracts are balanced so the weaker party will not be 
exploited.    
This is followed by Section 1.4 – Methods applied to confirm the 
interpretation of the English translation of the UCC. This section 
establishes that the construction and interpretation of the UCC, as 
drafted by Mr. Whelan who translated the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
Civil Code, Federal Law #5 of 1985 in his book, UAE Civil Code and 
Ministry of Justice Commentary - 2010. London, UK: Thomson Reuters 
(Legal) Ltd are correct. 
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1.1.1 Primary Sources of Islamic Sharī’a 
This subsection demonstrates that fiqh is derived from the preordained 
Laws of Allah through his Prophet Mohammed (pbuh). Consequently, 
man cannot challenge it, and so it is mandatory that any agreement 
entered into by the parties abide by these Laws52.  
The two primary sources from which the doctrines of fiqh were 
developed are: (a) the Qur’an, which records the commands of Allah; 
and (b) the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh), which sets out 
rules/principles on which the Qur’an was silent or ambiguous, and so 
acts as a commentary where such circumstances arise53.  
This is illustrated by verse 64:12 of the Qur’an that commands Muslims 
“Obey God and his Prophet”54.  
Thus, the doctrines developed from these two primary sources are also 
immutable. The method applied to extend and develop the doctrines 
which make up fiqh is innovative reasoning (ijtihād), the exercising of 
one’s own judgement by a variety of mental processes to form a legal 
opinion55. The central ingredient of ijtihād is analogy (qiyās)56. 
                                      
52 Coulson, op cit., n. 7, pp. 9-12; Khaddura & Liebesny, op cit., n. 3 pp. 85-86; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 
1-4 and 91-102; Abd El-Wahab Ahmed El- Hassan (1985-1986), ‘Freedom of Contract, The Doctrine of 
Frustration, and Sanctity of Contracts in Sudan Law and Islamic Law’, Arab Law Quarterly (ALQ), pp. 51-
59; Crone, op cit., n. 2, p. 18-19; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, p. 75; Fyzee, op cit., n. 3, pp. 11-12; Schacht, op 
cit., n. 2, p. 112; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 23-24.   
53 Records the normative custom/living of the Prophet as illustrated by his beliefs, what he approved 
tacitly or implied by his conduct and teachings which established rules/principles in respect of what the 
Qur’an had not revealed or was silent on, or upon which the Qur’an was ambiguous, Liebesny, op cit., n. 
28, pp. 13-16; Mallat, C., A.O. (2007) Introduction to Middle Eastern Law, Oxford University Press, UK, p. 
33; Kamali, op cit., n. 3, pp. 58-63; Schacht, S., A.O. (1950, reprinted 1967), The Origins of Muhammadan 
Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 58-61; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, pp. 42-44; Vogel & 
Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 23-24. 
54 Kamali, op cit., n. 3, pp. 16-55; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 1-9; Abd El-Wahab Ahmed El- Hassan op cit., 
n. 52; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, p. 202; Hallaq, W. B., A.O. (1997 reprinted 2008) A History of Islamic Legal 
Theories, Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, pp. 3-7; Liebesny, op cit., n. 28, p. 12; Fyzee, op 
cit., n. 3, p. 1; Shimizu op cit., n. 11; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 11; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 
101-102. 
55 Ali-Karamali & Dunne, (1994) ‘The Ijtihad Controversy’ ALQ, pp. 238-257; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, pp. 59-
61 & 77; Khaddura & Liebesny, op cit., n. 3 p. 87; Fyzee states ijtihād literally means ‘…exerting oneself to 
the utmost degree to attain an object…’ whilst technically it means ‘…exerting oneself to form an opinion in 
a case or rule of law…’, Fyzee, op cit., n. 3, p. 23; Liebesny, op cit., n. 28, pp. 12-19; Shimizu, op cit., n. 
11, pp. 36-40.   
56 Qiyās – analogical reasoning or deduction is the main method to extend the law to deal with new 
situations that arise in known forms of contract and to new areas of the law or forms of contract - Kamali, 
op cit., n. 3, pp. 264-301; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 20-21; Fyzee, op cit., n. 3, p. 1; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, 
p. 40; Shimizu, op cit., n. 11, pp. 37-38. 
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In addition to these two primary sources is a third source, the 
consensus of the Muslim community57. The origin of this third source is 
the words of the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh), “My community will not 
agree on an error” taken to mean, ‘whatever my community agrees on 
is the truth’58. The form this third source takes is personal reasoning 
with acceptance of the reasoning by consensus. Its application is to 
ensure equity when the central ingredient to ijtihad, analogy might 
otherwise lead to a result not consistent with the rulings and principles 
set out in the two primary sources, thereby keeping the law 
consistent59.  
The commands contained in the two primary sources are a combination 
of moral and pastoral theology, ethics, spiritual aspirations, ritualistic 
and formal observances, public and private hygiene, courtesy and all 
aspects of the Law. Thus, the term Sharī’a reflects the ‘Whole Duty of 
Man’ who follows the Islamic religion60. Hence, the fundamental 
concepts of civilised society, compassion, equity, equality, 
incorruptibility, justice, good faith and the prohibition of usury61 form 
the doctrines of fiqh.  
There are approximately eighty texts of the Qur’an considered to deal 
strictly with the law of contract62. An example is the command that one 
is to fulfil one’s contracts63. This is on the proviso that the type of 
contract, the provisions that the parties agree to apply to their contract, 
                                      
57 This basis of this source of law derives from the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) words “My community will 
not agree on an error”. Hence, what the Community agrees is right and so can be interpreted as Law - 
Hurgronje, C.S. (A.O. 1898) Le Droit Musulman, Leroux, France, pp. 225-227; Liebesny, op cit., n. 28, pp. 
16-18; Kamali, op cit., n. 3, pp. 228-232; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 82-97; Khaddura & Liebesny, op cit., 
n. 3, pp. 95-96. 
58 Hurgronje, C.S. op cit., n. 44, pp. 225-227; Liebesny, op cit., n. 28, pp. 16-18. 
59 Kamali, op cit., n. 3, pp.28-260 & 323-350; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, p. 59; Khaddura & Liebesny, op cit., 
n. 3, p. 95-96. 
60 Khaddura & Liebesny, op cit., n. 3, p. 85; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 1-2; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, p. 11; 
Mallat, op cit., n. 48, p. 32; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 3 & pp. 11-12.  
61 Coulson, op cit., n. 3, pp. 11-12; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 11-13, 200-202; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, 
pp. 11-13 & 26 - Monetary gain by aleatory means is considered immoral in fiqh; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 
9, pp. 56-69. 
62 Khaddura & Liebesny, op cit., n. 3, p. 87; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, p. 12; Kamali states that only seventy 
texts can be considered as being in respect of commercial transactions, with 30 being in respect of justice, 
equality, evidence, rights and obligations, Kamali, op cit., n. 3, p. 27.  
63 Verse no. 5:1 of the Qur’an ‘...O you who believe! Fulfill your undertakings...’; verse no. 17:34 of Qur’an 
‘…and fulfil (every) pledge, for (every) agreement will be enquired into on the day of reckoning…’ 
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and so the obligations and rights that arise from the contract do not 
contravene the doctrines of fiqh64.  
Coupled to this are non-legal texts used to deduce laws such as the 
commands to arbitrate with justice, to give true evidence, not to offer 
bribes, and to give full weight and measure65. These texts illustrate the 
moral attitude of the Qur’an towards legal matters as demonstrated by 
the verses: 
 ‘...Surely they say, usury is like sale. But God has made sale 
lawful and usury unlawful...’ (Verses 2:276-277); and ‘...They 
will ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say, in both is great 
sin and advantage to men. But the sin of them is greater than 
the advantage...’ (Verse 2:219)66. 
In the eyes of Allah all men are equal as they believe in a common faith 
and goal to realise the will of Allah. Consequently, they shall act as 
‘brothers’, with property67 being seen as a form of usufruct68 which is to 
be circulated in order to benefit the community69.  
The ‘Sunnah70 of the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh)71’ records the 
normative custom/living tradition of the Prophet. These records 
illustrate what the Prophet Mohammed’s (pbuh) beliefs were, and what 
he approved tacitly or implied by his conduct and teachings. Thus, as 
stated, the Sunnah of the Prophet became an explanatory commentary 
on interpreting the meaning and effect of the verses in the Qur’an. 
                                      
64 Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 100-102; Coulson, op cit., n. 7, pp. 50-55; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, 
pp. 31-40; Abd El-Wahab Ahmed El- Hassan op cit., n. 52. 
65 Schacht, op cit., n. 2 pp. 11-12; Verses 4:135, 5:41-42, 6:152 and 16:90-91 of the Qur’an.  
66 Khaddura & Liebesny, op cit., n. 6, p. 88; Shimizu op cit., n. 11. 
67 Whelan op cit., n. 6, art. 101 - Property being defined into two categories: real property, property which 
is not movable whilst all other property is moveable property. 
68 The right of use and to take the profits derived from such use. 
69 Shimizu op cit., n. 11; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 2-3. 
70 Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 8-9 & 17-18 The term ‘Sunnah’ means normative custom, a record of tradition 
and precedents which bound each of the Arab tribes in what was customary rights which included matters 
such as inheritance, marriage, divorce, sale, hire, loan, guarantee etc; A Sunnah can be localised in its use 
and can be introduced to a community through that community submitting to the practices (and theories) 
of a person or a group of persons who have become that community’s leader (Imam) i.e. the Propjet 
Mohammed (pbuh); Liebesny, op cit., n. 289, p. 13; Kamali, op cit., n. 3. p. 58; Fyzee, op cit., n. 3, p. 18. 
71 The Prophet’s own ad-hoc legal decisions, deeds, utterances and unspoken approval - Rayner, op cit., n. 
2, p. 1; Saleh op cit., n. 2, p. 1; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, p. 17; Kamali, op cit., n. 3. p. 58; Mallat, op cit., n. 
53, p. 33. 
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An example of his teaching when asked, “What form of gain is best?” 
the Prophet replied, “A man’s work with his hands, and every 
legitimate sale”72. Such expression further reinforces the prohibition 
against unfair contractual relationships.   
In order to deduce, elaborate and extend on the Laws set out in the two 
primary sources, the process of innovative reasoning is applied. As 
previously stated, analogy is the primary method. Where analogy leads 
to a result not consistent with the principles set out in these two 
primary sources of law, then personal reasoning is applied. Such 
reasoning takes the form of discretionary opinions to exercise equity by 
juristic preference (istihsān73). Such preference takes two forms: 1) 
presumption of continuity (istishāb61), the aim of which is to keep the 
status quo where the present circumstance is fair; and 2) having regard 
or consideration for public interest (istișlāh74) to find a satisfactory 
solution75. In order to validate laws derived from juristic preference, the 
third source of consensus of the Muslim community is applied.  
The above exemplifies the belief that Islamic Sharī’a is divine in nature 
and cannot be challenged by man. The concepts of this Holy Law 
enforce equity, equality, incorruptibility, justice, good faith and 
prohibits usury. Usury in fiqh has a wide meaning as its aim is to 
prevent any form of exploitation. A fundamental concept is the 
circulation of wealth for the benefit of the community. Thus, any form 
of excess gain goes against this concept.  
 
 
                                      
72 Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, p. 60, this teaching is to be considered with verses 4:160 of the Qur’an 
‘…because of their turning away from the path of God and their taking of usury when they were forbidden 
it, and of their devouring people’s wealth by false pretences…’ Thus, gain from a transaction shall be honest 
and not from an unfair advantage, allowing gain for which nothing was done in return. 
73 A doctrine of the Hanifa School - Coulson, op cit., n. 3, p. 91-93; Schacht, op cit, n. 6, pp. 60-62; 
Kamali, op cit., n. 3.  - Kamali refers to istihsān as equity in Islamic law pp. 323-350 - and istishāb as 
presumption of continuity, Kamali, pp. 384-396; Shimizu op cit., n. 11, pp. 29-42.  
74 A doctrine of the Māliki School - Schacht, op. cit. n. 6, pp. 60-61; Coulson, op. cit., n. 3, p. 60; Kamali, 
op cit., n. 3 pp. 351-367; Shimizu op cit., n. 11, pp. 29-42. 
75 These terms signified a breach of strict analogy on the grounds of public interest, convenience or similar 
consideration - Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 37 & 61; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, pp. 91-93.  
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1.1.2 Gharar and Riba 
This subsection analyses the definition of the gharar and riba 
prohibitions as determined by Jurists. It provides the basis for the 
author’s proposed definitions for these prohibitions and their application 
in the present day construction environment and demonstrates that: 
1. Jurists consider gharar as the root cause for a dispute to arise in a 
contract. The reason is that lack of control of an obligation leads to 
the anticipated profit not materialising for one of the party’s76, i.e. 
the countervalue paid does not correspond to the value of the 
work done, thereby allowing unfair gain. This in turn leads to one 
party’s regret that he entered into the contract and therefore 
claims for the losses suffered77. Hence, the method to determine if 
gharar is present in a contract is to see whether a dispute arises78;  
2. The criteria applied by Jurists to determine if gharar is intrinsic to 
a construction contract, and the ways it can manifest itself;  
3. Riba is a result of the inequality of a contract. The form of the 
inequality is that the first party to a contract has an advantage 
over the second party. This allows the first party to exploit the 
second party in order that the first party can increase its 
profitability in an unfair/immoral way, in that the second party 
receives an inadequate return for providing a service/goods;  
4. In order to minimise or prevent gharar, and to prevent riba being 
intrinsic to a construction contract, a complete design is required 
in the form of a full description, design drawings (structurally, 
environmentally and aesthetically), specifications and quantities of 
work, as these attributes allow the mode of performance to be 
identified, the period of delivery and countervalue;  
5. The proposed definitions provided by the author in the preamble 
are accurate, in that the aim of the prohibitions are to ensure that 
                                      
76 Whelan op cit., n. 6 Art. 203 – commentary; Ibn Rushd op cit., n. 5, p.179. 
77 Imam Maliki, op cit., n. 6, Book 31; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 24.  
78 Whelan op cit., n. 6, art. 203 – commentary. 
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the Contractor has control of his obligations to allow the structure 
to come into existence in the future by the agreed delivery date, 
and that the Contractor achieves the anticipated benefit (profit);  
6. By applying the proposed definitions of the gharar and riba 
prohibitions to the obligations and rights that arise from a 
construction contract, the parties can properly assess what their 
obligations are to avoid contravening these prohibitions. This 
ensures a primary obligation of fiqh, the circulation of wealth as 
per the obligation placed on the contracting parties by article 3, 
UCC. 
Pious Jurists who formed the schools of Islamic Jurisprudence79 during 
the sixth and seventh centuries AD developed the doctrines of fiqh from 
the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. A consequence of the rigour 
of the pious Jurists is that fiqh applies strict ethical and moral norms in 
the formation and performance of both civil and commercial 
transactions80. The consequence of this is the gharar and riba 
prohibitions. 
Gharar 
Imam Maliki81 and Ibn Taymiyyah’s82characterisation of a gharar sale is 
a sale where one party obtains something while the other is at ‘risk’, 
causing regret83. For this reason, Jurists consider gharar as the root 
cause for a dispute to arise in a contract, and so why a transaction in 
which gharar is present is prohibited84. 
                                      
79 Khadduri & Liebesny, op cit., n. 3, pp. 58-84; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 57-68; Liebesny, op cit., n. 28, 
pp. 21-22; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, pp. 36-52 & 62-71; Shimizu op cit., n. 11, p. 28. 
80 Ibn Rushd, op cit., n. 5, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer Vol I & II, Bidāyat al-Mujitahid wa Nihāyat al-
Muqtasid being an example of the body of law which resulted from such theory; Imam Malik Al-Muwatta 
being another; Mallat, op cit., n. 53, pp. 40-61. 
81 Mālik ibn Anas ibn Mālik ibn Abī 'Āmir al-Asbahī (711 – 795 CE) also known as "Imam Malik," the 
"Sheikh of Islam", the "Proof of the Community," and author of Al-Muwatta, "The Approved," which was 
said to have been regarded by Shafi'i to be the soundest book on Earth after the Qur'an. 
821263–1328, full name, Taqī ad-Dīn Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm ibn ʿAbd as-Salām Ibn 
Taymiyyah al-Ḥarrānī, renowned scholar of the Ḥanbalī School. 
83 Sami al-Suwailem, “Towards an objective measure of gharar in exchange”, (Oct 1999 & Apr 2000), 
Islamic Economic Studies, Vol. 7(1 & 2), pp. 64-66; Imam Maliki, op cit., n. 6, Book 31; Comair-Obeid, op 
cit., n. 2, p. 24. 
84 Ibn Rushd, op cit., n. 5, p. 179; Sami al-Suwailem, op. cit., n. 83, pp. 65-66; Imam Maliki, op cit., n. 6, 
Book 31. 
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Thus, based on this characterisation, the criteria used by Jurists to 
determine if gharar is intrinsic to a contract is whether a dispute arises. 
If it does, then gharar is present85. 
Jurists determined that gharar was intrinsic to a contract where the 
contracting parties failed to identify fully the:  
1) Subject matter of the contract;  
2) Characteristics as to the price, i.e. quantity, quality or the period 
for delivery;  
3) Possible causes for the subject matter not coming into existence, 
including obstacles to delivery;  
4) Certainty to the continued existence of the subject matter – (the 
modernised interpretation is, will the structure perform as 
expected); and  
5) A combination of any of these attributes86.   
Where there is failure to determine fully any of the elements described 
in 1) to 3) above, then there is a lack of control of the obligations as to 
how the subject matter will come into existence by the agreed delivery 
date87.  
Consequently, the basis upon which the legal relationship was created 
between the parties was that of speculation/uncertainty. Such 
circumstance in the eyes of the Jurist is analogous to maysir (Arabic for 
gambling)88.  
This allows an unfair gain to manifest in two ways. Either the 
Contractor has to provide:  
                                      
85 Whelan op cit., n. 6 art. 203 commentary; Imam Malik op cit., n. 6 Book 31; Sami al-Suwailem, op. cit., 
n. 83, pp. 65-66. 
86 Ibn Rushd, op cit., n. 5, p. 179; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 58; Dr. Sanhory, ‘Abd al-Razzaq the 
author of the Egyptian Civil Code promulgated in 1947, author of the Masadir al-haqq, Vol. III, pp. 31-42 - 
Saleh, op cit., n. 2, pp. 52 & 54; Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Qiyās fī ash-Shar‘ al-Islāmī, pp. 26–27; Translation 
from Mahdi Zahraa & S.M. Mahmor (eds.), “Validity of Contracts when the Goods are not yet in Existence in 
the Islamic Law of Sale of Goods”, (2002) Arab Law Quarterly (ALQ), p. 388; Mahmoud A. El-Gamal 
(2001), An Economic Explication of the Prohibition in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence, 4th International 
Conference on Islamic Economics, Leicester, UK, pp. 1-5. 
87 Coulson, op. cit., n. 7, pp. 20 & 44. 
88 Rayner states there is an immoral inducement provided by false hopes in the parties’ minds that they 
will profit unduly from the contract, Rayner, op cit., n. 2, p. 291; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, p. 89; Saleh 
op cit., n. 2, p. 49. 
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1) Additional services and/or goods necessary for the subject matter 
to come into existence over and above that priced; and 
2) Goods and/or services for the subject matter to come into 
existence are a higher quality than that allowed for in the price. 
This is why the gharar prohibition is repugnant to fiqh as the Jurists 
considered this unfair gain as unethical/immoral89.  
Hence, for a valid construction contract to come into existence in UAE 
Law, the services/goods provided must be equivalent to the 
countervalue paid.  
Although the unfair gain can take two (2) forms, gharar can manifest in 
a construction contract in the following ways.  
The first is where the Employer’s design data is deficient. The second is 
the Employer delaying performance of the Contractor. The third is an 
intervening contingency beyond the control of both the Employer and 
the Contractor. 
Since the time for delivery establishes the Contractor’s monthly site 
administrative and head office costs, any delay in delivery will cause 
the Contractor additional costs. If the loss suffered is significant the 
Contractor will claim for the additional cost and time. If unrecoverable, 
these losses translate into an unfair gain for the Employer.  
Modern examples of the application of these principles are as follows: 
A contract made the Contractor responsible for any additional expense 
that might arise from ground conditions not being as anticipated. The 
ground conditions were different, causing the Contractor to suffer 
additional expense. The decision reached by the Diwan al-Mazalim 
Court90 was that the Contractor was entitled to total compensation for 
the financial harm suffered, due to the lack of knowledge as to the 
ground conditions.  
                                      
89 Ballantyne  op cit., 49 - see page 325; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 58. 
90 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Decision of 6/2/1398 AH (17th January 1978), MAFQ 11, 1992. 
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Similar circumstance was put into context in EW Law in the case of 
Mitsui Construction Co Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong (1986) 33 
BLR, 1 by the Privy Council:  
“…Against this background of facts, if the contract documents 
were understood in the sense contended for by the Government, 
engineering contractors tendering for the work would have two 
options. They could gamble on encountering more or less 
favourable ground conditions or they could anticipate the worst 
case and price their tenders accordingly. It is clear from what 
happened here that the worst case might double or more than 
double the time required to do the work with consequent 
increase in time related costs. On this basis tenderers gambling 
on favourable ground conditions would risk a large loss, while 
conversely, if all tenderers anticipated the worst case, but in the 
event reasonable conditions were encountered, the Government 
would be the losers. It follows that, if the Government are right, 
there is a large element of wagering inherent in this contract. It 
seems to their Lordships somewhat improbable that a 
responsible public authority on one hand and responsible 
engineering contractors on the other, contracting for the 
execution of public works worth many millions of dollars, should 
deliberately embark on a substantial gamble…”    
Thus, even in EW Law a contract should not involve gambling if a 
dispute is to be avoided. 
In another example before an ICC arbitration in Saudi Arabia, a 
Subcontractor made a claim for losses because of gharar in the design. 
The Subcontractor, to address the gharar, had to do more work to 
discharge its obligations under the subcontract. Thus, the Subcontractor 
suffered financial harm due to the contract being unbalanced91. 
 
 
                                      
91 Comair-Obeid op cit., n.2 p. 202. 
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Riba 
Riba (literal meaning ‘excess’ or ‘increase’)92 is associated with usury 
but has a wider definition. Such definitions include: 1) any unjustified 
increase of capital for which no compensation is given, with such gain 
materialising in a usurious manner due to a right one party has over 
the other in the contract93; 2) enrichment without justification94; 3) 
receiving monetary advantage without giving a countervalue95; and 4) 
profiteering of all kinds96 .  
The point of these definitions is that party A, can by whatever means, 
gain an unjustified increase or enrichment without compensating party 
B for such increase. For party A to do this it must have some advantage 
over party B which allows party A to exploit party B in order to gain 
something for nothing97, thereby increasing the profitability of the 
transaction in favour of party A.   
The aim of the riba prohibition is to control the illegality of all forms of 
gain (profit) resulting from an unbalanced contract98. In a contract of 
mutual obligations this occurs when a party’s position can be exploited 
because it does not have control of its own rights and obligations.  
Such circumstance arises where party A can: 1) release itself from 
liability towards the other party; and/or 2) where party A can control 
party B’s rights where party A itself is in breach of contract; or 3) 
decide the quality and quantity of work to be done. In either 
                                      
92 Schacht, op cit, n. 2, p. 145; Saleh, op cit., n. 2, p. 13; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, p. 82; Hammond 
op cit., n. 2 p. 263; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 43-44; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 267-289 & pp. 255-
256 illustrates the difference between unfair exploitation and riba, the former being the countervalue 
received is grossly inadequate, whilst the latter countervalue is inadequate as a result of lack of equality in 
quantity, quality, delivery, mode of performance.    
93 Rayner op cit., n. 2, p. 268; Comair-Obeid op cit., n.2 pp. 44-45. 
94 Vogel & Samuel, op cit., n. 9, p. 45, p. 58 & pp. 62-62; Ibn Rushd, op cit., n. 5, p. 230; Comair-Obeid, 
op cit., n. 2, p. 12 & pp. 15-18.  
95 Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 145-146.  
96 Rayner op cit., n. 2, p. 278 - has defined riba as profiteering of all kinds. 
97 Coulson, op cit., n. 3, p. 87; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 58; Saleh, op cit., n. 2, p. 13; Islamic 
Jurists, by analogy, have applied the riba rules to equality in quantity, quality and delivery so an ‘increase’ 
in these attributes for which no payment is received is undue profit made by illegitimate trade as the 
Contractor has to discharge its obligations under the Contract to avoid damages being deducted by an 
Employer, which if the Employer does apply damages results in commercial exploitation; Rayner, op cit., n. 
2, p. 278; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 77-83.   
98 Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 144-146; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 17-18 & pp. 53-54 & p. 64; 
Coulson, op cit., n. 7, pp. 20 & 44-45; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 97-100; Saleh, op cit., n. 2, pp. 61-
65. 
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circumstance, party B has lost control as to how an obligation or right 
applies. This allows party A to be able to exploit party B’s position, 
causing the countervalue to be unbalanced. Moreover, in the second 
and third instance it allows gharar to infect the legality of the contract 
as it causes speculation as to how party A will exercise its discretion to 
decide party B’s rights. 
In order not to contravene the riba prohibition there is a strict 
obligation that, where possible, every obligation/right must be precisely 
determined or measured99.  
Consequences of these prohibitions  
A consequence of these prohibitions is that there is a presumption in 
fiqh that each party to a contract will gain an equivalent benefit, i.e. the 
price paid corresponds to the true value of the thing bought and so the 
anticipated profit from a transaction will be made100. Put simply, one 
party will not gain an excessive profit at the expense of the other party. 
To ensure this equal profit, obligations and rights have to be fairly 
balanced to ensure that neither party can exploit the other. This is 
achieved through certainty of the obligations that derive from the 
contract.  
Any increase in profit gained through speculation is considered unfair in 
fiqh, whilst profit gained in an opportunistic manner is illicit and 
considered as riba101. Thus, any transaction that results in unfair gain 
can be declared void in UAE Law102. 
In order to enforce this ethical control, Jurists implemented a nominate 
contract system103 to control rights and obligations which arise from a 
                                      
99 Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 144-146; Hammond op cit., n. 2 p. 263; Coulson, op cit., n. 7, pp. 20 & 44-
45; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 77-79; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 17-18 & pp. 53-54; Saleh, op 
cit., n. 2, p. 61-65. 
100Saleh, op cit., n. 2, p. 61-65; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 17-18 & pp. 53-54 & p. 64; Hammond op 
cit., n. 2 p. 263.   
101 This requirement has been traced to the Quranic verses 2:275 ‘...God has permitted selling and 
forbidden usury...’, 30:39 ‘...That which ye lay out for increase through property of [other] people will have 
no increase with God....’ and 4:161 ‘...That they [the Jews] took usury though they are forbidden; and they 
devoured men’s substance wrongfully.  
102 Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 43-45 & 58; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, p. 146; Hammond, op cit., n. 2, p. 
263. 
103 Vogel & Hayes op cit., n. 9, p. 97; Rayner op cit., n. 2, p. 86.  
Page 53 of 273 
 
contract. Where the contract is for a thing that comes into existence in 
the future, this obligates the parties to satisfy specific requirements at 
contract formation otherwise the contract will be void104. The parties to 
the contract are required to determine precisely the obligations that 
arise from the contract to prevent the presence of gharar and riba.  
These are:  
1) The subject matter must be precisely described; and  
2) Goods and services required are to be measured precisely, and 
quality punctiliously described.  
This in turn allows precision in the mode of performance and so the 
period for delivery to be accurately determined, along with a true 
countervalue.  
Compliance with 1) and 2) ensures that the subject matter will come 
into existence, and its existence will continue as there should be no 
latent defects.   
In a construction contract it is clear that for a Contractor to assess 
properly his obligations for performance and to be able to control them, 
the technical requirements need to be clearly determined, whilst legal 
requirements of the contract have to operate to remove gharar.   
The technical requirements of a construction contract which need to be 
satisfied are that the data consists of a comprehensive design 
(structurally, environmentally and aesthetically), inclusive of quality 
(specifications, details of quality of goods and standards of 
workmanship), and quantity of work to be executed. This in turn allows 
the Contractor to identify the resources and mode of performance to 
build the structure within the agreed period for delivery, and calculate 
an accurate countervalue.  
The problem that manifests here is if gharar is intrinsic to the contract 
caused by a deficient design, an unfair gain can occur in the type of 
                                      
104 Coulson, op cit., n. 7, pp. 20 & 44-45; Saleh, op cit., n. 2, p. 61-65; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 
17-18 & pp. 53-54 & p. 64; Hammond op cit., n. 2 p. 263.  
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additional work of whatever form, along with delays to delivery. This 
results in the Contractor not making the anticipated profit.  
This imposes a legal requirement, that the interpretation and 
application of the contract provisions be consistent with the aim of the 
gharar prohibition, by correcting any data deficiencies in order to create 
certainty as to design, quality, quantity, mode of performance and 
delivery. This in turn ensures the circulation of wealth, a primary aim of 
fiqh as illustrated by the requirements of article 3, UCC, otherwise riba 
will be present. 
Consequently, no provision can interfere with the balance of the 
contract. Therefore, party agreed contract provisions should not 
include, for example, a clause that releases a party from liability 
towards the other, or gives one party discretionary powers over the 
other, as such a clause can be applied in an opportunistic manner. Such 
clauses in fiqh are aleatory - as profitability depends on how the 
Employer operates the clause. Examples of these provisions in a 
construction contract are where the clause: 
1) Obligates the Contractor to notify the Employer of an Employer’s 
act that caused gharar to infect the contract, but which also  
operates as an exemption of liability clause where the Contractor 
fails to issue the notice in the specified timeframe105;  
2) Limits the grounds that a Contractor can require additional time to 
deliver, e.g. the Contractor can only ask for additional time to 
deliver where more work is ordered. A clause of this type operates 
as an exclusion or exemption of liability clause, as the Employer 
can argue that the Contractor agreed to be responsible for any 
other event that caused a delay to delivery106; and  
                                      
105 Sub-Clause 20.1 FIDIC99 - obligates the Contractor to notify the Employer of an Employer’s act which 
delays delivery, within a strict timeframe, say 28 days; Lord Wilberforce gave the following description to a 
provision which he considered a time bar clause which was in fact an excluded liability clause “…I treat the 
words ‘exceptions clause’ as covering broadly such clauses as profess to exclude or limit, either 
quantitatively or as to the time within which action must be taken, the right of the injured party to bring an 
action for damages…” Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen 
Centrale [1967] 1 A.C. 361.  
106 See Holmes v Guppy (1838) 3 M. & W. 387; Peak Construction (Liverpool) v McKinney Foundations Ltd 
(1970) 1 B.L.R. 114 Salman L.J. stated “…the liquidated damages and extension of time clauses in printed 
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3) Grants the Employer discretionary powers that can be operated in 
an opportunistic manner by deciding the: 1) compensation due 
where the Employer has delayed the Contractor’s performance 
allowing riba to infect the contract107; and 2) quality and quantity 
of work. These two points in turn allows gharar to infect the 
legality of the provision as the Contractor can only speculate as to 
how the Employer will operate these provisions. 
These provisions violate the ethical control of a legal transaction as 
determined by the gharar and riba prohibitions108.  
The author’s proposed definitions of gharar and riba for construction 
contracts provides parties with purposeful and objective criteria to 
evaluate whether gharar and/or riba will become intrinsic to the 
contract during the formation and the administration of the contract. 
This in turn should assist in preventing a dispute arising. If the parties, 
through their contract negotiations fail to prevent gharar and/or riba 
becoming intrinsic to their contract, the contract will be classified as 
void. If the contract provisions provide a mechanism to remove gharar 
then the contract will be or defective provided gharar is removed109.  
For clarification a contract is: 
1) Valid when all the essential elements for an enforceable contract 
to come into existence has been satisfied110;  
2) Void when none or only part of the essential elements required for 
a contract to come into existence have been satisfied111; and  
                                                                                                                   
forms of contract must be considered strictly contra proferentem. If the employer wishes to recover 
liquidated damages for failure by the contractor to complete on time, in spite pf the fact that some of the 
delay is due to the employer’s own fault or breach of contract, then the extension of time clause should 
provide, expressly or by necessary inference for an extension on account of such fault or breach on the part 
of the employer...” 
107 An example is Sub-Clause 3.5 FIDIC99. 
108 Schacht, op cit., n. 2, p. 144; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 31-31, 37-40; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, pp. 
37-39; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 91-95; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 98-102. Nabil, S. “Definition and 
formation of contract under Islamic and Arab Laws” ALQ (1990) pp. 101-116.  
109 Schacht, op cit., n. 2, p. 12; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 17-31; Shimizu op cit., n. 11; Coulson, op 
cit., n. 7, pp. 20 & 42-45; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 68-69; Abd El-Wahab Ahmed El- Hassan, op cit., 
n. 52; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 91-100 & p. 287.  
110 Coulson, op cit., n. 7, pp. 20 & 42-45. 
111Coulson, op cit., n. 7, pp. 20 & 42-45.  
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3) Defective when, although prima facie all such essential elements 
have been satisfied, there is a defect which becomes apparent 
during the contract execution, in that one or a combination of the 
essential elements are wanting and needs to be corrected to allow 
the contract to be enforceable112. If the defect(s) cannot be 
removed then the contract becomes void.  
In order for parties to a construction contract to avoid the contract 
being void or defective, the modernised definitions proposed above 
could be applied at each of the following stages when interpreting the 
relevant articles of the UCC: 
1) During the formation of their contract;  
2) During the life cycle of the contract; and  
3) When parties interpret and apply the provisions they have agreed 
in the contract. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
112 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, Art. 210; Coulson op cit., n. 7,  pp. 42-43; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 147-159; 
Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, p. 42.  
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1.1.3 Gharar, riba and the morals they enforce put into context with 
EW Law  
As demonstrated in the above subsection, the objective of the gharar 
and riba prohibitions, even when applying the modernised definitions as 
proposed by the author, is to ensure parties to a contract act in a moral 
and ethical manner when forming their contract and during the 
performance of the contract. This, as illustrated, is particularly 
important where one party has a discretion that controls the other 
party’s rights.  
This subsection demonstrates there are similarities in UAE Law between 
the effect of these prohibitions and the concepts in EW Law of: 1) An 
unconscionable bargain; and 2) unjust enrichment. 
Unconscionable bargain 
An unconscionable bargain arises in EW Law where a party enters into a 
contract without independent advice, and the terms of the contract are 
very unfair or there is a transfer of property for a consideration that is 
grossly inadequate. This arises where a party’s bargaining power is 
grievously impaired by reason of his own needs, desires, or by 
ignorance, with undue influence brought to bear on him, by, or for the 
benefit of the other party113. Consequently, one party has an unfair 
advantage that can be exploited in an opportunistic or morally culpable 
manner causing the transaction to be oppressive114. 
The factors that result in an unconscionable bargain115 arising in EW 
Law have been defined as: 1) where a party is seriously disadvantaged 
through poverty/ignorance or lack of independent advice, allowing an 
unfair advantage to be taken116; 2) the weaker party has been 
                                      
113 Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326. 
114 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd and others v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 87. 
115 McKendrick , op cit., n. 23, pp. 816 – 819; Peel, op cit., n. 18, pp. 463-468; Capper, D., (1998) Undue 
influence and unconscionability: a rationalisation L.Q.R.  
116 Op cit., n. 110, Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd; Creswell v Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy 
[1975] Q.B. 326. 
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exploited in a morally culpable manner117; and 3) the transaction has 
become overreaching and oppressive118.  
It has also been stated that: 1) a bargain cannot be unconscionable 
unless one party imposes the objectionable terms in a morally 
reprehensible manner that effects the conscience of such party119; and 
2) it is against justice and good conscience for the stronger party to 
retain the benefit of the transaction120. Such morally culpable and 
reprehensive manner includes usury121.   
The doctrine of an unconscionable bargain is subject to certain 
restrictions in EW Law. ‘Ignorance’ or lack of knowledge should be 
taken in the context as to the party’s experience in the type of 
transaction entered into122. The stronger party must be characterised 
by some moral culpability or impropriety such as actual or constructive 
fraud123. The terms imposed by a party are objectionable in a morally 
reprehensible manner in a way that affects that party’s conscience124. 
Whilst inequality of bargaining power does not of itself make the 
transaction unconscionable125.  
The gharar prohibition in UAE Law is to prevent an unfair gain due to 
speculation that can become oppressive if there is no corresponding 
benefit, i.e. the Contractor contributes from his anticipated profit to the 
cost of building the structure. However, since the gharar prohibition is 
developed from laws preordained by Allah, there are no restrictions 
attached to its operation. For the prohibition to be enforced all that has 
to be demonstrated is that the basis upon which the legal relationship 
was created between the parties was speculative and so aleatory, 
allowing an unfair gain in whatever form.  
                                      
117 Op cit., n. 114, Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. 
118 Op cit., n. 114, Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. 
119 Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden [1979] Ch.84. 
120 Op cit., n. 114, Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. 
121 Fry v Lane (1888) 40 CH D 312. 
122 Creswell v Potter unreported 1968, see Ross-Martyn [1972] 121 N.L.J. 1159 to 1160. 
123 Boustany v Pigott [1993] N.P.C. 75. It is not enough to prove that a bargain is harsh, unreasonable or 
foolish. 
124 Op cit., n. 114, Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. 
125 Horry v Tate & Lyle Refineries Ltd [1982] 2 Lloyds Rep. 417; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] Q.B. 
326; CNT Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallagher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER714.  
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Both the principles of an unconscionable bargain and gharar illustrate 
the similar moral objectives of preventing an unfair gain from a contract 
due to ignorance, or a lack of knowledge as to the obligations required 
to perform the contract. 
Unjust enrichment 
Unjust enrichment126 arises in EW Law where party A gains a benefit 
from party B, where party B did something for the benefit of party A in 
anticipation of entering into a contract with party A. The contract does 
not materialise so party B is out of pocket. Such circumstance is riba in 
UAE Law. 
EW Law has acknowledged that in a construction contract there is scope 
for an Employer to allow a Contractor to do work without a written 
instruction and then insist that such work was part of the contract127. 
Although this can be argued to be fraud, the behaviour is 
unconscionable, making the gain obtained by the Employer a form of 
unjust enrichment128.  
UAE Law recognises riba can manifest where a contract exists between 
the parties129. This arises where party B cedes certain rights to party A 
thereby losing control over an obligation/right. Thus, party A has the 
ability to exploit party B to gain an unfair/illicit monetary advantage as 
party B receives nothing in exchange, i.e. party A increases its profit at 
the expense of party B, despite party A having no right to do so.  
The way this occurs where a contract exists is: 
1. Party A commits a breach causing financial harm to party B. 
However, party A has the right to release himself from liability 
towards party B by operation of an exclusion/exemption of liability 
clause;  
                                      
126 Lipman Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548; McDonald v Coys of Kensington (Sales) Ltd [2004] EWCA 
Civ 47; Craven-Ellis v Cannons Ltd [1936] 2 KB 403. 
127 Molloy v Liebe (1910) 110 LT 616; Hill v South Staffordshire Railway co (1865) 12 L.T. 63. 
128 Atkins Chambers Ltd op cit., n. 19, pp. 831-832.  
129 Imam Maliki, op cit., n. 6, Book 31; Ibn Rushd op cit., n. 5, pp. 230-231. 
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2. Party A commits a breach causing financial harm to party B. 
However, party A has the right to either limit or release himself 
from liability towards party B by operation of a discretion. This 
allows party A to decide the level of compensation party B has a 
right to be paid for party A’s breach. This is despite party B 
anticipating that party A will operate such provision in an even-
handed manner towards party B by compensating party B fairly; 
and/or 
3. Party A can control the quantity and quality of work to be done by 
party B. 
As these provisions give party A the right to decide what party B’s 
rights and obligations are, party B has no control over its rights for 
compensation where such right exists. This in turn allows party A to act 
in an opportunistic or unconscionable manner by exploiting party B’s 
position. Hence, party A can increase its profitability unfairly, as there is 
inequality in the operation of the contract. This results in a morally 
reprehensible outcome, as the amount paid by party A for the 
goods/services provided is grossly inadequate, to the extent that party 
B is subsidizing the cost of providing such goods/services.  
To put this into the context of a construction contract, the Employer 
knowingly pressurises the Contractor into an agreement that allows the 
Employer to be released from compensating the Contractor130. This is 
often found in two provisions in such contracts that allows the Employer 
to act in such an opportunistic manner131:  
1) A notice provision which acts as an exclusion of liability clause 
through time barring; and  
2) Provisions that give the right to the Employer to decide the 
Contractor’s level of compensation for a breach committed by the 
Employer, or whether additional/extra work has been done of any 
form or kind.  
                                      
130 Op cit., n 127 - Molloy v Liebe (1910) 110 LT 616; Hill v South Staffordshire Railway co (1865) 12 L.T. 
63. 
131 McKendrick, op cit., n. 23, pp. 816 – 819.   
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Again, as the riba prohibition is developed from laws preordained by 
Allah there are no restrictions attached to its operation. All that is 
needed for this prohibition to be enforced is that it can be demonstrated 
that the principles which form the basis of the riba prohibition have 
been violated, i.e. party A has acted in an opportunistic manner to 
exploit party B, the weaker party, thereby allowing party A to increase 
its profitability unfairly. 
EW Law is committed to freedom of contract limiting its ability to 
intervene to redress the balance of obligations where the parties have 
agreed the terms of their transaction132.  
Thus, unless some principle as determined by the EW Courts, such as 
operating a provision in an unconscionable manner or the rules against 
penalties/forfeiture or the mandatory requirements of the UCTA 1977 
have been contravened, then there is unlikely to be any redress for the 
disadvantaged party.  
This illustrates that EW Law is created by the Courts from the 
provisions the parties agree to apply to their contract. The aim of fiqh is 
to ensure ethical control of transactions, to prevent such illicit gain by 
minimising speculation and the control of discretionary clauses which 
can be applied in an opportunistic manner.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
132 McKendrick, op cit., n. 24, p. 793. 
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1.1.4 Incorporation of the Gharar and Riba prohibitions into the UCC 
This subsection demonstrates that: 
1) The gharar and riba prohibitions have been incorporated into the 
UCC;  
2) A nominate contract system has been incorporated into the UCC 
through the specific articles that apply to a construction contract;  
3) The aim of incorporating these prohibitions and the nominate 
contract system is to prevent speculation and unbalanced 
contracts; and 
4) There is a fundamental difference between EW and UAE Law in 
that, as the gharar and riba prohibitions have been incorporated 
into the UCC, autonomy of contract is restricted to ensure equity 
in commercial transactions to ensure circulation of wealth. 
The starting point for this is the UAE Constitution. Article 7 of the UAE 
Constitution states that Islamic Sharī’a will be the main source of 
legislation.  
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Figure 5 below illustrates how fiqh is incorporated into the UAE 
legislation. 
Figure 5 – Hierarchy of Legislation in the UAE 
      
  
The Qur'an and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet, 
Sources of Islamic 
Sharī'a   
  
 
  
  
Laws devolved from 
these sources by Is-
lamic Jurists (fiqh) - 
Fiqh is the supplemen-
tary source of Law re-
ferred to in Article 1 of 
the UCC   
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  The UAE Civil Code    
      
 
As recorded, the primary legislation that regulates construction 
contracts in the UAE is the UCC. The reason is that this legislation deals 
with offer and acceptance; validity and effect of the contract; essence 
and circumstance for a valid contract; the subject matter of a valid 
contract, the type of contractual provisions which may be agreed; the 
effect of fraud and mistake; interpretation of agreements; the right to 
withdraw; remedies for breach and general questions of contract law133.  
                                       
133 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, Preface p. 6. 
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The Law of Commercial Transactions134 (LCT) applies where the 
construction contract is of a commercial nature. However, its 
application is limited as there are no articles that are specific to a 
construction contract135 other than obligating the parties to abide by 
their agreements136. This is on the proviso that the agreement does not 
conflict with public order or morals137 of the UAE, i.e. fiqh.  
To understand how the gharar/riba prohibitions are incorporated into 
the UCC, an examination of articles 1 and 2 of the UCC is required. 
Article 1 of the UCC provides that:  
‘…The legislative provisions shall apply to all matters dealt with 
by those provisions in the letter and in the spirit. There shall be 
no scope for innovative reasoning (ijtihād) in the case of 
provisions of definitive import. If the judge finds no provision in 
this Law, he must pass judgement according to Islamic Sharī’a. 
Provided that he must have regard to the choice of the most 
appropriate solution from the schools of Imam Malik138 or Imam 
Ahmad bin Hanbal139, and if none are found there, then from the 
schools of Imam al-Shafici140 and Imam Abu Hanifa141 as dictated 
by expediency…’ 
Whilst article 2 provides: 
 ‘...The rules and principles of Islamic jurisprudence shall be the 
point of reference in the understanding, construction and 
interpretation of these provisions...’ [the articles of the Law as 
set out in the UCC]. 
                                      
134 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, Preface, p. 6. 
135 Grose. M., A.O. (2002), Construction Contracts and Disputes in the United Arab Emirates; Michael 
Grose, Dubai, UAE, pp. 12-13; LCT. 
136 LCT, Art. 2(1). 
137 LCT, Art. 2(3). 
138 Op cit., n. 81. 
139 Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Hanbal Abu `Abd Allah al-Shaybani (780–855 CE) also referred to as 
"Sheikh ul-Islam founder of the Hanbali school of Islamic Jurisprudence. 
140 Abū ʿAbdullāh Muhammad Ibn Idrīs al-Shafiʿī (767-820 CE) a student of Imam Māliki and founder of 
the Shafi'i school of Islamic Jurisprudence and is considered the founder of Islamic Jurisprudence.  
141 Actual name Nuʿmān ibn Thābit ibn Zūṭā ibn Marzubān better known as Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, (699 — 767 
CE) founder of the Hanafi school of Islamic Jurisprudence. 
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Article 1 requires, where the articles of the law are of definitive import 
[express is the word herein used when describing if an article is of 
definitive import] in their requirement, then they will be applied without 
deviation. Conversely, where an article can be interpreted in more than 
one-way, dependent on the circumstances, then the spirit or essence of 
the aim of the article has to be complied with. When there is no article 
that addresses a matter, then reference is made to the doctrines of fiqh 
to find a solution. Article 2 provides that the rules and principles of fiqh 
are the point of reference in the understanding, construction and 
interpretation of the articles of the UCC.  
These articles demonstrate that there are two sources of Law to be 
found in the UCC, ‘Official’ and ‘Supplementary’142. ‘Official’ is the 
articles of the UCC. ‘Supplementary’, as illustrated by article 2, are the 
historical laws and the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, i.e. the 
doctrines of fiqh that provide guidance as to how the text of the 
‘Official’ articles are to be construed and interpreted143.   
The ‘Official’ articles of the UCC are divided into two: 1) articles of the 
UCC that are express in their requirements144 and so are not subject to 
ijtihad145; and 2) articles that are subject to ijtihad as these articles are 
those that are of a general nature and so can be applied to any type of 
transaction146.  
The ‘Official’ articles are where the requirement of the Law is concise in 
its content as to the rule or doctrine to be applied expressly. By 
application of article 2, fiqh is the supplementary Law that is to be the 
point of reference in understanding the construction and interpretation 
of such article(s); and where the text of the law is open to ijtihad, again 
by application of article 2, fiqh will be the point of reference. Where 
there is no article, then the most suitable interpretation/doctrine will be 
                                      
142 Al-Muhairi Butti Sultan Butti Ali (1996), ‘The Position of Shari’a within the UAE Constitution and the 
Federal Supreme Court’s Application of the Constitutional Clause concerning Sharī’a’, Arab Law Quarterly 
(ALQ), pp. 219-244. 
143 This is contrary to the Qur’an, verse 64:12 ‘Obey God and His Prophet’. 
144 Note to understand the express requirements an understanding of the supplementary law is still 
required as the basis of the law is derived from fiqh. 
145Coulson, op cit., n. 3, p. 76; Kamali, op cit., n. 3, p. 468; Hallaq, op cit., n. 54, p. 19. 
146 It is permissible for Muslims to do what they wish provided such action does not in contravention of an 
injunction.  
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applied as developed by the four Sunni schools of fiqh stated in article 
1, UCC147. 
Consequently, a detailed knowledge of fiqh is necessary to understand 
and interpret the aim of these articles. The primary reason, as 
recorded, is that the doctrines of fiqh were devolved from laws as 
preordained by Allah and his Prophet and so are mandatory.  
To demonstrate this the following articles of the UCC are examined in 
the following order - 202(1), 203(1), 106(2)(b) and 3. 
Article 202(1) provides:  
‘…a future thing may properly be the subject matter of a 
commutative contract148, involving property in the absence of 
gharar…’ whilst 
Article 203(1) provides: 
‘…In commutative contracts involving property the subject 
matter must be specified in such a way as to avoid gross 
uncertainty…by a statement of its distinguishing characteristics, 
and the amount thereof must be stated if it is measurable 
property or the like, in such a manner as avoids gross 
uncertainty…’; and article 203(3) provides ‘…If the subject 
matter is not specified as aforesaid, the contract shall be void…’ 
Article 202(1) demonstrates that a contract for a future thing must not 
contain any form of speculation, as if gharar is present there is 
potential for an unfair gain. To prevent such unfair gain article 203(1) 
obligates the parties to ensure there is no gross uncertainty concerning 
the subject matter or thing. The method by which the gross uncertainty 
is to be removed is by a statement of distinguishing characteristics, i.e. 
                                      
147 These being the doctrines of the classical Islamic theory of law as developed by the four schools Sunni 
Schools of fiqh as set out in article 1 and not the roots of such doctrines, i.e. the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the 
Prophet or Consensus. 
148 A contract where the parties give and receive the equivalent, i.e. the price paid corresponds to the 
actual value of the thing bought. 
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a precise and punctilious description of the thing is required, and the 
material elements of the thing are to be quantified where applicable149.  
This illustrates that the aim of the article is to ensure that the parties 
have full control over their obligations, which in turn allows each to 
achieve its anticipated profit from the transaction. This is confirmed by 
the term ‘commutative or bilateral contracts’, a contract where the 
parties give and receive the equivalent, i.e. the price paid corresponds 
to the actual value of the thing bought. The regulator for this is market 
forces at the time the bargain is entered into and so the price paid 
includes profit, with the medium of money being the method for 
ensuring the price paid is the equivalent value for the goods received.  
To reinforce this article 203(3) provides that, where the subject matter 
is not specified (as required by article 203(1)), then the contract is 
void.  
These articles demonstrate that the doctrine or supplementary law 
expounded by Jurists, to prevent gharar in a contract where the subject 
matter is a thing that comes into existence in the future, has been 
incorporated into the UCC. This is supported by article 2, which requires 
that fiqh is the point of reference for the understanding, construction 
and interpretation of the articles of the UCC.  
In another example article 106(2)(b) provides: 
‘…The exercise of a right shall be unlawful if the interests which 
such exercise of right is designed to bring about are contrary to 
the rules of the Islamic Sharī’a, the law, public order or morals…’ 
As recorded in the Preamble, both the riba and gharar prohibitions are 
repugnant to fiqh and so are contrary to Islamic Sharī’a and the morals 
of the UAE. Hence, a provision of a contract as those described in 
section 5, Preamble which confer a right that results in a conflict with 
                                      
149 Ibn Rushd op cit., n. 5, p.179; Saleh, op cit., n. 2, pp. 61-65; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 78-79; 
Ibn Taymiyyah op cit., n. 86, pp. 26-27; Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 146-147; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 267-
289 & pp. 255-256; Coulson, op cit., n. 7, pp. 20 & 44-45. 
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either or both of these prohibitions, will be contrary to the UAE Law and 
therefore be unlawful.   
Moreover, a provision which operates as a time bar from preventing a 
party from making a claim where the Law states a longer maximum 
time in which a party can make a claim will have no force.   
Again, article 3 provides:  
‘…Public Order shall be deemed to include matters relating to... 
freedom of trade, the circulation of wealth, rules of individual 
ownership and the other rules and foundation upon which society 
is based, in such a manner as not to conflict with the definitive 
provisions and fundamental principles of the Islamic Sharī’a...150’. 
The effect of this article is that freedom of trade is allowed, provided it 
does not conflict with the express provisions [articles] and fundamental 
principles of fiqh. This requirement places an overriding obligation on 
the parties to a transaction not to disobey the gharar and riba 
prohibitions. This in turn ensures circulation of wealth amongst the 
community.  
The UCC has incorporated by article 128, a nominate contract system. 
This article provides:  
(1) ‘…The general provisions contained in this part shall apply to 
nominate and innominate contracts;  
(2) So far as concerns the rules specific to particular types of 
contract, the special provisions governing the same shall be laid 
down in this Law or in other laws…’ 
The specific articles which set out the parties’ rights and obligations in 
respect of a particular nominate contract are over and above those that 
the general articles of the Law place on the parties. 
                                      
150 In Islam all men are equal with a common goal to serve Allah. This philosophy results in all Muslims 
being brothers, and as brothers they are to circulate property as it is considered a form of usufruct in order 
to benefit each other. Thus, exploitation in any form i.e. the benefits gained from a contract which are not 
equivalent is considered Riba -usury, Shimizu op cit., n. 11.   
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A construction contract is a nominate contract with specific articles set 
out in Chapter III, Part 1, UCC, and so is subject to the ethical control 
as determined by Jurists to prevent gharar being present in this 
particular type of contract. The primary article which demonstrates this 
is article 874 which states the specific requirements which have to be in 
place at contract formation for a valid construction contract is:  
1) A description of the structure;  
2) A statement of the type and extent of the structure, along with 
the mode of performance; 
3) The period over which the structure is to be built, the anticipated 
date when delivery will be achieved; and 
4) The countervalue151. 
Thus, to correctly interpret the requirements of each article of the UCC, 
both those that apply in general and those which apply to a specific 
type, i.e. a ‘nominate contract’, a knowledge of the supplementary 
source of law, i.e. fiqh, is requisite.  
By applying the authors proposed definition of gharar to article 874, it 
requires that, as a structure is a thing which comes into existence in 
the future it has to be precisely and punctiliously described to ensure 
that:  
1) The Purchaser’s expectations are met;  
2) Both the Employer and the Contractor have concise knowledge of 
all their obligations in building the structure;  
3) The anticipated profit will be achieved; and  
4) There is no methodology by which either party can make an 
unfair profit to ensure the benefits gained are equivalent.   
                                      
151 These elements being the essential pillars of a construction contract relating to the consideration 
(countervalue), which by failing to define them results in inherent uncertainty causing speculation as to 
what has to be done, the characteristics of which is the same as gambling (maysir), Rayner, op cit., n. 2, 
pp. 137-143, pp. 147-153 & pp. 289-299. By satisfying these requirements gharar, as qualified by Ibn 
Rushd, Ibn Juzayy, Sanhory and Saleh will be removed, op cit., n. 2, pp. 49-56; Tyser, C.R., Demetriades, 
D.G., and Effendi, I.H., A.O.(2001, 2nd, reprint 2007) The Mejelle Being an English Translation of the 
Majallah El-Ahkam-I-Adliya and a Complete Code on Islamic Civil Law, the Other Press, Kuala Lumpar, 
Malaysia – art. 388 which illustrates that a detailed evaluation of the work to be done is required to allow 
the manufacturer has a comprehensive knowledge as to what is needed to make the product being ordered 
by the buyer - References are found throughout Whelan’s translation.   
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This is supported by article 2 which requires that fiqh, the 
supplementary law as expounded by Jurists, shall be the point of 
reference for the understanding, construction and interpretation of the 
articles of the UCC. The effect of article 2 is that the riba prohibition has 
been incorporated into the UCC, through the definition of what an 
unlawful use of a right is, refer article 106. Consequently, autonomy of 
contract is restricted in UAE Law unlike EW Law. 
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1.2 The Nominate Contract System 
This section examines how article 2, UCC applies to the article(s) of the 
nominate contract system which determines how a valid construction 
contract comes into existence. The author proposes the “prohibition 
test” for this examination which is derived from the EW Law business 
efficacy test. This test is used by EW Courts to identify what terms are 
to be implied where it is necessary to give the transaction business 
efficacy. The starting point for identifying an implied term is the 
provisions of the parties’ contract that for some reason is ambiguous as 
to how something is to be done so the objective of the contract, can be 
achieved152.  
This test is amended, for use in the UCC so that it must be the parties’ 
intention not to contravene either the gharar or riba prohibitions as 
proposed by the author. 
Subsection 1.2.1 - Methodology applied to identify how Article 2, 
UCC operates sets out the particulars of how the “prohibition test” was 
developed. 
This test was applied to the primary articles of the UCC which the 
author considers applies to a construction contract under the nominate 
contract system, and general articles of the UCC as examined in section 
1.3.  
The aim of the ‘prohibition test’ is to determine what the parties’ 
obligations are when interpreting the articles of the UCC that apply to 
the type of contract they are entering into, by preventing gharar and 
riba being intrinsic to the contract in order to comply with the 
requirements of article 2, UCC. 
This in turn identifies the types of construction contract permitted by 
the UCC as they limit the level of gharar intrinsic to a contract.  
                                      
152 Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10.   
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Consequently, the ‘prohibition test’ plays a fundamental role in a 
modernised understanding of how the gharar and riba prohibitions 
apply to a construction contract.   
Subsection 1.2.2 - Examining articles 872 – 874, UCC in light of 
the ‘prohibition test’ establishes:  
1) There are specific obligations which have to be adhered to by the 
parties when their contract is formed, and when they exercise 
rights or perform obligations during the performance of the 
contract; 
2) The aim of the nominate contract system, where the subject 
matter is a structure which is to come into existence in the 
future, is to ensure that there is only nominal gharar 
(speculation) or risk as to what parties’ obligations entail153;  
3) To satisfy this requirement there must be a comprehensive 
design prepared. All attributes necessary for the structure to 
come into existence must be fully determined. This includes 
measuring all work to the precision expounded by Jurists, and 
determining accurately the mode of performance and the period 
for delivery; and 
4) The obligation to provide a comprehensive design is the 
Employer’s as it is his expectations that are to be satisfied. 
Subsection 1.2.3 - Examining articles 875, 876 and 877, UCC , in 
light of the ‘prohibition test’ establishes: 
1) That the level of design is detailed enough to allow the Contractor 
to understand all incidental works associated with the work items 
to prevent gharar, so the countervalue reflects the equivalent 
value of the work done. Thus, it can be said to mirror the inclusive 
price principle in EW Law. 
                                      
153 Commercial law in the Gulf states Chapter 2. 
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Subsection 1.2.4 - Examining articles 886 and 887, UCC – Types 
of Contract, taking account of the examinations in subsections 1.2.2 
and 1.2.3 demonstrates: 
1) The two types of construction contract permitted by the UCC are 
M&V and LS. This can be deduced because both M&V and LS 
contracts minimise the level of gharar intrinsic to a contract by 
converting the design into quantifiable items of work. A M&V 
contract achieves this via the Employer’s right in UAE Law to 
terminate the Contractor’s employment where the countervalue 
significantly increases. Whilst in a LS contract the design must be 
fully determined to prevent gharar. Hence, any change will 
constitute a variation to the contract, which the Employer in UAE 
Law is obligated to pay for. For these reasons these forms of 
procurement can be considered Islamic compliant; and 
2) That the design and build method of procurement is not Islamic 
compliant. The reason is that Contractors interpretations as to 
how to satisfy the Employer’s design requirements can vary 
significantly. 
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1.2.1 Methodology applied to identify how Article 2, UCC operates     
The author, to develop the ‘prohibition test’ applied the principles of the 
business efficacy test substituting the objectives of the test so it oper-
ates to identify whether the gharar/riba prohibitions come into play, 
and if they do how the article is to be interpreted and applied so that 
these prohibitions are not disobeyed. 
The basis of the business efficacy test is that:  
“…a term will be implied only where it is necessary in a business 
sense to give efficacy to a contract of one which the parties must 
obviously intended…”154. 
The House of Lords further defined this by its reasoning:  
‘…the search for an implied term necessary to give business 
efficacy to a particular contract and the search, based on wider 
considerations, for a term which the law will imply as a necessary 
incident of a definable category of contractual relationship…’155.  
As illustrated, the objective of this test is to determine what the parties 
will regard as an obvious term which is implicated as a “…necessary 
incidental to give the effect to the intentions of the parties, and would 
be fair and reasonable for the type or category of contract they have 
entered into to make the contract workable156…”  
By adjusting the objective of this test based on the author’s proposed 
definitions of gharar and riba in respect of a construction contract, it is 
possible to provide a suitable approach to determine how the require-
ments of article 2 can be met. This is summarised as follows and de-
fines what the prohibition test is:  
“…What is necessary incidental based on the proposed definitions 
of gharar and riba for the parties to a contract of mutual obliga-
tions to avoid disobeying these prohibitions by ensuring that the 
                                      
154 The Manifest Lipkowy [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.138. 
155 Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [1992] 1 A.C. 294. 
156 Lewison, K., A.O. (2007) The Interpretation of Contracts 4th Ed., Sweet and Maxwell Ltd London, UK, 
pp. 204 - 220. 
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countervalue paid is equivalent to the goods and services provid-
ed...”  
To demonstrate the obligations that the ‘prohibition test’ places on 
the parties to a construction contract are correct, reference is made to 
article 203, UCC. This article obligates the parties to ensure that their 
contracts are equitable. The term ‘bilateral contract’157 and the Arab 
word ‘Badal’ translates to countervalue. Thus, the contracting parties 
are to give and receive an equivalent, the thing sold is equivalent to the 
countervalue paid, inclusive of profit. This is particularly important to 
avoid contravening the riba prohibition158, with money being the 
medium used to achieve this as it provides a ‘neutral measure of 
respective values’159. 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                      
157 The seller gives the thing sold and receives the price, which is the equivalent; the buyer gives the price 
and receives the thing sold, which is equivalent. 
158 Vogel & Samuel, op cit., n. 9, pp. 74-79. 
159 Saleh op cit., n. 2, p. 62; Vogel & Samuel, op cit., n. 9, pp. 78-79. 
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1.2.2 Examining articles 872 – 874, UCC 
An examination of articles 872 and 874, UCC is essential as these 
determine what establishes a contract and what prerequisites in Law 
are required for a valid contract to come into existence.  
Article 872 
Article 872 UCC defines what constitutes a contract of work. This is 
where one party (a Contractor) undertakes to make a thing (a structure 
in this instance) against a countervalue to be paid by the other party 
(the Employer).  
Thus, as in EW Law, there has to be offer and acceptance between the 
parties. However, as illustrated by the analysis of article 874, for the 
offer and acceptance to be valid in UAE Law there are specific 
requirements that have to be satisfied to ensure the contract is valid. 
Moreover, the use of the term countervalue when applying the 
prohibition test, illustrates that the potential for unfair gain caused by 
speculation must be prevented so no undue profit can be made from 
the transaction. Put simply, the amount paid must be equivalent for the 
structure supplied. 
Article 874 
Article 874 sets out the prerequisites which have to be satisfied at 
contract formation (the documentation which forms the contract), for a 
valid contract to come into existence. Consequently, this article is the 
primary article for minimising gharar from being intrinsic to a 
construction contract160. As it is the Employer’s expectations that have 
to be satisfied, the requirement of this article becomes the sole 
responsibility of the Employer161. This is confirmed by FIDIC4162 being 
the most common type of contract provisions selected in the Emirate of 
Dubai.  
                                      
160 Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 4-5; Saleh, op cit., n. 2, pp. 54-55.  
161 Saleh, op cit., n. 2, pp. 54-55; Tyser, Demetriades and Effendi, op cit., n. 151, art. 388 which 
illustrates that a detailed evaluation of the work to be done is required to allow the manufacturer has a 
comprehensive knowledge as to what is needed to make the product being ordered by the buyer. 
162 Sub-Clause 8.1; Corbett, E. C., A.O. (1991 reprinted 2000) FIDIC 4th A Practical Legal Guide, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, UK, p. 100.  
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Hence, the Employer, by application of the prohibition test is under a 
strict obligation to determine precisely all attributes of the structure to 
a level of precision so the Contractor has a complete knowledge of all 
obligations associated with the making of the structure; and which 
achieves the Employer’s required design.   
Thus, the Employer’s obligation is to define punctiliously the functional 
and quality requirements to satisfy these prerequisites to the level 
necessary so that the amount paid corresponds to the value of the 
structure supplied. This allows a comprehensive design to be prepared 
in the form of: 
1) A complete set of dimensional drawings for all levels of design 
(which through the latest technology for preparing a design, 
“Building Information Modelling”163 (BIM) can more-or-less elimi-
nate gharar in the design and quantities of work to be done), and 
all elements of the structure (structural, architectural, mechani-
cal, electrical and environmental services (MEP)) shall be pre-
pared and provided to the Contractor164; 
2) A complete specification which sets out all quality requirements 
for goods, materials, MEP services and workmanship to be satis-
fied, properties of the substrata of the Site and the selection and 
approval process associated with all elements the Employer 
wishes to control; and 
3) A meticulous description setting out all the attributes the Em-
ployer requires from the completed structure to ensure his ex-
pectations are satisfied, and specifics as to the location of the 
Site and its boundaries and access to the Site. 
This in turn allows a statement of the type and extent of the structure 
to be prepared. Again, by applying the prohibition test to ensure that 
the amount paid corresponds to the value of the structure supplied, the 
                                      
163 The United States National Building Information Model Standard Project Committee defines BIM as “a 
digital representation of physical and functional characteristics of a facility”.  
164 This is a clause of the FIDIC99 see Baker, Mellors, Chalmers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 93; A Designer 
will fail in his duty if the design provides requires variation to compete the structure to the satisfaction of 
the Employer – Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, p. 307; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, p. 74; Totterdill, 
op cit., n. 43, p. 100. 
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statement should fully quantify all goods/materials and work activities 
for two reasons: 1) It allows the physical resources necessary to build 
the structure to be determined; and 2) It satisfies the precision 
expounded by Jurists to minimise gharar165.  
All of this data allows the Contractor to assess the optimum duration 
over which the structure will materialise and so the most economical 
price for the structure. 
These interpretations are reinforced by the annotations of the Lebanese 
Jurist, Dr. Sobhi Mahmassani166, that where the subject matter of a 
contract is work which materialises over a period of time, that a 
punctilious knowledge of the subject matter be provided in order to 
forecast an accurate time for delivery167. 
The method applied to assess the optimum duration is critical path 
methodology168 (CPM), a spin-off from the US Navy Programme 
Evaluation and Review Technique169. This methodology, by use of 
suitable software, allows the Contractor to ascertain the most logical 
process for building the different elements of the structure170. The 
durations for work items which make up the different elements are 
derived from historical or standard productivity rates for the physical 
resources as determined by the Contractor to build the structure. An 
important aspect of the CPM is that it identifies what is termed the 
critical path for building the structure171. Put simply, it establishes what 
                                      
165 Ibn Rushd requirement for avoiding contravening the riba injunction was mathematical exactitude, 
Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, p. 78; Tyser, Demetriades and Effendi, op cit., n. 151, Art. 388; Rayner, op 
cit., n. 2, pp. 137-143, pp. 147-153 & pp. 289-299; Ibn Rushd, op cit., n. 5, p. 179; Saleh op cit., n. 2 pp. 
50-52. 
166 Born 29.01.09, Beirut, Lebanon, legal scholar, lawyer, judge, and political figure whose writings on 
Islamic jurisprudence remain authoritative works on this topic for legal scholars and researchers. 
167 Saleh, op cit., n. 2, p. 55. 
168 Critical path is the term used which defines the sequence of activities through a project network from 
start to finish, the sum of whose duration determines the overall project duration. Put simply the optimum 
time in which the structure can be built – Mirant Asia-Pacific Construction (Hong Kong) Ltd v (1) Ove Arup 
and Partners International Ltd (2) Ove Arup and Partners Hong Kong Ltd [2007] EWHC 918 (TCC); Lowsley, 
S. and Linnett, C., A.O. (2006) About Time Delay Analysis in Construction, RICS Business Services Limited, 
Coventry, UK. p. 23. 
169 Gibson, R., A.O. (2008) Construction Delays Extensions of Time and Prolongation Claims, Routledge 
Taylor & Francis Group, London & New York, UK & USA, pp. 22-24; Lowsley and Linnett, op cit., n. 170, pp. 
23-24. 
170 Gibson, op cit., n. 169, p. 27; Lowsley and Linnett, op cit., n. 168, pp. 40-44. 
171Gibson, op cit., n. 169; Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 226.  
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work items or elements cannot be delayed if the agreed completion 
date is to be met172. 
By using CPM a very accurate period for completion can be determined 
in days. However, such accuracy is dependent on the attributes, as 
stated above, being determined to the precision required by the Jurists. 
Thus, as the level of precision diminishes then the accuracy in the 
duration to complete will also diminish.  
The duration required is fundamental to calculating the countervalue 
that is equivalent to the goods and services provided, as it determines 
the time/cost of all resources necessary to build the structure within the 
identified optimum duration173. Consequently, it is fair to say the CPM 
identifies the most economical or cost efficient period in calendar days 
over which the structure will come into existence174, thereby satisfying 
the Jurists requirement for precision. 
Thus, an Employer’s act of prevention causing gharar to infect the 
contract as it interferes with the Contractor’s mode of performance and 
prevents the agreed completion date from being achieved goes to the 
root of the contract, as time to complete is an essential element of the 
contract175. This is demonstrated by the fact that the planned date for 
delivery is a specific requirement for a valid contract to come into 
existence.    
The method for presenting the mode of performance and its 
interrelationship with the time in which the structure will come into 
existence is analogous to a Gantt chart and is referred to as the 
Programme or Works176. The chart lists work activities to the left. 
Opposite the work activities are the durations for performing the same, 
with months and dates provided along the top of the chart so the 
durations can be assessed.  
                                      
172 Lowsley and Linnett, op cit., n. 169, pp. 24-25. 
173 Gibson, op cit., n. 169, p. 27; Lowsley and Linnett, op cit., n. 168, pp. 40-44. 
174 Gibson, op cit., n. 169, p. 27-28. 
175 Vaughan Williams L.J. demonstrates this, in Wells v Army & Navy Co-operative Society (1902) 86 LT 
764 when he stated “… If in the contract one finds the time limited within which the builder is to do the 
work, that means, not only that he is to do it within that time, but it means also that he is to have that 
time in which to do it…”.  
176 FIDIC99 Sub-Clause 8.4; Lowsley and Linnett, op cit., n. 168, pp. 21-23. 
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Since this document presents the Contractor’s precise mode of 
performance for delivery of the structure by the planned date for 
delivery, it establishes an essential element for a valid construction 
contract to come into existence, the period to build the structure177. 
Consequently, the Programme of Works is a contract document in UAE 
Law. 
This is supported by the requirements of the prohibition test in that:  
1) The Programme of Works is a fundamental document, as the 
CPM used to compile it determines an accurate date when the 
structure will be delivered178; and  
2) Where an Employer’s act causes gharar to become intrinsic to 
the contract delaying delivery, the Programme of Work, due to 
the CPM, can establish a new date for delivery by assessing the 
effect gharar that has delayed delivery179.  
This enables the countervalue to be adjusted so that it corresponds to 
the time related services/goods provided by adjustment to the 
Programme of Works whether due to:  
1) The Employer, by some act, delayed the Contractor’s perfor-
mance;  
2) It was a circumstance that neither party was responsible, for 
which the parties have a pre-agreement as to how this is to be 
addressed; or  
3) It is through some default of the Contractor. 
 
 
 
                                      
177 Dodd v Churton [1897] 1 Q.B. 562; Holme v Guppy (1838) 3 M. & W 387; Perini Pacific Ltd v Greater 
Vancouver Sewerage (1966) 57 D.L.R.: Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd. V Mckinney Foundations Ltd. 
(1970) 69 L.G.R. 1; Wells v Army & Navy Co-operative Society (1902) 86 LT 764.   
178 Lowsley and Linnett, op cit., n. 168. 
179 Lowsley and Linnett, op cit., n. 168, p. 4. 
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1.2.3 Examining articles 875, 876 and 877, UCC  
As illustrated in the previous subsection, there has to be precision in 
determining goods and services that the Contractor is to provide to 
ensure the work done meets the Employer’s expectations. This 
subsection demonstrates the extent of detail required in the Employer’s 
design to prevent gharar infecting a contract, and mirrors the inclusive 
price principle in EW Law.  
Articles 875, 876, 877 and article 246, see commentary below, place an 
obligation on the Contractor to determine the necessary supplementary 
materials to be procured, and tools and equipment needed to decide 
the mode of performance and productivity that determines the period 
for delivery and so countervalue.   
Article 875 
Article 875 is relevant where the Contractor supplies materials for 
inclusion in the structure. Hence, the Contractor is responsible to 
ensure that the quality meets the standard specified in the contract. 
Article 876 obligates the Contractor to provide all additional equipment 
and tools to complete the work; and article 877 provides that the 
Contractor will complete the work in accordance with the contract 
provisions, and that he shall correct any faulty work.  
To give effect to the obligations placed on the Contractor the 
prohibition test is applied. The necessary incidentals to be derived from 
these obligations to prevent gharar, are, the Contractor is not only 
responsible for the quality of materials but also the quality of 
workmanship required to install such materials. This includes incidental 
materials and tools to carry out the installation. This obligation is 
termed the inclusive price principle in EW Law180.  
                                      
180 Where a BoQ has been prepared in accordance with an SMM to price the work to be done, the inclusive 
price principle in this context in EW Law means all work necessary incidental to completing the work 
described and measured in the BoQ where the contract is LS and M&V – Atkin Chamber, op cit., n. 19, p. 
762. 
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Moreover, the Contractor is obliged to ensure that accessory materials 
are compatible with goods specified in the design181. If the design 
information is in the form of a specification setting out a ‘general 
description’ of accessory materials, then the Contractor is to ensure 
that such accessories are of the required quality. In terms of 
installation, the tools used should be suitable for the installation 
process in order to avoid damaging materials when they are installed; 
and to ensure that such materials are installed correctly, with the 
labour being skilled in the required installation process, again, to avoid 
damaging materials during installation182.  
However, for the Contractor to be able to discharge these obligations, 
by application of the prohibition test, the design must be specific as to 
the materials supplied. Thus, where the design specifies a specific type 
of aluminium roofing system but accessory materials are not described 
or quantified but are necessary for the installation, the Contractor can 
readily identify what these accessory materials are and the specialist 
tools needed for the installation.  
An example of the above circumstance is a specification makes a 
general statement that the roof sheeting is to be aluminium with no 
further particulars. By application of the prohibition test it is clear that 
the Contractor is to install a roof consisting of aluminium sheets. 
However, there is uncertainty as to what accessory materials are 
required for the roofing works and tools needed. The reason for this is 
that there are many roofing systems manufactured by different 
companies with design and installation variances. Consequently, the 
Contractor will have to speculate as to what is required to discharge 
this obligation. This allows gharar to infect the countervalue and 
delivery period.   
 
 
                                      
181 Furst & Ramsey op cit., n. 42, pp. 77-80; Atkins Chambers Ltd op cit., n. 19, pp. 461-474; Baker, 
Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 102. 
182 Vogel & Samuel, op cit., n. 9, pp. 74-79.. 
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Article 876 
Article 876 obliges the Contractor to provide, at his own expense, such 
additional equipment and tools necessary to complete the structure. By 
application of the prohibition test this article requires the Contractor to 
provide everything necessary to achieve the mode of performance.  
This includes all spares, consumables and incidentals to ensure the 
efficient performance of the equipment needed to build the structure, 
inclusive of all tools needed to install materials which form a permanent 
part of the structure183. Consequently, all requirements as set out in 
subsection Examining articles 872 – 874, UCC 1.2.2 have to be satisfied 
so an accurate mode of performance is determined.  
Article 877 
To allow the Contractor to discharge the obligation placed on him by 
article 877, all requirements of subsection 1.2.2 and that of articles 875 
and 876 have to be satisfied. This minimises the potential for latent 
defects, which if one should appear, then the Contractor has an 
obligation to repair. This in turn satisfies the fourth point as determined 
by Jurists to prevent gharar being intrinsic to the contract provided the 
defect was not a design fault, then the obligation falls to the Employer.    
There are two key documents that allow the Contractor to perform the 
obligations placed on him by these articles, they are the Specification 
and the BoQ. Consequently, any ambiguities or lack of detailed 
quantification will cause gharar to be intrinsic to the contract. These 
two documents are also key in allowing the Contractor comply with the 
inclusive price principle in EW Law184.  
 
 
 
                                      
183 Vogel & Samuel, op cit., n. 9, pp. 74-79.. 
184 Atkins Chambers Ltd op cit., n. 19, p. 762. 
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1.2.4 Examining articles 886 and 887, UCC – Types of Contract 
Taking account of the obligations placed on parties by articles 874 to 
877 and applying the prohibition test, a review of articles 886 and 887 
demonstrate that there are two forms of contract permitted for the 
procurement of a thing, i.e. a structure that comes into existence in the 
future, these being M&V and LS as they ensure equivalence. 
Article 886 - Measure & Value Contract 
Article 886 provides, that where it appears during the course of work 
the quantity of work required to achieve the agreed plan increases 
substantially, based on the contract being an itemised list (of quantities 
of work to be done) and unit rates, then the Contractor must notify the 
Employer of the increase immediately otherwise the Contractor loses 
his right to recover the extra cost. In such circumstance the Employer 
can cancel the contract. If he decides to cancel the contract, he must 
do so immediately. If he delays in cancelling the contract he is 
responsible for all work until he does. Where he does cancel the 
contract then work will be valued up to that date. In both 
circumstances, work done is assessed in accordance with the contract.  
As illustrated by article 886, the quantity of work needed to achieve the 
design is an estimate185. The method of calculating the countervalue 
due to the Contractor is by physically measuring the quantity for each 
work item completed and multiplying it by the rate/price inserted next 
to each item of work186. This demonstrates that the process adopted to 
calculate the countervalue for the work done is measure and value 
(M&V).  
Importance of the BoQ 
Reference to an itemised list and unit rates demonstrates that a BoQ is 
a fundamental document for valuing work to be done. The reason for 
this is stated in subsection 1.2.2. It also reiterates the importance of 
                                      
185 Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 43, pp. 161-162; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 
255-256; Atkins Chambers Ltd op cit., n. 19, pp. 764-765; Furst & Ramsey op cit., n. 42, pp. 119-121. 
186 Sub-Clause 8.1; Corbett, E. C., A.O. (1991 reprinted 2000) FIDIC 4th A Practical Legal Guide, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, UK, p. 100.. 
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accuracy expounded by the Jurists and demonstrates that the 
countervalue to be paid corresponds to the value of the goods and 
services provided, thereby satisfying the prohibition test. This is 
supported when article 886 UCC is construed with the obligations 
placed on the parties by articles 202, 203 and 874, UCC.  
The examination in subsection 1.2.2 demonstrates the importance that 
Jurists place on accuracy to prevent gharar and riba being intrinsic to a 
contract.  
However, as illustrated in subsection 1.2.2, such equivalence can only 
be guaranteed where there is certainty in the design and quality. Any 
inadequacies in these two attributes will affect the accuracy of the 
description of the work items, but more importantly the mode of 
performance and so the period for delivery.    
The form that gharar can be manifested in these circumstances is that 
there are inaccuracies in the description of work items such as 
materials to be supplied, associated sundry items which are necessary 
to complete the main items of work, quantities of work to be done, or 
the use of an inappropriate unit of measurement187. This is 
demonstrated in subsection 1.2.3 as these attributes allow the 
Contractor to evaluate productivity requirements, and tools and plant 
needed to perform all work items. Any inaccuracies can have a 
detrimental effect on the mode of performance and so delivery. 
This is of particular importance in respect of goods that are termed long 
lead items, i.e. goods which require a long period for delivery.  
By application of the prohibition test, the obligation placed on the 
Contractor to notify the Employer immediately of a substantial increase 
in quantity is to ensure equivalence. This obligation also includes where 
the Contractor discovers a deficiency in any elements that determine 
the accuracy of the rates/price and/or the work items presented in the 
BoQ, or a combination of these elements, along with an increase in 
quantity of work.  
                                      
187 Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 255-256; Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, p. 772. 
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The increases in quantity are addressed through the measurement and 
value process, which would, by application of the prohibition test, 
include extensions to the period of delivery and other circumstances 
that caused an increase to the countervalue, otherwise there will be an 
unfair gain in the form of goods/services. For these reasons it is 
imperative that the contract provisions that the parties apply to their 
contract address these circumstances. This is on the proviso that such 
provisions are operated in a manner that ensures the equivalence of 
the contract. 
The obligation placed on the Employer by article 886 UCC not to delay 
in cancelling the contract otherwise the Contractor is entitled to 
payment, demonstrates that the Employer accepts: (a) liability as to 
the precision of his design; and (b) that the design can be achieved by 
the agreed delivery date. It also demonstrates that the Employer has 
control over the Contractor’s obligation to deliver.  
This obligation not to delay in cancelling the contract, when put in 
context with the requirements of the prohibition test, ensures 
equivalence of the contract as it is only the Employer who knows 
whether he can afford the increase in countervalue.  
Conversely, the loss of the right to claim for additional payment by the 
Contractor is fair, otherwise unnecessary financial harm would result 
and the Employer’s circumstance could be open to exploitation. 
Therefore M&V contracts, properly interpreted are considered to be 
Islamic compliant. 
Article 887 - Lump Sum Contract 
Article 887, UCC provides that where the contract is based on an 
agreed plan, and payment is on a LS basis, the Contractor cannot 
demand any further payment. Where the Employer consents to a 
variation then the agreement will be observed in connection with such 
variation. 
By application of the prohibition test, to ensure equivalence of the 
contract the “agreed plan” means that all requirements of article 874 
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have to be complied with. This also means that the design has to be 
complete and firm in all aspects as this certainty of the design provides 
certainty as to the mode of performance, quality, quantity and period 
for delivery. Without this precision, the contract cannot come into 
existence. This is confirmed by article 887 that the Contractor cannot 
claim for any further payment.  
The need for a BoQ in this type of contract is of particular importance 
as the term ‘Lump Sum’ illustrates that price is the factor upon which 
an Employer will decide to proceed or not. Thus, again this type of 
contract can be said to be Islamic compliant. 
Where any of the inaccuracies described above occur, the Contractor 
will need to seek the Employer’s agreement to increase the time for 
delivery or countervalue, with such increase being granted through a 
variation clause agreed with the Employer. Often there will be one 
provision for an increase to countervalue and one provision for an 
increase in time to complete. These provisions can operate 
independently or together188. These are examined in subsection 4.2.4. 
However, their operation must not contravene the gharar and riba 
prohibitions otherwise the validity of the contract is compromised.  
Article 888 - Valuing of extra work 
Article 888 provides that where payment for work done is not specified 
in the contract then such payment will be fair and include the value of 
materials required for the work. The customary approach is that rates 
in the BoQ will apply where work is of a similar nature, with adjustment 
to take account of any change in condition under which the work is 
executed. Where there is no similar work then a new rate will be 
calculated.  
By application of the prohibition test the use of existing rates ensures 
fairness as it reflects what the Contractor would have priced the work 
at the time when the contract came into existence. Thus, there is no 
potential for unfair gain to be made. Where a new rate is calculated it 
                                      
188 Refer Sub-Clauses 13 and 8.4; Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 43, pp. 58-60; Glover & 
Hughes, op cit., n. 43, p.74. 
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will be at market rates, so again it will be fair as the true price is paid 
at the time the work was done and there is no unfair gain. In both 
instances the equivalence of the contract is maintained. 
M&V and LS Contracts - the traditional method of procurement 
in EW Law 
As recorded, in EW Law these two types of contract are termed the 
traditional methods of procurement. Below is a brief explanation as to 
how these two forms of contract operate in EW Law, from which 
illustrates a similarity to UAE Law in concept and in documentation  
requirements at the formation of contract.  
Construction contracts in EW Law are considered entire contracts189. 
Under this doctrine the Contractor’s right to payment is dependent on 
completing the structure190. A further aspect is that M&V and LS forms 
of contract are subject to the inclusive price principle191. This principle 
is that any work, which is necessary incidental to complete the 
structure, is included in the contract price. Hence, the rates/prices in 
the BoQ are all inclusive of the work which has to be done for that 
measured item of work. 
For both M&V and LS contracts the design is a detailed set of design 
drawings, a comprehensive specification, a description of the Works 
and a BoQ. These documents all form part of the Contract192. The BoQ 
translates the design into an accurate measurement of work to be 
done. This is achieved as the BoQ is measured in accordance with a 
SMM193. As previously mentioned, this document sets out the rules of 
measurement for each item of work and describes what each item of 
work covers. This description therefore identifies incidental work which 
                                      
189 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, pp. 760-762; Furst & Ramsey, op cit., 42, pp. 100-101 & 109.  
190 Op cit., n. 192 - For economic grounds the Contractor can claim for payment on account as the work 
proceeds subject to certain monies being retained by the Employer to ensure entire performance. 
191 Where a BoQ has been prepared in accordance with an SMM to price the work to be done, the inclusive 
price principle in this context in EW Law means all work necessary incidental to completing the work 
described and measured in the BoQ where the contract is LS and M&V – Atkin Chamber, op cit., n. 19, p. 
762.   
192 Atkins Chamber’s, op cit., n. 19, pp. 385-390; Furst & Ramsey op cit., n. 42, pp. 4-5 & 119-121- the 
incorporation of the BoQ is through the express terms of the conditions of contract which refers to the 
same; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, p. 14 – Sub-Clause 1.1.1.9 illustrates that BoQ in FIDIC99 
demonstrates this. 
193 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, p. 387; Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 43, pp. 167-170. 
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the Contractor has to allow for which is necessary incidental for the 
structure to be completed.  
Put simply, work items which form the BoQ allow the design to be 
measured to a high level of precision. Consequently, any changes in the 
quantity of work, type of work or condition under which the work is 
done constitutes a variation194, subject to the inclusive price principle. 
Hence, the contract price calculated is more-or-less risk (gharar) free. 
For a M&V contract the BoQ is an estimate of the quantity of work to be 
done. Hence, the contract sum (countervalue) is an estimate. The final 
contract sum is determined on actual work done multiplied by rates in 
the BoQ195. It is used where the quantity of work may vary to achieve 
the design. Such change in quantity is classified as an automatic 
variation196. This form of contract is aimed more towards civil 
engineering works where ground conditions can only be determined 
once work commences197.  
LS contracts are where a Contractor agrees to build a structure for an 
agreed sum. The form of design is the same. However, the design will 
be completely developed so an accurate measure of work to be done 
can be prepared198 prior to tender. Thus, the quantities included in the 
BoQ are not subject to re-measurement. In saying this, in some 
instances the foundation works only maybe re-measured where there is 
some uncertainty concerning ground conditions199.  
As illustrated, with these two forms of contracts any change in design 
or method of working caused by changes in condition or design 
constitute a variation for which the Employer is liable200. As time to 
                                      
194 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, pp. 783-786; Furst & Ramsey op cit., n. 42, pp. 119-121. 
195 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, p. 761. 
196 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, p. 786; Furst & Ramsey op cit., n. 42, p. 121; Baker, Mellors, 
Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 43, pp. 167-170. 
197 Gibson, op cit., n. 170, p. 27; Lowsley and Linnett, op cit., n. 168, pp. 40-44. 
198 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, pp. 765-766.  
199 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, pp. 765-766. 
200 Critical path is the term used which defines the sequence of activities through a project network from 
start to finish, the sum of whose duration determines the overall project duration. Put simply the optimum 
time in which the structure can be built – Mirant Asia-Pacific Construction (Hong Kong) Ltd v (1) Ove Arup 
and Partners International Ltd (2) Ove Arup and Partners Hong Kong Ltd [2007] EWHC 918 (TCC); Lowsley 
and Linnett, op cit., n. 168 p. 23. 
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complete is a fundamental ingredient for calculating delivery and price, 
any circumstance that impedes the Contractor goes to the root of the 
contract. Hence, any variation that delays the Contractor’s performance 
entitles the Contractor to additional time to complete201.  
The precision of these traditional methods of procurement satisfy the 
strict requirement in fiqh, that all work, including incidental work 
necessary to complete the measured work items, be quantified and 
readily identifiable, i.e. accessory materials without which the main 
element cannot be installed.  
Accepted forms of the traditional method  
The requirements of articles 874, 886 and 887 limits contractual 
freedom202, the objective of which is to ensure profits are equivalent to 
those anticipated in order to avoid a dispute203. This results in a very 
strict criterion for the legality of contracts204, in that where gharar 
infects the contract it will be defective until the parties agree changes 
to countervalue and time to deliver, which if they fail to do the contract 
will be declared void.  
Other forms of construction procurement that can fall within M&V and 
LS contracts are Management Contracting205 where the work is all 
subcontracted. Construction Management206 is where the Employer 
directly engages different Contractors to execute different elements of 
the project and uses a Construction Management Contractor to manage 
these Contractors and Cost Reimbursement Contracts.  
 
                                      
201 It is permissible for Muslims to do what they wish provided such action does not in contravention of an 
injunction. 
202 Schacht, op. cit., n. 2, p. 144; Comair-Obeid, op. cit., n. 2, p. 17. 
203 Coulson, op. cit., n. 3, pp. 50-55; Comair-Obeid, op. cit., n. 2, p. 15; Rayner, op. cit., n. 2, pp. 148-
153. 
204 Comair-Obeid, op. cit., n. 2, pp. 16-22; Rayner, op cit., n. 2 pp. 147-153 & 159-161. 
205 Murdoch, J., & Hughes, W., A.O. (1992 Reprinted 1999) Construction Contracts Law and Management, 
Spons Press Taylor Francis Group London & New York, pp. 57-59; Chappell, D., Cowlin, M., & Dunn, M., 
A.O. (2009) Building Law Encyclopedia, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, Chichester , UK, pp. 338-339; Pickavance 
K., (A.O. 2005) Delay and Disruption in Construction Contracts, Informa Professional London UK, pp. 61- 
66; Davis, P., (June 2008) Report on Building Procurement Methods, Cooperative Research Centre for 
Construction Innovation, Brisbane, Australia. 
206 Chappell, Cowlin & Dunn, op cit., n. 205, P.113; Murdoch & Hughes, op cit., n. 205. pp. 71-72.  
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Management Contracting: Figure 6 below represents the contractual rela-
tionship for Management Contracting.  
Figure 6 – Management Contracting – Contractual Relationship 
 
As illustrated in Figure 6 the “Management Contractor” (the Contractor) be-
comes part of the Employer’s consultant’s team. The Contractor’s role is to 
appoint and enter into contracts with work/package contractors and manage 
them for each stage of the construction process. Thus, work contractors are 
essentially subcontractors for a specific element of the construction process. 
However, this does not release the Contractor from all responsibility for any 
defects207. The early involvement of the Contractor allows the Employer’s 
team to benefit from the Contractor’s construction experience, such as the 
Employer’s Designer’s understanding of the need for buildability, whilst allow-
ing the Employer to remain in control of the design, thereby ensuring certain-
ty as to the Employer’s requirements/expectations. The appointment of work 
contractors is by competitive bidding, ensuring the structure is procured on an 
economic basis208.  
                                      
207 Copthorne Hotel (Newcastle) Ltd v. Arup Associates (1997) CILL 1318. 
208 Murdoch & Hughes, op cit., n. 205, pp. 59-62; Chappell, Cowlin & Dunn op cit., n. 205, pp. 340-341; 
Davis op cit., n. 205; Pickavance, op cit., n. 205 pp. 61-66.  
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A primary benefit of this form of procurement is the reduced overall procure-
ment time, as the design does not have to be completed before construction 
starts as is the case with traditional procurement. Hence, the design is devel-
oped in logical sequential stages whilst construction takes place, thereby al-
lowing an overlap in the design and construction processes. This has resulted 
in this form of procurement being referred to as ‘fast-track construction’209.  
A consequence of this overlap is that the Contractor has to maintain a high 
level of supervisory staff, both in numbers and experience, to be able to effec-
tively engage and administer Works Contractors, particularly as to quality 
control, co-ordination, programming and interfacing210. Coupled with this, 
there is potential for variations resulting from changes to the Employer’s re-
quirements, or abortive work caused by the design and construct overlap211.  
However, as each element of the structure which makes up a works package 
is designed and quantified, taking account of the extent of work done in the 
previous/present work package, such variation can be readily accommodat-
ed212. As the design for each element of the work is fully known as well as be-
ing fully quantified, the work contractors have certainty as to their obligations 
which arise from the contract, thereby satisfying the precision required by Ju-
rists to ensure the gharar and riba prohibitions are not contravened. Coupled 
with this, because of the Contractor’s own experiences, the Contractor can 
control the interface and programme requirements to ensure a smooth transi-
tion between each of the Work Contractors, and readily identify variations 
necessary to maintain progress, keeping the Employer and his team aware of 
such matters.  
Certainty of price within this method of procurement is achieved by “Cost Re-
imbursement”. The process applied is that the Employer’s Cost Consultant will 
prepare an estimate in the form of a cost plan, which includes not only the 
cost of construction but all costs associated with the design and management 
                                      
209 Murdoch & Hughes, op cit., n. 205, pp. 59-62; Chappell, Cowlin & Dunn op cit., n. 205, pp. 340-341; 
Davis op cit., n. 205; Pickavance, op cit., n. 205 pp. 61-66. 
210 Pickavance emphasises that work sequencing and coordination of works contractors to maintain 
programme must remain with the Contractor, Pickavance, op cit., n. 205, pp. 61-66.  
211 Murdoch & Hughes, op cit., n. 205, pp. 59-62; Pickavance, op cit., n. 205 pp. 61-66.  
212 Pickavance, op cit., n. 205 pp. 61-66. 
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by the Employer’s team213. Cost plans are compiled based on historical data, 
taking account of the site location and type of structure to be built. The cost 
plans should be prepared in the following stages: stage 1 - concept design; 
stage 2 - design development and technical design; and stage 3 - pre-tender 
estimate. This third stage will be updated both post tender and during con-
struction to reflect current costs to the Employer214. The basis of the cost plan 
can be divided into two main forms, cost estimates and elemental cost mod-
els. 
Structures such as tunnels, bridges etc. are prepared using a comparative 
method. Taking a tunnel as an example, previous projects which have similar 
characteristics would be examined to identify similarities in tunnels such as 
length, cross sectional area and ground conditions in which the tunnel was 
built all of which dictate the methods of construction etc.   
Cost estimates are calculated from cost per functional unit, i.e. a hotel cost 
per unit multiplied by the number of beds, or cost per m2 of internal gross 
floor area (GIFA), i.e. GIFA m2 multiplied by the cost per m2 of a specific ele-
ment for that particular type of structure to be built, i.e. the concrete 
frame215. Note, such costs can be inclusive or exclusive of all other “on costs”, 
i.e. the Contractors overheads, profit and other consultant’s fees, but if exclu-
sive these sums are added as a lump sum estimate.  
The other method is the element unit quantity (EUQ) – a unit of measurement 
that relates solely to the quantity (m2) of the element or sub-element, e.g. 
the area of external cladding, windows or roofing, excluding the support struc-
ture which would form a separate sub-element. This area is then multiplied by 
the element unit (m2) rate (inclusive of all labour, material, plant and other 
such production costs, as well as all “on-costs”) (EUR))216. 
As the cost plan provides detailed costs for the work to be done, the Cost 
Consultant can monitor and continually update the cost plan into firm costs 
and forecast costs to completion, thereby allowing the Employer to be able to 
                                      
213 Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (A.O. 2012), The RICS New Rules of Measurement (NRM) NRM 
1: Order of cost estimating and cost planning for capital building works 2nd Ed, Coventry, UK, p. 2; Murdoch 
& Hughes, op cit., n. 205, pp. 65-66.  
214 RICS, op cit., n. 213 p. 8. 
215 RICS, op cit., n. 213, p. 12. 
216 RICS, op cit., n. 213, p. 12. 
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control costs as the construction work progresses. Thus, this method of pro-
curement falls within the M&V form of procurement as the Employer has ac-
cepted how gharar is to be controlled. This is further demonstrated as the 
work contractors are appointed as the construction work proceeds.  
There are three primary forms that payment of the Contractor takes. These 
are: 
Cost plus percentage: The Contractor is paid the actual cost of the work 
done by the Works Contractors, along with a percentage fee which includes 
the Contractor’s overheads and profit. The basis upon which the Contractor 
calculates the percentage fee is based on the amount reflected in the cost 
plan for the physical construction works217. The percentage to be added can 
be negotiated or tenders can be invited from Contractors, the same way as 
design consultants’ bids for work are evaluated. The payment of a percentage 
fee on all costs has been criticised as there is no incentive for the Contractor 
to control costs. This is countered on the basis that tenders for Works Con-
tractors will be on a competitive basis. This then obligates the Contractor to 
carefully and fully evaluate the Works Contractors offers.  
Cost plus fixed fee: The same approach as above but the fee for the Con-
tractor is fixed218. Consequently, this approach requires a clear definition as to 
what work forms part of the original contract and which is a variation, other-
wise there is potential for gharar, and so riba, to infect the contract. 
Cost plus Fluctuating Fee: This approach is that the Contractor gives an of-
fer based on the amount reflected in the cost plan for the physical construc-
tion works. However, the amount of the fee due increases where the contrac-
tor reduces costs and reduces where costs increase219. Again, this approach 
requires a clear definition as to what work forms part of the original contract 
and which is a variation, otherwise there is, once again, potential for gharar 
and so riba to infect the contract.   
                                      
217 Chappell, Cowlin & Dunn op cit., n. 205, pp. 131-132; Murdoch & Hughes, op cit., n. 205, pp. 65-66; 
Chappell, Marshall, Powell-Smith, Cavender op cit., n. 51, pp. 106-107. 
218 Chappell, Cowlin & Dunn op cit., n. 205, pp. 131-132; Murdoch & Hughes, op cit., n. 205, pp. 65-66; 
Chappell, Marshall, Powell-Smith, Cavender op cit., n. 51, pp. 106-107. 
219 Chappell, Cowlin & Dunn op cit., n. 205, pp. 131-132; Murdoch & Hughes, op cit., n. 205, pp. 65-66; 
Chappell, Marshall, Powell-Smith, Cavender op cit., n. 51, pp. 106-107. 
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An important feature of this procurement process is that the Employer con-
trols the design, and work packages are quantified for each element of the 
structure, thereby providing the precision required by Jurists, with certainty of 
price being provided through the cost plan. Where there is potential for the 
cost plan to be exceeded, then the Employer has the ability to control costs 
through design amendments. As this procurement method allows for an early 
start for construction work whilst the design is still being developed, it 
achieves a primary aim of the design and build form of procurement, namely 
shortening the overall procurement period.  
Construction Management: Figure 7 below presents the contractual rela-
tionship for Construction Management.   
Figure 7 – Construction Management – Contractual Relationship 
 
This method of procurement mirrors that of Management Contracting, the dif-
ference being the contractual and management links. Unlike Management 
Contracting, the contractual link is between the Employer and Works Contrac-
tors, whilst the management/administrative link is between the Construction 
Management Contractor and the Works Contractors220. There are two ad-
vantages to the Employer if this method of procurement is selected. The first 
is that the Employer has greater control over the bidding process and selec-
                                      
220 Murdoch & Hughes, op cit., n. 205, pp. 71-80; Davis op cit., n. 205; Pickavance, op cit., n. 205 pp. 61-
66. 
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tion of works contractors. The second is he has control over payment, so 
when a disagreement arises he has the ability to negotiate with the works 
contractor, taking account of his commercial needs221. 
Again, this form of procurement, for the reasons presented above, is a meth-
od which satisfies the Jurists’ requirements for certainty, allowing the design 
to be developed while physical construction proceeds at Site.   
The three methods for calculating the Contractor’s fee for Management Con-
tracting and Construction Management (described above), can also be applied 
as a separate contractual arrangement where the Contractor is engaged by 
the Employer to build the structure. This form of procurement is referred to as 
a Cost Reimbursement Contract.  
To control the Employer’s Costs, the Consultant prepares a cost plan which is 
the basis for the Contractor to offer his fee. The cost plan is again closely 
monitored and updated throughout the procurement process. However, with 
this form of procurement, the Contractor will actually construct certain ele-
ments of the structure, e.g. the sub-structure, the structural frame, with spe-
cialist elements being subcontracted. 
This process requires an open book approach so the Employer’s Cost Consult-
ant has access to the Contractor’s accounts and any subcontractors’ accounts. 
An alternative approach is that the Contractor can price a schedule of rates 
based on the known scope of work for the elements of work he will perform. 
The same approach can also be applied to elements of the work to be per-
formed by subcontractors.    
There is one difference in respect of cost plus fixed fee in that the Contractor 
has the incentive to complete the Works as quickly as possible, as by doing so 
he reduces his overheads and so increases his profit. Consequently, it could 
be argued that there is an element of riba present in this form of contracting. 
As the Employer retains control of the design with costs being true costs plus 
the Contractor’s agreed fee, or the work is quantified and rates in the sched-
ule of rates are applied to give a firm price, then these methods of Cost Reim-
bursement Contracts provide the precision required by Jurists. Again, this 
                                      
221 Murdoch & Hughes, op cit., n. 205, p. 80. 
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method of procurement achieves the primary aim of the design and build form 
of procurement, namely shortening the overall procurement process. 
In addition for structures where the Contractor has a standard design that 
only requires alterations to substructure works to accommodate prevailing 
ground conditions, this would be Islamic compliant provided the prerequisites 
set out under articles 203 and 874, UCC are satisfied. Structures which fall 
within this method of procurement are generally of an industrial nature such 
as a power station, treatment plant, a warehouse or a prefabricated structure, 
although housing and schools and possibly administrative buildings such as 
hospitals could also be procured this way. This form of contract is termed 
Engineer, Procure and Construct (EPC). 
For Design and Build contracts - the Contractor is to prepare the design from 
the Employer’s requirements. Prima facie this form of procurement would not 
be construed as satisfying the prerequisites for a valid construction contract to 
come into existence under UAE Law. The reason is that the Contractor’s 
interpretations as to how to satisfy the Employer’s expectation can vary 
significantly, particularly where the Employer requires that the Contractor 
interpret third party or stakeholder design requirements. This prevents 
certainty/precision in respect of quality, aesthetics, spatial and functional 
needs and so quantity of work to be done, causing gharar and riba to infect 
the contract. Consequently, the basis of the legal relationship created 
between the parties is speculative in nature, allowing for an undue or 
excessive benefit to be derived from the contract222. This was confirmed by 
decision number 182(19/8) of the International Council of the Fiqh Academy, 
an offshoot of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) held 26-30 April 
2009 in the Emirate of Sharjah, UAE concerning Build Operate and Transfer, a 
form of Design and Build for Public Sector projects. 
Consequently, research as to how such a form of contract can comply with the 
requirements of articles 202, 203, 874, 886 and 887, UCC is required.      
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1.2.5 A summary of the nominate contract system 
The examination above demonstrates, that as a result of the specific 
requirements of articles 874, 875, 876, 877, 886 and 887 there are 
only two forms of construction contract in the UAE, M&V and LS which 
satisfy the requirements of equivalence and are therefore Islamic 
compliant. Where deficiencies in the contract documentation, whether 
design, BoQ, Programme of Works or other are discovered, then gharar 
becomes intrinsic to the contract. To remove gharar, certainty as to the 
delivery and countervalue has to be re-established, otherwise the 
contract is classified as void223.  
Although articles 886 and 887 provide a process for establishing 
countervalue and delivery in such situation, it is not determined in a 
precise manner. Thus, the parties to the transaction need to agree a 
set of contract provisions to address such circumstances so that gharar 
can be removed. The application of these provisions is subject to them 
not contravening the gharar and riba prohibitions as determined by the 
prohibition test, i.e. they must be applied so they ensure equivalence in 
that the countervalue paid is equal to the goods and services provided. 
This will be further examined in Part 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
223 Comair-Obeid, op. cit., n. 2, pp. 15-18; Rayner, op cit., n. 2 pp. 148-153; Schacht, op. cit., n. 2, pp. 
120-121. 
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1.3 General articles of the UCC that apply to a construction contract 
This section examines how the relevant articles of the UCC that are of a 
general nature apply to a construction contract, and so how they 
operate to prevent gharar becoming inherent to the contract and 
prevent a dispute arising. 
The analysis presented, taking cognizance of the prohibition test as 
proposed by the author, establishes that in: 
Subsection - 1.3.1 - Legal Maxims – operate to limit a party’s ability 
to enforce an unbalanced contract by obligating parties to comply with 
the requirements of the articles of the law that regulate their type of 
contract. Consequently, parties have to operate contract provisions 
such as discretionary power and exemption clauses in a positive way, 
otherwise they cause the contract to be aleatory and so invalid, requir-
ing such provisions to be severed from the contract224;  
Subsection - 1.3.2 - The Elements, Validity and Effect of the 
Contract - the UCC enacts the gharar prohibition by requiring that a 
thing that comes into existence in the future be comprehensively de-
scribed and quantified to minimise uncertainty as to what an obligation 
entails, and not to operate contract provisions in an opportunistic way 
to gain an unfair financial advantage.  This in turn minimises the poten-
tial for a dispute arising; 
Subsection - 1.3.3 - The Effects of a Contract – the UCC requires 
contracts to be performed in a manner consistent with good faith. 
Moreover, in a contract of mutual obligations where a party delays in 
performing its obligation the other party can refrain from performance, 
thereby enforcing the prevention principle. The effect of the gharar 
prohibition requires pre-contract negotiations be performed in a trans-
parent way to ensure the equivalence of the contract. Whilst where a 
party’s obligation becomes onerous the Courts can re-balance the con-
tract, which includes: 1) economic impracticality caused by abnormal 
                                      
224 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, UCC, art. 210; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 43-55. 
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price increases; and 2) a failure by a party to disclose a circumstance 
that affects how an obligation can be discharged by the other; 
Subsection - 1.3.4 - The Construction of Contracts – deficiencies 
in the Employer’s design fall to the Employer, and so any defect found 
in the structure is the Employer’s liability as the UCC requires parties to 
interpret any doubt in favour of the Obligor, the aim being to prevent 
gharar by the Obligee exploiting the Obligor. This obligation reflects 
that of the principle of the contra proferentem rule in EW Law which is 
seen as a rule of justice;     
Subsection - 1.3.5 - Means of Enforcement, Section 1 – Volun-
tary Execution – that the Employer, where there is a deficiency in the 
design allowing gharar to become intrinsic to a contract, has to correct 
the design so the Contractor’s ability to control his obligation of delivery 
is reinstated; 
Subsection - 1.3.6 - Means of Enforcement, Section 2 – Compul-
sory Enforcement – by one party failing to perform an obligation al-
lows the other to issue notice to compel such party to correct such 
breach. A right for compensation arises once such notice is issued 
where the party issuing the notice has suffered harm; and  
Subsection - 1.3.7 - Extinguishment of Rights, Section 1 - Dis-
charge – the period that a party has a right to claim compensation in 
UAE law is mandatory and cannot be altered by the parties. The period 
in respect of a civil contract is two (2) years and for commercial con-
tracts is ten (10) years.  
Further points demonstrated from the examinations are that: 
1) The method adopted by fiqh and so UAE Law to determine if gha-
rar is present in a contract is, if a dispute arises between the 
parties then gharar is present and the contract will be classified 
as void;  
2) Unlike EW Law where freedom of contract allows parties to de-
cide their own provisions, such a right is limited under UAE Law. 
Page 101 of 273 
 
The effect of article 206 illustrates this as the contract provisions 
have to support the rights and obligations placed on the parties 
by Law, for which no provision can be aleatory. Whereas in EW 
Law a party wishing to be granted relief in an un-balanced con-
tract is dependent on the use of implied terms, the contra 
proferentem rule, and where applicable rules against penal-
ties/forfeiture; 
3) By application of the prohibition test using the innovative defini-
tions of the gharar and riba prohibitions as proposed by the au-
thor to ensure equivalence of the contract, obligates parties to a 
construction contract to act in a manner that prevents infringing 
these prohibitions; 
4) The obligations placed on the parties by the articles of the Law, 
taking account of the said prohibitions, require that the parties 
act in a moral and ethical manner when conducting their con-
tract; and  
5) Specific articles of the UCC are aimed at preventing one party 
from taking advantage of the other where circumstances cause 
gharar/riba to be present in a contract. Such articles operate by 
application of article 2, UCC or they are express in their require-
ment.  
As stated earlier, articles 1 and 2, UCC obligate parties to interpret and 
apply the articles of the Law that apply to their type of contract in a 
manner compliant with the gharar and riba prohibitions. This applies to 
articles that are: 1) express in their requirements; or 2) general in their 
requirement and so are open in their interpretation and application.    
In both instances, when interpreting the requirements of the articles 
the prohibition test is applied to ensure equivalence of the contract to 
prevent gharar and riba being present in a transaction.  
Where the article is general in its requirement the form of the examina-
tion is contemporary interpretations by use of examples, where appli-
cable, to illustrate the following:  
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1) How these prohibitions can manifest in a construction contract; 
and  
2) What parties’ obligations are to avoid contravening these prohibi-
tions, or to correct the defective elements of the contract where 
the said prohibitions are contravened.  
To understand fully the obligations placed on parties by articles of the 
Law, consideration needs to be given to article 206, UCC. The reason is 
that this article determines how the provisions of contract that the par-
ties agree to are to be applied in their contract. Hence, the effect of ar-
ticle 206 forms part of the analysis in this subsection. 
Article 206 
Article 206 requires that party agreed contract provisions must not con-
travene the Law or morals of fiqh otherwise they will be void and so 
should be severed from the contract225. Subsection 1.1.2 above sets out 
three types of provisions, and illustrates that as their operation is de-
pendent on an uncertain event or future contingency they are aleatory 
as they allow gharar to be intrinsic to the contract. This in turn allows 
the Employer to acquire services and goods at the expense of the Con-
tractor, thereby allowing the Employer to make an unfair gain.  
This in turn results in speculation as to whether a party will achieve the 
anticipated profit from the transaction. Such provisions can also allow a 
riba to be present in a contract as they confer a right that allows a par-
ty to act in an opportunistic manner to increase unfairly its profit at the 
Contractor’s expense.  
In addition to these provisions are clauses that make the Contractor li-
able for matters over which he has no control. Such provisions in re-
spect of a construction contract are those that allows the Employer to 
decide the Contractor’s rights as to: 
                                      
225 Ibn Rushd, op cit., n. 5, p. 155; Coulson, op cit., n. 7, p. 44; Vogel & Hayes, op cit., n. 9, pp. 100-102; 
Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 37. 
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1) Quality and scope of work, by operation of approval, variation 
and future contingency provisions such as physical Site Condi-
tions. A provision of this nature allows the Employer to decide 
whether the Contractor is liable for additional work needed to 
overcome a subsurface physical condition at Site. This is despite 
subsurface ground conditions varying dramatically. Thus, the 
Contractor has to speculate as to what the physical Site condi-
tions may be and is therefore taking a gamble as to the mode of 
performance (temporary works and type of resources to do the 
work) 226. This leads to gharar as to the quantity of work to be 
done, and whether the period of delivery and countervalue are 
accurate227. This includes utilities and mandatory requirements 
associated with the same; 
2) Coordinate/cooperate with the Employer’s other third party con-
tractors who Contractor A is dependent on to discharge his obli-
gations. Where a third party contractor is in delay, for whatever 
reason, then Contractor A cannot complete and the Employer can 
hold Contractor A responsible for the delay228.   
In the first instance the Contractor can suffer financial harm because of 
necessary changes in the mode of performance, i.e. temporary works, 
different equipment needed to perform the work, additional/extra work 
necessary to achieve the design, and any delay to delivery caused by 
the same. This situation can be further exacerbated where the Employ-
er delays in correcting the initial (deficient) design to take account of 
the actual ground conditions.   
Consequently, there is an unfair gain in that work done is not equiva-
lent to the value of the structure built as the Contractor had to over-
                                      
226 Mitsui Construction Co Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong (1986) 33 BLR, 1 by the Privy Council; 
Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 309.  
227Red Line, Doha Metro the Contractor discovered that the ground was heavily contaminated with erosive 
chemicals requiring a completely different approach to the tunneling and underground station work.   
228 Certain conditions of contract, such as FIDIC99 see Sub-Clause 4.6 make this an express requirement, 
but its operation in practice due to conflicting needs of one contractor with the other contractor. Glover & 
Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 92-94 – the commentary provided in respect of this provision demonstrates 
there is a high degree of speculation as to what such co-operation entails.  
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come exceptional difficulties229. Their effect can cause Contractors to 
suffer substantial losses and consequently the potential for a dispute to 
arise.  
In the second instance, whilst as there is no contractual obligation be-
tween the different Contractors, Contractor A, although dependent on 
Contractor B to coordinate or cooperate, Contractor A has no power to 
force Contractor B to complete and so has no control over whether he 
will be able to meet his delivery date.  
Thus, Contractor A’s agreed delivery date, mode of performance and 
countervalue are speculative. Consequently, a provision of the contract 
of this nature is aleatory as it prevents the anticipated profit from being 
attained. Coupled to this the Employer has the right to deduct damages 
where the Contractor is in delay thereby causing riba to infect the 
contract.  
A further important requirement is that article 206 records, that if a 
provision of this nature induces the contract, then the contract will be 
void230. Thus, if any, or a combination of these type of provisions cause 
a party to enter into the contract, the contract would be void.  
The analysis above illustrates that these provisions fail to satisfy the 
prohibition test. The reason is they provide an opportunity to make an 
unfair gain providing fertile grounds for a dispute to arise. This is the 
reason why the method adopted by fiqh, to identify if gharar has infect-
ed the contract, is if a dispute arises between the parties. If a dispute 
does arise then gharar is present and the contract is void231 unless gha-
rar can be removed.   
                                      
229 A decision from the Diwan al-Mazalim, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Decision of 6/2/1398 AH (17th January 
1978), MAFQ 11, 1992, pp. 291-297 – the contract between the KSA Government placed the risk on the 
Contractor in respect of ground conditions. The Court rejected the ministry’s position. ‘...It found in the 
case a typical example of imprévision: This case raises what is known in the doctrine, in case-law generally 
and in administrative case-law in particular, as the theory of unforeseen material difficulties. The theory 
can be summarised as follows: ‘If the party faces at the time of performance of his obligations material 
difficulties that have a purely exceptional character and could not be in any way foreseen at the time the 
contract was concluded, it is possible for him to ask for total compensation for the harm done to him 
because of the difficulties...’   
230 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, UCC, Art. 206. 
231 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, UCC, art. 203, commentary. 
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As illustrated by the above analysis, unlike EW Law where freedom of 
contract allows parties to decide their own provisions, such a right is 
limited under UAE Law. This is because parties to a contract have to 
abide by the articles of the Law that regulate their contract. Also, due 
to the effect of article 206, they have to ensure that their agreed con-
tract provisions support the rights and obligations placed on them by 
Law. This obliges parties, when taking account of fiqh, to ensure they 
do not contravene the gharar/riba prohibitions and other precepts of Is-
lam such as unjust enrichment.  
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1.3.1 Legal Maxims  
The first articles examined are the relevant legal maxims232. These 
maxims were formulated in the first half of the second century of the 
hijra233 and evolved from early systematic reasoning. They are not uni-
form as to origin or period and take two forms, those that:  
1) Reflect the commands of the Qur’an and explained further by the 
Sunnah of the Prophet; and  
2) Were formulated by the pious Jurists, and so the roots of such 
maxims are found in fiqh234.   
The applicable articles are examined on an article-by-article basis for 
ease of reference.  
Article 31 
The maxim of article 31 is express in its requirement that mandatory 
provisions of the Law take precedence over a duty created by party 
agreed provisions235. Thus, parties’ autonomy to decide their rights and 
obligations with regard to the type of contract is restricted. By 
application of the prohibition test this maxim reinforces the effect of 
construction contracts falling within the nominate contract system, in 
that the parties’ rights and obligations which arise from the contract are 
decided by the Law and not the parties236.  
As a construction contract is for a future thing, parties have a strict 
obligation to abide by the requirements of article 3, 106(2)(b), 202(1), 
203, 874 and 875 to prevent gharar and riba being inherent in the 
contract. 
                                      
232 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, UCC, Art. 29-70. 
233 Schacht, op cit., n. 2, pp. 37-40. 
234 Kamali, M. H., A.O. (2008), Sharī’a Law an Introduction, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, UK, p. 142. 
235 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, UCC, art. 31. 
236 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, UCC, art. 128. 
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Taking account of this, the types of contract provision described under 
the analysis of article 206 should not be incorporated into the agreed 
contract as such provisions are aleatory237.  
Moreover, article 106(2)(c) will also be contravened, which provides:  
‘…The exercise of a right shall be unlawful if the interests desired 
are disproportionate to the harm that will be suffered by others 
[i.e. the other party to the Contract]…’ 
The disproportionate harm (additional cost) suffered will be in two ways 
where the Contractor’s performance is delayed. 1) The Contractor will 
have to retain resources at Site longer than expected; or 2) Alterna-
tively, the Contractor will have to deploy more resources to increase 
productivity to meet the agreed delivery date, i.e. the Contractor, by 
losing control of its obligation to deliver is forced to change his mode of 
performance. Hence, gharar manifests as the Employer obtains the ad-
ditional services provided by the Contractor for free, so the anticipated 
profit expected by the Contractor is not achieved.    
As illustrated, any provisions that allow the Employer to exploit the 
Contractor by manipulating what is required to discharge an obligation 
are not permitted. The cause is that as cited by the Jurists, an immoral 
incentive induced by the rights granted through these provisions to 
make an unfair gain238. A similar situation arises where the Contractor 
incurs additional expense as a result of the Employer threatening to 
deduct damages unless the Contractor meets the stipulated delivery 
date.  
Article 42 
This maxim expressly obliges parties not to harm one another. Where 
one party suffers harm, then the other party is not to retaliate, and 
where a party does cause harm, he shall remove the harm. Harm in re-
                                      
237 Comair-Obeid, op ci.t, n. 2, p. 5; Whelan, op cit., n. 6, UCC, art. 206, commentary; Abd El-Wahab 
Ahmed El- Hassan, op cit., n. 52. 
238 Rayner, op cit., n. 2, p. 291. 
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spect of a construction contract takes the form of unplanned expendi-
ture for which a party will not be reimbursed.  
By application of the prohibition test such circumstance might arise 
where the Employer fails to provide a complete design, either deliber-
ately, negligently or ignorantly239. This allows gharar to infect delivery 
as the requisite control needed to ensure the mode of performance 
cannot be established. If the situation is not corrected then a delay to 
delivery will occur. This in turn results in the Employer unfairly gaining 
additional services as the Contractor will have to remain at Site longer 
than planned, causing the Contractor to suffer harm.  
Hence, article 42 obligates the Employer to remove the harm by 
promptly issuing to the Contractor additional data needed to correct the 
deficient design. If this is not done then the Employer is obligated to 
compensate240 the Contractor by: 1) granting additional time needed to 
meet delivery; 2) paying the additional costs suffered by the Contractor 
resulting from the delay; and 3) paying for any additional/extra work 
needed to correct the design. 
This article also, by application of the prohibition test, obliges the Em-
ployer to refrain from acts that will delay delivery. The primary form 
that such an act takes is the Employer exercising his right to instruct a 
variation (a variation clause) which the Contractor is obligated to com-
ply with. Hence, as the attributes upon which the contract was created 
are of a speculative nature there is potential for an immoral incentive to 
be induced, allowing an undue profit by manipulating the Contractor’s 
obligations. 
This right allows the Employer to change the functional and quality re-
quirements and so the scope and type of work to be done. This in turn 
causes the Contractor to lose control of the four prerequisites241 that 
are necessary for a valid construction contract.  
                                      
239 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, art. 282, commentary. 
240 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, arts. 42, 282 and 292; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 199.  
241 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, UCC, art. 874, commentary. 
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Consequently, such provision is aleatory as the Contractor has lost con-
trol over what is needed to complete the structure. The reason is that a 
design variation can affect the appearance, quality, aesthetics, perfor-
mance and quantity of work. This in turn affects the mode of perfor-
mance, allowing gharar to manifest as to when delivery will be achieved 
and what the true countervalue is. This, for the grounds stated above, 
results in an unfair gain of services and goods by the Employer. The 
level of gharar is dictated by the scope of the variation and the timing 
when the variation is issued.  
The following example puts this into context. Where a variation revises 
only the internal office-partitioning layout whilst the external envelope 
is being constructed, then gharar infecting delivery and countervalue is 
nominal, i.e. the loss of control is minimal and the contract remains 
valid.  
Conversely, where such instruction was issued when finishing works 
were well advanced, then gharar contaminating delivery and counter-
value will be significant because of reworks, resulting in a significant 
loss of control by the Contractor to the mode of performance. The same 
situation applies where the instruction, despite being issued before par-
tition work starts to increase the number of offices, then productivity 
reduces as building smaller offices is more labour intensive. There will 
also be a loss of productivity to floor, ceiling and wall finishes, as again 
the work becomes more labour intensive.  
As the variation clause obliges the Contractor to do the varied work, 
there is gharar as to whether the requisite increase to delivery and 
countervalue will materialise. This makes a variation clause aleatory 
despite other articles of the UCC granting the right to the Contractor to: 
1) claim for the additional time needed to meet delivery242; and 2) be 
paid the additional expense resulting from the delay, the reduction to 
productivity and the unnecessary work done243. This is because:  
                                      
242 Article 886 and 887 UCC. 
243 Article 886 and 887 UCC. 
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1) The obligation placed on the Contractor to do the work weakens 
his position when negotiating his rights for additional time to 
meet delivery and additional payment for the expense of mitigat-
ing the delay where possible, the actual delay suffered, and the 
additional/extra work done;  
2) The employer be will released from liability where any of the 
clauses act to exclude liability or allow a discretion in the form 
stated under the examination of article 206 where such a provi-
sion(s) forms part of the contract; and 
3) Despite the Contractor satisfying the notice requirements the 
Employer is still in a position to exploit the Contractor by: 1) re-
fusing to accept liability for the delay to delivery and increase in 
countervalue; or 2) simply ignoring the notice and threatening to 
apply damages for late completion, and/or refusing to accept 
that the additional/extra work has caused the Contractor addi-
tional expense as a result of a reduction in productivity and re-
moval of work previously done.  
Again, the effect of a variation clause is analogous to granting the right 
to the Employer to change, unilaterally, the time for delivery without 
having to pay the consequences. Such circumstances contravene the 
requirements of articles 106(2)(c), 106(2)(b) and 203 for the grounds 
previously stated; and articles 386 and 476, 886 and 887, UCC and ar-
ticle 95 LCT, which obliges the Employer to compensate the Contractor 
both time and money.   
As stated at the start of this subsection, this is the central reason why 
party agreed provisions have to be interpreted in a manner to avoid or 
prevent contravening the gharar and riba injunctions, otherwise the 
contract will be void244. 
 
 
                                      
244 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, art. 210; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 43-55. 
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Article 32 
The maxim ‘an act required to perform an obligation is in itself an 
obligation’245.This article is express in its requirement. By application of 
the prohibition test to ensure reciprocity of the contract, the Employer 
must completely satisfy all the requirements of articles 874 and 875 to 
prevent gharar manifesting in a transaction.  
Moreover, if, during construction the Employer becomes aware of a de-
ficiency in the design, the Employer has an obligation to provide the 
missing information to avoid contravening the gharar prohibition. 
Conversely, this maxim also implies an obligation on Contractors to 
notify the Employer promptly of any design deficiencies. Using the 
prohibition test, the notice must demonstrate the cause of gharar and 
its effect on delivery causing delay246 and countervalue. This in turn 
allows the Employer to remedy any default on his part, which allows the 
Contractor to regain control of his obligations thereby negating gharar 
infecting delivery and countervalue.  
Article 52 
The maxim ‘where prohibition conflicts with an obligation, the prohibi-
tion shall take precedence’, article 52247, is express in its requirement. 
Thus, where a prohibition manifests itself as an obligation then the ob-
ligation shall no longer be an obligation248.  
An example is that a party to a contract is obligated to perform what 
they have agreed to do249. Hence, a Contractor enters into a contract to 
build a structure for which a complete design is provided. He starts the 
foundation work and comes across a large physical obstruction250.  
                                      
245 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, art. 32. 
246 Whelan, op cit. n., 6, art. 380 makes the claimant responsible for demonstrating the breach 
247 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, UCC, art. 52; A clause which contravenes a prohibition shall be invalid. Abd El-
Wahab Ahmed EL Hassan, op cit., n. 52; Coulson, op cit., n. 3, pp. 51-55; Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, pp. 
31-32.  
248 Rayner, op cit., n. 2, p 158. 
249 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, art. 338. 
250 The term applied to such circumstance is physical or abnormal unforeseen ground conditions. 
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This causes the contract to become defective as gharar is now present 
in that: 1) the design is no longer complete as characteristics of the 
structure are uncertain; and 2) there is a possibility that the structure 
may not come into existence251. These circumstances result in the re-
quirements of articles 202, 203, and 874 being contravened. Conse-
quently, by application of the prohibition test, the Contractor has the 
right to refrain from performance until the Employer issues the revised 
design.  
The Contractor would be entitled to additional time to meet delivery to 
negate the effect of gharar. The parties would be obligated to remove 
gharar by agreeing a new date for delivery along with the quality, char-
acteristics of the additional work and increase in countervalue.  
If the above is not done there is potential for the riba prohibition to be 
contravened. The grounds are that the Contractor, in order to avoid 
paying damages for late delivery, will pursue a solution to overcome 
the lack of instruction. Conversely, the Employer will seek to avoid 
payment and deduct damages for late delivery, further compounding 
the harm suffered by the Contractor.  
Conversely, the Employer would not have the benefit of the structure 
and so would consider it correct to deduct damages. These events, as 
construed by the Jurists, are the ingredients for a dispute to develop for 
which the primary cause is gharar. In either instance, the contract 
would be considered void. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
251 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, this article provides that where it can be demonstrated by the Obligor that it is 
impossible to give specific performance through some external cause which the Obligor played no part, 
then he is not liable to the Obligee. This being pursuant to the Shari’a rule that God imposes upon no 
person more than that person can do. 
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1.3.2 The Elements, Validity and Effect of the Contract 
The aim of articles 202 and 203, as illustrated earlier, is to prevent 
gharar from being intrinsic to a contract. 
Article 210  
Article 210(1) provides, that if the contract is found to be non-
compliant it will be declared void, as the nature and circumstances do 
not comply with the Law, i.e. the structure to be built has not been 
exactly determined due to a lack of description, resulting in gharar. The 
effect of this article is to ensure that the obligations placed on the 
parties to a construction contract by articles 202, 203, 206, and those 
which set out the requirements of a nominate contract are complied 
with.  
Where gharar is found to be present then article 212(1) applies. This 
article provides that where the requirements for a valid contract to 
come into existence were satisfied but then a certain element becomes 
no longer satisfactory, e.g. a necessary design change which allows 
gharar to infect delivery and countervalue, then the contract is 
‘defective’ until the imperfection is removed, if the imperfection is not 
removed the contract will become void. 
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1.3.3 The Effects of a Contract  
As illustrated, construction contracts are classed as one type of 
nominate contract. To ensure that parties fully grasp their obligations 
that arise from the effect of article 874, the requirements of article 2 
have to be complied with. Coupled to this, article 243(1) provides that 
the contract shall govern the subject matter; and article 243(2) 
provides that the parties are bound by and must perform the 
obligations that derive from the Contract.  
Their effect is that they obligate the Employer to prevent gharar by 
complying with the requirements of article 874. Conversely, the effect 
of these articles on the Contractor is that he is responsible for 
executing all work set out in the design to the quality specified in the 
design, thereby reinforcing the Contractor’s obligation as set out in 
articles 875 to 877. 
Article 243 
The requirements of article 243 are that the contract will be governed 
by the subject matter of the contract; and that parties to the contract 
must perform that which the contract obligates them to do. Thus, 
parties have to ensure that the provisions of the contract they agree to, 
which apply to their contract, reflect the rights and obligations that 
arise from the type of contract they have entered into.  
Hence, by applying the requirements of articles 31 and 206 no 
provision of the contract shall be of an aleatory nature.  
Article 246 
Article 246(1) requires that a construction contract be performed in 
accordance with its content and in a manner of good faith; and article 
246(2) requires that parties accept matters that accompany the 
primary obligation.  
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EW Law prima facie does not recognise a general principle of good faith 
in terms of performance of a contract252. In saying this, EW Law does 
not accept acts of bad faith253. The mechanism employed to prevent 
this is implied terms254. In the case of Director General of Fair trading 
v. First National Bank Plc the concept of good faith was defined as “…an 
overarching concept of fair and open dealing requiring both procedural 
and substantive fairness in contracting…”255. It was also stated in this 
case that the UK’s Unfair Terms in Consumer Regulations 1999 enacts 
the concept of good faith. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 has replaced 
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Regulations 1999, which as illustrated in 
the case of David, Barbara Abbott & Ors v RCI Europe256, the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 continues to recognise the concept of good faith.   
Where a contract confers a discretion to one of the contracting party’s, 
which is wider than that necessary to protect their own legitimate 
interests, Courts in Common Law jurisdictions such as Australia and 
Canada examine whether the discretion exercised is consistent with 
that required to fairly and reasonably protect their interest. This is 
demonstrated in Godfrey Constructions Pty Ltd v Kanangra Park Pty Ltd 
257, that there is a general obligation in Law that a party perform the 
obligations placed on it by the contract, despite there being a discretion 
to rescind the contract because such party was unwilling or unable to 
comply with the obligation. The basis of the Courts decisions was that 
such discretion should not be exercised in a capricious or arbitrary 
manner. The outcome has been that the Courts will construe such 
contractual powers in a way that requires consideration to be given to 
the interest of the other party. The approach is to ensure that powers 
conferred operate in line with the objective of the contract. 
Consequently, discretionary clauses, although aimed at protecting a 
                                      
252 Mckendrick, op cit., n. 23, p. 542, records “…While English contract law is influenced by notions of good 
faith, it does not, as yet recognize the existence off a doctrine of good faith…”; M. Bridge, Doubting Good 
Faith (2005)11 NZBLQ 430, 450 “…There is no general duty of good faith and fair dealing in English 
contract law and there is no reason why there should be…” 
253 In EW Law this is defined as to act in a dishonest manner and not in the sense which European 
jurisdiction does – Director of Fair Trading v. First National Bank [2000] 1 WLR – Evans-Lombe J.  
254 Collins, op cit., n. 19; Mckendrick, op cit., n. 23, pp. 379-380. 
255 [2001] UKHL 52 [2002]. 
256 [2016] EWHC 2602 (Ch). 
257(1972) 128 C.L.R. 529; Hoffens v Commercial Bank of Victoria Ltd (1980) 1 NZCPR 262. 
Page 116 of 273 
 
party’s interest, such clause should not be operated to undermine the 
reasonable expectations (profit to be achieved from the transaction) of 
the other258.       
 An example is where the Employer discovers that an element of the 
design is deficient, say the depths of the drainage system which 
prevents the system from working in accordance with the design. The 
Employer should issue a corrected design as promptly as possible and 
not wait for the Contractor to give notice requesting such correction. If, 
as a result of the deficient design, the Contractor suffers a delay to 
delivery and incurs additional expense, then agreement for a new date 
and countervalue should be reached to remove the gharar that has 
infected the Contract.  
Conversely, where the Employer is unaware of such deficiency the 
Contractor should notify the Employer promptly when discovering it, act 
to minimise the delay by detailing where changes in depth are required, 
change working methods or increase resources provided it does not 
cause financial harm to the Contractor. Such action removes the 
potential for gharar and riba to contaminate the contract.  
The above circumstances demonstrate that where a contract is a 
contract of mutual obligations, such as a construction contract, then the 
desired outcome will not be achieved if either of the party’s delay in 
performing its obligation.  
By application of the good faith obligation of article 246(2) to the above 
principle, then neither party to a contract of mutual obligations will 
prevent the other from discharging its obligations. This includes where 
one party is dependent on the other for its performance, then such 
party will not delay in performing that obligation upon which the other 
is dependent. 
This concept is supported by the following implied terms found in EW 
Law that: 
                                      
258 A.F. Mason, ‘Contracts, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing (2000) 116 (Jan), LQR 66-
94. 
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 “…Where in a written agreement it appears that both parties 
have agreed that something should be done which cannot 
effectively be done unless both concur in doing it, the 
construction of the contract is that each agrees to do all that is 
necessary to be done on his part for the carrying out of that 
thing though there may be no express words to that effect…”259; 
“…There is an implied contract by each party that he will not do 
anything to prevent the other from performing a contract or 
delay him in performing it. I agree that generally such a term is 
by law imported into every contract…”260; and  
as stated by Devlin J. in Mona Oil Equipment & Supply Co Ltd v. 
Rhodesia Railways Ltd261  
“…I can think of no term that can be properly implied other than 
one based on the necessity for co-operation…The law can enforce 
co-operation only in a limited degree…to the extent it is 
necessary to make the contract workable…”  
This principle has been incorporated into UAE Law by article 247. This 
article allows either party, where one party is dependent on the other 
to perform an obligation, to refrain from performing their obligation if 
the other party is not performing theirs262. Hence, an aim of this article 
is to prevent a party acting in an unfair way where he delays 
performance of the other party.  
The difficulty which arises in EW Law in the application of good faith is 
during negotiations in the formation of a contract. Such concept has 
been described as ‘inherently repugnant’ to the adversarial positions of 
the parties when involved in negotiations’263. The rationale argued is 
that: 1) parties should be free from any obligations until the contract 
comes into existence; 2) adversarial negotiations are fundamental to 
                                      
259 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, pp. 96 Lord Blackburn Mackay v. Dick (1881) 6 A.C. 251. 
260 Vaughan Williams L.J. Barque Quilpé Ltd v. Brown [1904] 2 K.B. 264, at 274. 
261 [1949] 2 All E.R. 1014. 
262 Dubai Court of Cassation Judgement #90/95. 
263 Lord Ackner – Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128. 
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the contract formation; and 3) it is impossible to impose an alternative 
system264.  
This is despite the argument that transparent negotiations would serve 
the parties long-term interests265 as this guarantees that both parties to 
the contract will achieve their planned benefit. This concept aligns itself 
with article 246(2), in that a primary obligation is for a structure to 
come into existence in the future to the expectations of the Employer. 
Hence, any withholding of requisite data by the Employer will prevent 
the Contractor from achieving this primary obligation of the contract 
and so neither party will achieve the equivalent benefits expected.   
Consequently, during negotiations parties hold back information as 
their aim is to get something as cheap as possible at the expense of the 
other. Such an environment clearly encourages an immoral incentive 
for an unfair gain. This in turn leads to uncertainty as to what an 
obligation entails or pressure to agree to aleatory provisions. These 
circumstances clearly conflict with the prohibition test.  
Such circumstance goes against the aim of the gharar prohibition of 
preventing an unfair gain caused by lack of knowledge as to what the 
Employer’s expectations are for the thing that is to come into existence 
in the future. The result is that the parties’ expectations will not be met 
which, if the financial loss is excessive, then a dispute will arise. 
Deliberate Silence 
An important aspect of UAE Law, as illustrated by article 186, UCC is 
that: 
 ‘…Deliberate silence concerning a fact or circumstance shall be 
treated as a misrepresentation if it is proved that the person 
                                      
264 Cohen, Two Freedoms and the Contract to Negotiate in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 12 
O.J.L.S. 
265 Hoskins H., Contractual obligations to negotiate in good faith; faithfulness to agree common purpose 
L.Q.R 131 2014. 
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misled thereby would not have made the contract had he been 
aware of that fact or circumstance…266.  
This is because fiqh views misrepresentation as a serious moral wrong, 
having a wider definition than that in EW Law267.  
Thus, negotiations shall be conducted in an honest and open manner, 
and in accordance with the principles of good faith in order to avoid 
speculation as to what an obligation fully entails. Consequently, the 
Employer has an obligation, pre-contract, to disclose circumstances 
that will affect the performance of an obligation.  
By application of the prohibition test to ensure equivalence, it is clear 
that to prevent contravening the gharar prohibition an Employer, where 
negotiations are aimed at concluding a contract, should disclose all 
information so a Contractor may draw his own conclusion about 
whether it will affect the way he prices the work to be done. Otherwise, 
article 874 will be contravened and there will be an unfair gain of 
services or goods. Where there is not full disclosure, then there is 
potential for the Employer being in a position to exploit the Contractor 
because of an immoral incentive to gain an undue benefit. Such 
exploitation results in unfair profit and so the riba prohibition being 
contravened.       
As EW Law allows parties to agree the obligations which derive from a 
contract of mutual obligations, subject to the parties being experienced 
and understanding what they are agreeing to, this allows gharar to be a 
characteristic of the contract268. Consequently, if one of the parties 
suffers a financial loss, then, as a result of speculating as to what it will 
cost to perform the obligation, he has no redress against the other 
party, unless misrepresentation can be demonstrated in accordance 
with the EW Misrepresentation Act 1967.  
                                      
266 Article 186 provides - Deliberate silence concerning a fact or circumstance shall be treated as a 
misrepresentation if it is proved that the person misled thereby would not have made the contract had he 
been aware of that fact or circumstance - Whelan, op cit., n. 6, p. 99. 
267 Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 205-206. 
268 Peel, op cit., n. 18, pp. 361-374. 
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The Misrepresentation Act gives the Courts the right to allow a party 
claiming misrepresentation to rescind the contract or treat the 
misrepresentation as a breach, entitling such party to damages in lieu 
of rescission. Rescission is a remedy allowed under EW Law in respect 
of all forms of misrepresentation, the aim of which is to restore the 
parties, as far as possible, to the position they were in before they 
entered into the contract269.      
If the party claiming misrepresentation is unable to satisfy the 
attributes to allow it to claim misrepresentation, then the party has to 
accept such loss. This being despite the party feeling aggrieved that it 
was misled during negotiations and should be reimbursed for losses 
suffered. Thus, unless: 
1) The Courts can imply a term in Law or fact which re-balances the 
risk so that the loss made as a result of the speculative decision 
is to be reimbursed by the other party; or  
2) The party with the advantage adopts a fair and reasonable 
approach and agrees to reimburse the losses suffered by the 
other party, the party suffering such loss has to accept it  
Moreover, a disclaimer in the form of an exclusion of liability clause will 
not have any effect under UAE Law as it is in direct contradiction of 
article 52, unlike in EW Law.  
As illustrated in this thesis, EW Law applies a number of methods to 
limit the effect of exclusion of liability clauses. These are namely:  
1) The contra proferentem doctrine, which as illustrated under the 
commentary of article 266, is to control the protection of the 
party who relies on such a clause by identifying ambiguities in 
the text of the clause270;  
2) Implied terms, where courts are allowed to act as an unofficial 
legislator where there is a lack of definition as to which party is 
responsible for a risk that arises from a contract which places 
                                      
269 Mckendrick, op cit., n. 23, pp 678-679. 
270 Lewison op cit., n. 156, pp. 260-268; McKendrick, op cit., n. 23, pp. 446-460. 
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such risk upon the party most suited to control such risk271. This 
is further examined in Section 2.4 below; and  
3) Strict interpretation of the application of such clauses272 so they 
do not offend the rules against penalties/forfeiture, see 
subsections 2.3.2 and 2.3.4 below.    
Article 249 
Article 249 invokes the concept of Al-Qūwat Al-Qāhira, a similar 
concept of force majeure273 or intervening contingencies274. If such 
circumstance occurs, the Contractor loses control over its obligations 
(the mode of performance is no longer possible) and gharar infects the 
contract. Where such circumstance causes unfair loss/harm as 
performance is impossible or has become unreasonably burdensome275, 
threatening grave financial losses (a major delay to delivery occurs 
allowing the Employer to deduct damages), then riba will contaminate 
the contract.  
The effect of either of these circumstances cause the equilibrium of the 
contract to be lost. Where this occurs the Court can, upon application 
from the party facing the financial losses, weighing up the interests of 
the parties, reduce the onerous obligation to a reasonable one, 
reinstating the balance of benefits.  
The form the reinstatement can take is to allow the Contractor to be 
exempt from the obligation, or the period for delivery or countervalue 
being adjusted276. 
                                      
271 McKendrick, op cit., n. 23, pp. 337-402. 
272 McKendrick, op cit., n. 23, pp. 446-460. 
273 Amkhan A, (1991) ‘Force Majeure and Impossibility of Performance in Arab Contract Law’, (ALQ), pp. 
297-308; Rayner, op cit., n. 2, pp. 259-263. 
274 Amkhan A, (1994) ‘The Effect of Change in Circumstances in Arab Contract Law’, (ALQ), pp. 258-275. 
Both of these doctrines are accepted by the Maliki School. 
275 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, UCC, Art. 273(1), provides that where Al-Qūwat Al-Qāhira intervenes when a 
corresponding obligation which makes performance impossible, the contract will be automatically cancelled; 
Art. 273(2) releases the Obligor from performance where the impossibility of performance is of a temporary 
nature, although the Obligee can cancel the contract by notice to the Obligor during the period of 
temporary impossibility. This circumstance would correspond to partial or full suspension of the Works.   
276 Rayner, op cit., n. 5, pp. 259-261. 
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There are two alternative responses depending on how these 
intervening contingencies manifest:  
1) Excuse that which applies to a contract where a time period is 
specified for performance, where such intervening contingencies 
render continuing performance harmful to the Contractor, e.g. 
mode of performance is no longer possible as a result of 
unforeseen physical obstruction which did not appear in the 
geotechnical reports, or from a misinterpretation of the same277; 
and  
2) Disastrous event such as flooding, earthquakes or an epidemic 
that are considered acts of God. 
An Employer’s act that prevents the Contractor from building the 
structure, such as the suspending of the Works for an excessive period, 
would also fall within the ambit of excuse.  
For the Contractor to claim that an obligation has become unreasonably 
burdensome he must: 1) demonstrate that the event was wholly 
unforeseeable, 2) a fundamental change has occurred, 3) the contract 
has become exceptionally onerous on the party discharging the 
obligation and so there is a duty to impose a reasonable solution278.   
An example of the above is where a change is enacted to migrant 
labour laws limiting the number of migrant workers a company can 
employ which occurs after signing the contract and there was no prior 
warning, then the obligation to meet the agreed delivery date will 
become speculative. The reason is that migrant workers establish what 
productivity a Contractor can achieve. If he cannot secure the planned 
level of migrant workers, the planned durations for executing 
construction activities will become impossible, resulting in gharar 
infecting delivery as there will be a significant increase in time needed 
to achieve delivery of the structure.  
                                      
277 Rayner S, (1991) ‘A note of Force Majeure’ in Islamic Law (ALQ), pp. 86-89. 
278 Amkhan, op cit., n. 273; Amkhan, op cit., n. 274. 
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This will cause the Contractor to incur excessive Site administrative 
costs by having to keep equipment needed to build the structure and 
supervisory staff on the project longer than planned279, and by missing 
the stipulated delivery date, this will permit the Employer to claim 
damages for late delivery, thereby causing riba to pollute the contract.  
As the effect of this new labour law would be the same for all 
construction contracts, Employers will lose the benefit of the use of the 
structure in the short term. However, they will eventually receive the 
planned benefit, whilst Contractors will not be able to recover the 
losses suffered. This will be an unfair gain of goods/services as 
Contractors have to remain at Site longer than planned. Hence, the 
Court has a duty to take account of the gharar that has infected the 
Contractor’s obligations.  
This can further lead to riba contaminating the contract as the 
Employer can deduct damages for late completion thereby allowing him 
to gain an excessive benefit273. 
The comparable principle with this article in EW Law is the doctrine of 
frustration that operates by discharging parties from further 
performance of a contract. For it to operate the following applies:  
1) A fundamental assumption upon which the parties agreed the 
contract can no longer apply due to some unforeseen 
supervening event;  
2) The frustrating event must not have been brought on by either of 
the parties;  
3) Neither of the parties accepted responsibility for an unforeseen 
event through the contract; and  
4) The event must make further performance impossible280.     
This fundamental assumption has been assessed as going to the root of 
the contract, as it is essential for the performance of the contract281. 
                                      
279 Case #14 of the Syrian Court of Cassation 17/1/1981 ruled that sharp change in economic 
circumstances falls within the ambit of intervening contingencies.  
280 Atkins Chamber’s op cit., n. 19, pp. 65-67.  
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Lord Radcliffe recorded:  
“… Frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without 
default of either party a contractual obligation has become 
incapable of being performed because of the circumstance in 
which performance is called for would render it a thing radically 
different from that which was undertaken by the contract… it was 
not this that I promised to do...”282 
However, the application of this doctrine in the context of a 
construction contract is limited as the party agreed contract provision 
generally provide for when an unanticipated event occurs.  
In the absence of a contract provision that addresses such an event the 
Contractor would be liable to complete, despite any significant increase 
in cost as the Employer does not guarantee the practicality of the 
design nor the suitability of the Site283. This, as illustrated above, is a 
fundamental difference between UAE and EW Law. 
This is also the case where the cost to perform the contract significantly 
increases due to an abnormal increase in prices. EW Law does not 
recognise the economic impracticability as fulfilling the requirement 
that performance is impossible284.   
As illustrated above, economic impracticability is recognised in UAE Law 
as Force Majeure. However, as demonstrated by the examples given, 
such economic impracticability must affect the construction industry as 
a whole285.   
 
 
                                                                                                                   
281 Krell v Henry [1903] 2 K.B. 740. 
282 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC [1956] A.C, 696. 
283 Atkins Chamber’s op cit., n. 19, pp. 65-67. 
284 British Movietonews Ltd v London & District Cinemas [1952] A.C. 166; Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd v C. 
S. Wilson & Co Ltd [1917] A.C. 495; Gold Group Properties Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd (2010) B.L.R. 235; The 
Nema [1982] A.C. 724; Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd v Noblee Thorl GmBH [1962] A.C. 93. 
285 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, art. 249. 
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1.3.4 The Construction of Contracts  
Article 263  
Article 263 expressly provides that a description of an absent thing shall 
have effect. Applying the prohibition test this article supports article 
874 in that as a structure comes into existence in the future the Con-
tractor has the right to rely on the description given by the Employer, 
otherwise gharar would be present286.   
Consequently, any lack of such definition which results in an aesthetic 
requirement or lack of performance not being satisfied falls to the 
Employer287. To prevent such instance article 246(2) obligates the 
Employer to rectify such deficiency in order to remove speculation as to 
countervalue and time for delivery. 
Article 266 
Article 266 provides that doubt will be interpreted in favour of the 
Obligor. Thus, where there is any speculation in the interpretation of 
the wording of the contract causing gharar, such doubt will be 
interpreted in favour of the Contractor.  
An example in respect of a construction contract is where there is 
ambiguity in the interpretation as to which utilities are to be placed in 
the ground first because of a poorly drafted specification. Coupled to 
this, each utility is to be installed by different Contractors. Applying the 
requirements of article 246(2) and using the prohibition test, the 
Employer is obligated to state which utility will be first.  This removes 
gharar in the form of speculation as to the mode of performance, i.e. 
form and type of lateral support required to prevent collapse of an 
excavation, method of excavation, machine or by manual labour etc., 
all of which negates speculation as to delivery and countervalue.  
The aim of this article is to provide certainty in respect of work to be 
done or goods to be supplied by favouring the Contractor, and places 
                                      
286 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, art. 263, commentary. 
287 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, art. 263, commentary. 
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an obligation on the Employer to ensure that the design is meticulously 
prepared to avoid gharar infecting the contract.  
The contra proferentem rule is comparable with the application of 
article 266 in EW Law. The rule is that where there is ambiguity in 
respect of a document where methods of interpretation have failed to 
clarify, then the words creating the ambiguity should be construed 
against the party relying on such wording288. Sedley L.J. described this 
not only as a principle in law but also of justice, as its aim is to limit the 
power of a dominant party who can adopt a take it or leave it 
approach289.  
Such statement is supported by Lord Mustill290 who recorded:  
‘…the basis of the ‘contra proferentem’ principle is that a person 
who puts forward the wording of a proposed agreement may be 
assumed to have looked after his own interests, so that if words 
leave room for doubt about whether he is intended to have a 
particular benefit there is reason to suppose that he is not…”  
And Evans L.J.291 who stated: 
“…It is common ground that the rule of construction known as 
contra [proferentem] operates against the respondent for two 
reasons. First they only rely upon the clause to exclude or to 
limit the liability alleged against them, and, secondly, they were 
responsible for introducing during the negotiation process the 
particular parts of the clause on which they now rely…’ 
The above extracts illustrate that the aim of the contra proferentem 
principle is to introduce equity into the construction and interpretation 
of a provision of which the aim is to protect the party who relies on its 
operation. The reason is that the provisions objective is to protect such 
                                      
288 Furst & Ramsey, op cit., n. 42, p. 61. 
289 Lewison op cit., n. 156, p. 261 - Association of British Travel Agents Ltd v British Airways Plc [2000] 
2 All E.R. (Comm) 204; Johnson v Edgware Railway Co. (1866) 35 Bev. 480 – Romily M.R. recorded “…It is 
to be observed, that all deeds are to be construed most strongly against the grantor…” 
290 Lewison op cit., n. 156, p. 262 – Tam Wing Chuen v Bank of Credit and Commerce Hong Kong Ltd 
[1996] 2 B.L.C. 69. 
291 Lewison op cit., n. 156, p. 264 – BHP Petroleum Ltd v British Steel Plc [2000] 2 Lloyds Rep 277. 
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party’s interests by excluding it from being liable for an act that causes 
the other party harm.   
Hence, there is a clear analogy between EW Law and fiqh on the basis 
of the application of this rule, as the aim in both jurisdictions is to 
ensure justice and so fairness by ensuring a balance of obligations by 
favouring the party to whom the ambiguity will do the most harm.  
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1.3.5 Means of Enforcement, Section 1 – Voluntary Execution 
Article 354  
Article 354 is express in its requirement that substitute performance is 
only allowed with the Employer’s consent. The Contractor is obliged by 
article 338 to complete the structure as per the design292. Thus, 
variations to the design have to be instructed by the Employer. This is 
comparable with the Contractor’s obligation in EW Law, as any variance 
to the design by the Contractor results in a breach of contract by the 
Contractor293.  
Without the right granted to the Employer by article 354 the Employer 
would not be able to revise the design, quality, quantity of work and 
mode of performance, and so time for delivery as time is a fundamental 
constituent of countervalue. Moreover, there would be no mechanism to 
remove gharar infecting the contract resulting from the Employer’s 
deficient design, and so the Contract would be void. 
Note, no liability can be placed on the Contractor where he 
misinterprets geological surveys, as by application of the prohibition 
test this allows gharar to infect the contract. This is illustrated by the 
following analogy. If a man is blindfolded before he is allowed to cross 
the road, his ability to control when he crosses the road is removed. 
Thus, if a Contractor is not to dig up services buried in the ground, 
without data to indicate where such services are he has no control over 
how he is to prevent digging them up.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
292 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, art. 338 provides - A right must be satisfied when it satisfies the legal provisions 
rendering it due for performance, and if an obligor fails [to perform an obligation], it must be compulsorily 
enforced either by way of specific performance or by way of compensation in accordance with the 
provisions of the law - Whelan, op cit., n. 6, Arts. 380-387. 
293 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, p. 783. 
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1.3.6 Means of Enforcement, Section 2 – Compulsory Enforcement  
Articles 380, 386 and 387 
Article 380(1) is clear in that it gives a right to a party to give notice to 
the other party to compel that party to perform where it is failing to do 
so294.  
Article 386 obliges the defaulting party to pay compensation. However, 
where the defaulting party can demonstrate that it was impossible to 
perform an obligation, or that a delay in giving such performance was 
through some external cause in which they played no part295, then the 
non-performing party will not be liable to the other.  
Article 387 provides that an injured party may claim compensation 
provided a notice has been issued under article 380296. 
For a party to demonstrate that performance is impossible or delayed 
due to gharar infecting the contract through an external cause, the 
following criteria have to be satisfied297: 
1) The cause was unforeseeable at the time of signing the contract. 
The measure to illustrate this being that a diligent man, when 
entering into a contract would have foreseen the impossibil-
ity/delay of performance. This obligation is not absolute298; and 
2) The cause was unavoidable in that the party must be able to 
demonstrate that all steps were taken to prevent the occurrence 
of the event or its consequences. 
An example of an external cause delaying the performance of the 
Contractor, in which he played no part whilst satisfying these criteria, is 
that the Employer’s initial design was deficient at the time of 
contracting. The Employer failed to meet its obligations under articles 
                                      
294 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, - Commentary on the UCC in respect of this article which states that the obligee 
has the right to demand performance of an obligation where it is in the bounds of possibility and the obligor 
has the right to discharge the obligation. There is no right for substitution of performance unless the parties 
agree on such a substitution.  
295 The basis of this right being derived from the Shari’a doctrine that Allah imposes upon no person more 
than he can do, Whelan, op cit., n. 6, commentary on Art. 386. 
296 Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment No. 13/99. 
297 Amkhan, op cit., n. 273; Amkhan, op cit., n. 274. 
298 Amkhan, op cit., n. 273; Amkhan, op cit., n. 274. 
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202, 203 and 874 to provide a complete design so as not to allow 
gharar to infect the mode of performance, period of delivery and so 
countervalue. 
As illustrated by article 354, only the Employer has the right to vary the 
design. Hence, any delay in correcting the design by the Employer will 
in turn increase the level of gharar infecting the said attributes. 
Coupled to this, where the corrected design causes the Contractor to do 
additional/extra work or changes the mode of performance, again the 
level of gharar will increase these attributes.  
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1.3.7 Extinguishment of Rights, Section 1 - Discharge 
Articles 472, 476, 487 and 95 LCT are the relevant articles that are 
considered to apply to a construction contract. 
Article 472 - Impossibility of performance 
Article 472 is clear in its requirements in that the Obligee will be 
released from performance of an obligation where he proves it has 
become impossible due to an external cause. Hence, if an Employer 
instructs the Contractor to suspend work whilst he revises the design 
and attempts to arrange additional financing, but fails to instruct the 
Contractor to re-start work, then delivery will be impossible.  
In such a case, by application of the prohibition test, the Contractor has 
the right to be released from performance. The exercising of this right 
negates gharar in the form of the Contractor having to retain resources 
at the Site, despite not providing any benefit to the Employer caused by 
the uncertainty as to whether the structure will come into existence. It 
will also prevent contravening the riba prohibition as the Employer will 
be unable to apply damages for late delivery.     
Articles 476, 482, 486 487 and 95 LCT - Compulsory period 
within which to make a Claim 
An important aspect of UAE Law is that it sets out mandatory periods in 
which parties can make a claim against the other. This right is subject 
to the requirements of articles 380(1), 386 and 387, above. 
Where the construction contract is of a civil nature, i.e., one of the 
party’s to the contract is a private individual or a government body, 
then article 476, UCC gives parties the right to make a claim within two 
(2) years299. Where the contract is of a commercial nature, i.e. both 
parties are companies, then article 95, LCT extends the right to ten 
(10) years. The point from which time starts to run in respect of article 
476, UCC and 95, LCT is the date from which the right became due, 
                                      
299 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, Art 476. 
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with the period being measured in days, with the first day not being 
included in the calculation, but inclusive of the last day.  
Article 486 provides that a right is barred once the specified time for 
making such claim has expired. Article 487 provides that parties are not 
allowed to agree a different time period for a party to make a claim 
other than that stated in Law.  
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1.4 Methods applied to confirm the interpretation of the English 
translation of the UCC  
This section examines the accuracy of translations upon which the 
analysis set out in this thesis was verified. The process adopted was to 
compare texts of injunctions in the Qur’an quoted in the literature 
examined to identify consistency of the meaning of the text. It should 
be noted that many of the authors of the literature examined are Arab. 
Where differences in wording were found, the translations were 
carefully examined by applying different meanings to words used, 
taking cognizance of the context of the words being applied to identify 
whether there were any fundamental differences in what the text was 
conveying to the reader; no such differences were found. 
The approach adopted to examine the text where books/articles quoted 
a particular Jurist’s doctrine, was that consideration was given to the 
meaning of the words applied in the text to ensure the point(s) they 
were making were consistent with other author’s views. For example, in 
the translation of Ibn Rushd’s definition of a gharar sale as recorded at 
page 179 in his book Bidāyat al-Mujiahid II, the Book of Sale, ‘24.2.5 
Chapter 3: Sales Proscribed on Account of Misappropriation the Cause 
of which is Gharar’, the aim was to demonstrate that where the 
characteristics of the subject matter was wanting and/or the quantity, 
quality was lacking, and/or there was any obstacles to delivery of the 
subject matter, then gharar is present in the contract resulting in 
misappropriation. Nabil Saleh in his book ‘Unlawful Gain and Legitimate 
Profit in Islamic Law’ at page 52; Nayla Comair-Obeid in her book ‘The 
Law of Business Contracts in the Middle East’, page 58; Susan Rayner 
at page 289 in her book ‘The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law’; and 
Noel Coulson at page 44 in his book ‘Commercial Law in the Gulf States’ 
all describe the same circumstances as that stated in the text of Ibn 
Rushd’s book. 
This same process was applied to confirm the translation provided by 
Mahdi Zaraa and Shafaai M Mahmor’s translation in their article ‘The 
Validity of Contracts when the Goods are not yet in Existence in the 
Islamic Law of Sale of Goods’ to Ibn Juzayy’s definition of a gharar sale. 
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This translation was analogous with translations given by Nayla Comair-
Obeid at page 58 of her book, page 51 of Nabil Saleh’s book, and again 
Susan Rayner’s description of this text at page 289 of her book.  
In respect of the UCC, Whelan first translated this Code in 1987 with 
the assistance of Essam Al Tamimi, a prominent lawyer in Dubai, and 
Dr. Hassan Alloub, a former Judge, which was published by Graham 
and Trotham300. This became the customary reference book used by 
legal and claims practitioners in the construction industry in the UAE up 
until Whelan published his new translation301.  
The problem with the first translation was that without having 
knowledge of the underlying doctrines, little sense could be made of the 
articles, this being illustrated by the text of the Preface in Whelan’s new 
translation. This records that at the time of the first translation the 
Ministry of Justice Commentary on the Civil Code had not been 
published, with only a few judgements being available from the Federal 
Court of Cassation and the Dubai Court of Cassation as to how the 
articles of the Law applied. Thus, Whelan felt that a new translation was 
needed.  
Despite this, to confirm the accuracy of this improved translation of the 
UCC, a comparison of the text was made with the text of the translation 
prepared by Daoud A. Abdo PhD, Professor of Linguistics which was 
published in Amman, Jordan in 1995302 to ensure that the aim of the 
articles of the UCC were consistent.  
Whelan’s translation of the UCC includes a translation of the Ministry of 
Justice Commentary on the Civil Code, which explains how the articles 
of the Law are to be interpreted and applied. These explanations make 
reference to articles in the Majallah el-Ahkam-I-Adliya (Mejelle), the 
Civil Code of the Ottoman Empire, to assist in the interpreting and 
application of the articles of the UCC. Translations of articles cited from 
the Mejelle were compared with translations of the Mejelle in the Arab 
                                      
300 Under the title Business Laws of the United Arab Emirates Volume III, ISBN 0 86010 860 0. 
301 Copies of extracts from this book was provided to the author by Alqari Advocates & Legal Consultants 
of Dubai, Galadari Pinsent Masons, Al Tamimi & Company.   
302 National Library, Amman – Jordan 399/4/1995. 
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Law Quarterly (ALQ) and those prepared by Tyser, Demetriates and 
Effendi to ensure the meaning of these articles were consistent. This 
process allowed the author to verify that the intent of the articles of the 
UCC being examined was accurate.  
An example of how this comparison was undertaken is presented below 
in respect of article 203(1), UCC. To identify which translations are 
being examined the following references have been applied: Whelan’s 
translation (WT), Professor Abdo (AT), ALQ’s translation of the Mejelle 
(AM) and Tyser, Demetriates and Effendi’s translation (TDE).  
For example, the text of the translation of article 203(1) UCC was 
examined. The text was typed, starting with AT’s translation which 
provides ‘…The object of a compensatory contract (i.e. to give money or 
something else of value to (someone) in return for something (such as 
work)303) shall be specifically designated in a manner beyond all 
doubt…by describing its main characteristics, and by showing its 
amount if it is assessable (quantifiable, measureable) or in any other 
manner that eliminates sheer ignorance…’ WT’s translation provides 
‘…In commutative contracts (the price paid is the equivalent of the 
goods/work provided) involving property the subject matter must be 
specified in such a way as to avoid gross uncertainty…by a statement of 
its distinguishing characteristic, and the amount thereof must be stated 
if it is measurable property of the like, in such a manner as avoids 
gross uncertainty…’ 
Although there are differences in the text of the two translations, the 
aim of the article is the same. In that where the subject matter of a 
contract is where one party pays another for goods/work, then the 
specific characteristics of the subject matter must be described. This 
includes the amount of the goods/work to be done in a manner to avoid 
complete ignorance or gross uncertainty of the subject matter so that 
the consideration paid reflects the true value of the subject matter of 
the exchange.    
                                      
303 Merriam-Webster Dictionary online. 
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WT’s translation of the Ministry of Justice Commentary on the Civil 
Code reveals that the reason for this is in order to prevent a dispute 
arising from the contract caused by one of the parties feeling they have 
been deceived. Thus, where the subject matter is impossible to specify, 
or work done cannot be accurately estimated or is partly undetermined, 
then the contract is void. The Ministry of Justice Commentary on the 
Civil Code makes reference to articles 200-304 of the Mejelle.  
From an examination of these articles from the translations of AM and 
TDE, it was seen that articles 200 to 251 and 262 to 292 are relevant to 
a construction contract as they specify, including examples of the 
prerequisites to be satisfied for the following elements that create a 
valid contract, the subject matter, price and delivery.  
It was again found that although the wording of these translations were 
different, the objective of them was consistent. An example of this 
being in respect of a thing being sold. The parties must know the 
subject matter by referring to its state or qualities of its state and a 
description, which distinguishes it from other things. This is illustrated 
by the translation of article 201 which AM provides ‘…The fact that the 
thing sold is known is ascertained by referring to its state and 
description which distinguish it from other things…’ whilst TDE provides 
‘…The thing sold becomes known by a description of its qualities and 
state, distinguish it from other things…’.  
Articles which require the essential elements to be described must be 
satisfied. The term ‘Price’ is selected as an example. The articles state 
the way the price is to be ascertained is from the description of the 
thing being sold. Thus, if the thing is measurable then this will be a 
basis of calculating the price, and the price has to be stated in the 
agreement. Where payment is to be by instalments the period has to be 
stated.   
By applying the above process it was found that although texts of 
translations are different, the aim being conveyed is consistent. A 
benefit of this approach was that when applying different meanings to 
words used to translate a text, taking account of the context in which 
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such words were applied, particularly where the authors were ‘of Arabic 
origin’, gave a clear understanding of the depth and scope as to the 
objective of an injunction, the doctrines developed by Jurists from such 
injunctions, and so how the articles of the UCC would apply to a 
construction contract.  
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Part 2 – Gharar,riba and the influence of English Law 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Part 2 examines the effect EW Law has on construction contracts in the 
Emirate of Dubai, and the difference in the application of good faith in 
EW and UAE Law. It also demonstrates that notice and discretionary 
clauses, when applied taking account of the current approach of such 
provisions in EW Law, conflict with the aim of the gharar and riba 
prohibitions.    
This section also establishes there are two contractual approaches in 
EW Law that operate in a manner that adheres closely to the notion of 
good faith, these are: 
1) Parties’ expectations: Parties, whilst protecting their interests, 
should not operate contractual provisions which favour them in a 
manner which is detrimental to the other; and  
2) Construction contracts have been classified as relational 
contracts because their aim is to achieve a common goal for the 
successful completion of a structure. To achieve this it is a 
prerequisite that parties have a high level of cooperation. Such 
cooperation requires that notice and discretionary clauses be 
operated in a manner that allows each party to realise the 
anticipated profit they expect from the bargain.  
These two forms of contractual approaches have strong similarities as 
to how UAE Law requires parties to perform a contract of mutual 
obligation. 
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2.2 EW Law and Construction Contracts in the Emirate of Dubai 
 
As stated in the Preamble, the most common standard form of 
construction contract which Employers used for procuring a 
construction project when this research was carried out was FIDIC99. 
This contract is specifically for use with both M&V and LS Contracts.   
Although FIDIC99 is available in the Arabic language, Employer’s - 
Government, parastatal and the private sector use the English language 
version with the governing language being English304. Arabic is only 
used for specific elements such as the Agreement, with the applicable 
Law being that of the UAE305, which in turn determines the validity and 
enforceability of the contract provisions306.   
This is put down to the dominance of American and British project 
management companies (PMC’s) (AECOM, Hyder, KEO, Halcrow, 
PARSONS, Parsons-Brinckerhoff, Arups, Hill International, Faith and 
Gould etc.), in the Gulf States which administer the projects, with many 
of the professionals engaged by these PMC’s being British who do not 
speak or read Arabic. There are a number of books in the English 
language that provide commentaries as to how the relevant clauses, 
contained in FIDIC99, operate in EW Law when a Contractor claims a 
right to be granted an extension of time to complete and additional 
payment, some of these are referenced in this thesis.  
Consequently, parties wishing to understand their rights and obligations 
rely on the interpretations provided in such books. This being despite 
such interpretation being derived from EW case Law, i.e. Law created 
by man unlike that of Shari’a, Law as preordained by Allah, and the 
provisions of the contract stating that the Law governing the contract is 
that of the UAE. 
                                      
304 Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 43, p. 48 the purpose is to avoid difficulties translating 
legal and technical principles which can effect parties rights/obligations. 
305 Roads and Transport Authority of Dubai Standard Form of Construction Contract (2006); Emaar 
Standard Form of Construction Contract; Dubai Municipality Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil 
Engineering Construction: Dubai Properties PSJC Conditions of Contract. 
306 Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 43, p. 47; Ballantyne records that there is a lamentable, 
if understandable, ignorance, even an aversion to the Shari’a among Western Lawyers op cit., n. 2.   
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For this reason it was concluded, as illustrated in the Preamble, that 
there has been a lack of interest in the West to understand fiqh. 
Consequently, there is a lack of literature in the English language which 
explains how the nominate contract system, used by Jurists operates. 
This in turn has led to a lack of understanding as to how the principles 
of fiqh apply to a contract for a thing that comes into existence in the 
future. The books referenced in this thesis demonstrates this.    
In saying this there are a number of English translations of the Majallah 
el-Ahkam-I-Adliya (the Mejelle), the Islamic Civil Code of Law of the 
Ottoman Empire, as promulgated in 1869, which codifies the doctrines 
of fiqh. As demonstrated in section 1.4 above, this Legislation is a 
principal reference point for the Ministry of Justice Commentary on the 
UCC. This codified Law was introduced to the Gulf States by the 
Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century307. However, from the 
author’s experience, knowledge of the existence of this legislation and 
the importance it plays in the construction, understanding and 
interpretation of the articles of the UCC and nominate contracts as 
obligated by Islamic Sharī’a is virtually non-existent. It is clear when 
reading the Mejelle that a background knowledge of Islamic Sharī’a is 
required to understand this legislation. Once such understanding is 
gained, it is clear that the aim of this legislation is to ensure 
transactions entered into by Muslims are Islamic compliant. 
The consequence of the above is that ‘professionals’ in the construction 
industry, and so Employers and Contractors, have an inadequate 
knowledge of the governing Law as derived from the Holy Law of Islam 
which applies to their contract.  
Hence, parties are failing to understand the obligations placed on them 
by the UCC in the construction, interpretation and application of 
contract provisions when discharging their rights and obligations that 
arise from a construction contract.  
                                      
307 Tyser, Demetriades and Effendi, op cit., n. 151, Foreword to this edition pages v to vii. 
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This is particularly important, as illustrated in subsection 1.1.2 and 
section 1.3 in respect of provisions that exempts, or limits the 
Employer’s liability for a breach that is the accepted approach, at 
present, under EW Law.  
The method by which such provisions operate in EW Law is by limiting 
the time to give notice for the breach, or by allowing the defaulting 
party to decide the compensation due to the injured party. Section 2.3 
establishes how these provisions operate and how they disobey the 
gharar and riba prohibitions as proposed by the author.  
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2.2.1 Methods adopted in the Emirate of Dubai to resolve disputes 
The approach adopted is to present detailed claims demonstrating the 
legal entitlement, cause, effect and additional payment required.  
The process that then follows is:  
1) Negotiations between the parties directly or through 
intermediaries. This can be in the form of informal or formal 
mediation to find alternatives in lieu of strict contractual 
solutions. The outcome is generally the Employer will not deduct 
damages if the Contractor forgoes additional payment for the 
additional time required to complete but all additional work is 
paid. It can also involve the Employer negotiating with the 
Contractor for a new contract.  
2) Expert determination - one of the party’s, generally the 
Contractor as he wants to recover his losses, proposes to the 
Employer to agree to appoint such expert. If the Employer 
accepts then an expert is jointly selected and appointed by the 
parties. The expert will work either alone, or with the assistance 
of further experts to address delay analysis and quantum as well 
as contractual points. The difficulty is that the Employer will 
generally not make any pre-agreement to accept the expert’s 
determination. 
3) If the dispute is in respect of a government project, then prior to 
any formal dispute process being pursued the Contractor has to 
submit a copy of its statement of claim to the Ruler’s Court for 
examination. This allows the Government to discuss the matter 
with the Government department which the Contractor has the 
dispute with. This can result in the Ruler’s Court negotiating a 
settlement. Alternatively, the Ruler’s Court may consent to the 
Contractor moving forward with the formal dispute process set 
out in the contract.  
4) Arbitration has become the main process for formally dealing 
with a dispute in Dubai as illustrated in the Preamble. The 
primary institution used is Dubai International Arbitration Centre, 
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although the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is 
present. The award is subject to the Court of First Instance’s 
approval to ensure all procedural requirements have been 
properly performed308. Once approved compensation can be 
recovered. If the party whom the award is against fails to pay, 
then the award is placed with the Court of Execution and 
payment is recovered through the bailiff. To keep the matter 
private, parties tend to honour the award to prevent the dispute 
becoming public knowledge. 
5) The Courts - the procedure here is to refer the matter to the 
Court of First Instance. All submissions have to be translated into 
Arabic. The Judge will nearly always appoint an expert to 
evaluate the claim whilst the Judge considers the legal 
arguments. The process can take a number of hearings with all 
oral evidence having to be translated into Arabic. Either party 
can appeal to the Court of Appeal. This is limited to document 
submissions and is based on either party disagreeing with the 
Court of First Instance’s Judgement. The highest Court in Dubai 
is the Court of Cassation and only deals with points of Law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
308 Dubai Cassation Judgement 165/966. 
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2.3 Application of notice and discretionary clauses 
 
This section examines the construction, understanding and 
interpretation of notice and discretionary clauses that exclude or limit 
the Employer’s liability for a breach of contract in EW and UAE Law. 
This analysis demonstrates the difference in the rights associated with 
operating these types of clauses in the two jurisdictions.  
To put this examination into context, the relevant provisions of FIDIC99 
were analysed as an example. The primary clauses in FIDIC99 are Sub-
Clause 20.1 and Sub-Clause 3.5. Although their aim is argued to be to 
protect the Employer’s interest, their construction can operate in an 
opportunistic way towards the Contractor. 
Other discretionary clauses in FIDIC99 that give the right to the 
Employer to decide quality, increase the Contractor’s scope of work, 
and whether a future contingency is the responsibility of the Contractor. 
These are examined in section 4.4 below.  
Sub-Clauses 20.1 and 3.5 operate in conjunction with each other, in 
that if the Contractor has suffered a delay, which the Employer is 
responsible for, the Contractor is obligated to give notice under Sub-
Clause 20.1. If the Contractor satisfies the obligations set out in this 
clause and the Engineer acknowledges the same, then Sub-Clause 3.5 
obligates the parties, through negotiation, to compensate the 
Contractor in the form of additional time to complete and/or additional 
payment309.   
Thus, this section examines and establishes in: 
Subsection 2.3.1 - EW Law - notice clauses and the prevention 
principle – the operation of a clause limiting the time a Contractor has 
to notify the Engineer of an Employer’s delay event in EW Law, 
excluding the Employer from liability, is a rule of construction; 
                                      
309 Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 43, pp. 329-330; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 
378-379; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, p. 239; Bunni, op cit., n. 43, p. 525. 
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Subsection 2.3.2 - Notice or exclusion of liability clause - by 
applying the principles of EW Law that determines if a clause that 
enforces a strict timeframe for the Contractor to issue notice should be 
classed as an exemption of liability clause;      
Subsection - 2.3.3 - EW Law and Discretionary Clauses the 
Employer’s right, through a discretionary clause that allows the 
Engineer to decide the Contractor’s rights, can operate as an exemption 
clause in favour of the Employer; 
Subsection - 2.3.4 - Discretionary or exclusion of liability clause 
– by applying the principles of EW Law that determines if a clause 
which gives the right to the Engineer to decide the compensation due to 
the Contractor should be classed as an exemption clause; and 
Subsection 2.3.5 - Conflict with gharar and riba prohibitions – as 
notice and discretionary clauses operate to exclude an Employer’s 
liability towards a Contractor, they are aleatory in nature and so 
contravene the author’s proposed definitions for the gharar and riba 
prohibitions.     
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2.3.1 EW Law - notice clauses and the prevention principle 
Where the Employer prevents the Contractor from meeting the delivery 
date, in EW Law the Employer cannot insist that the Contractor meet 
the stipulated delivery date310. Where this occurs, the date for 
completion is termed “at large”. In this situation, the Contractor is 
obligated to deliver the structure within a reasonable time311. This 
doctrine is referred to as the prevention principle in EW Law312.  
In such circumstances the Employer loses its right to deduct damages 
for late delivery as there is no date from which the liquidated damages 
provision can operate313. This is a primary reason for the inclusion of an 
extension of time provision in construction contracts in EW Law. The 
rationale is twofold: 1) to allow the Contractor relief from damages for 
not meeting the delivery date; and 2) to create a new date for delivery 
to reactivate the damages provision.  
For the Contractor to gain the right to have the delivery period 
extended, he is obligated to notify the Engineer when the Employer 
commits an act that delays delivery. The Contractor, to have the right 
to claim additional payment associated with the delay or for some other 
reason, must again give notice to the Engineer.   
Sub-Clause 20.1314 FIDIC99 obligates the Contractor to issue a notice 
to the Engineer within 28 days where the Contractor considers that an 
                                      
310 Winser, C Shutting Pandora’s Box: The Prevention Principle After Multiplex v Honeywell (2007) 23 
Const. L.J. 511. 
311 Holmes v Guppy (1838) 3 M. & W. 387; Trollope & Colls v NW Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board 
[1973] 1 W.L.R. 601 HL Lord Denning M.R. “…it is well settled that in building contracts, when there is a 
stipulation for work to be done in a limited time, if one party his conduct – which may be quite legitimate 
conduct…renders it impossible or impracticable for the other party to do the work within the stipulated 
time, then the one whose conduct caused the trouble can no longer insist on strict adherence to the time 
stated…”; Peak Construction (Liverpool) v McKinney Foundations Ltd (1970) 1 B.L.R. 114; Dodd v Churton 
[1897] 1 Q.B. 562; Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, pp. 893-904.   
312 Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 43, pp. 415-416; Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, pp. 
893-904. 
313 Article 186 provides - Deliberate silence concerning a fact or circumstance shall be treated as a 
misrepresentation if it is proved that the person misled thereby would not have made the contract had he 
been aware of that fact or circumstance - Whelan, op cit., n. 6, p. 99. 
314 Sub-Clause 20.1 states “…If the Contractor considers himself to be entitled to any extension of the 
Time for Completion and/or any additional payment, under any Clause of these Conditions of otherwise in 
connection with the Contract, the Contractor shall give notice to the Engineer, describing the event or 
circumstance giving rise to the claim. The notice shall be given as soon as practicable, and not later than 
28 days after the Contractor became aware, or should have become aware, of the Event or circumstance. If 
the Contractor fails to give notice of claim within such period of 28 days, the Time for Completion shall not 
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Employer has failed to perform an obligation which impedes the 
Contractor’s mode of performance, delaying delivery of the Works; 
and/or where the Contractor claims an increase to the contract price. 
If the Contractor fails to issue such notice within the 28-day timeframe, 
then he forfeits all rights to any additional time needed for delivery and 
any right for additional payment315. 
Employer’s delay events, or as they are termed Employer Risk Events 
(ERE), are set out in Sub-Clause 8.4, FIDIC99316. The definition of such 
events is very broad, with the aim to cover all future contingencies to 
ensure that every possible form of ERE falls within Sub-Clause 8.4, 
otherwise the “time at large” doctrine will apply317. This is 
demonstrated by the form that the ERE’s take, these are the issuing of 
a variation; any cause of delay as specified in any other provisions of 
FIDIC99318; exceptional adverse climate conditions; unforeseeable 
shortages of personnel or goods caused by an epidemic or government 
actions; and any delay caused by the Employer or his agents.  
The inclusion of such provisions illustrate that it is in the contemplation 
of the parties that some future contingency will possibly delay delivery, 
and/or increase the contract price. This makes gharar intrinsic to the 
contract as there is speculation in that there could be obstacles to 
delivery and so the characteristics of price. 
The rationale for obligating the Contractor to notify the Engineer of an 
ERE is so the Engineer can investigate how such an event manifested. 
                                                                                                                   
be extended, the Contractor shall not be entitled to additional payment, and the Employer will be 
discharged from all liability in connection with the claim...”  
315 Atkins Chambers op cit., n. 19, pp. 904-910; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 320-
323; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 377-378; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, p. 238. 
316 Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 43 pp. 294-300; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, p.74; 
Totterdill, op cit., n. 43 pp. 145-148;    
317 Hoskins, op cit., n. 265 & 313. 
318 Sub-Clause 1.9 - Delayed Drawings or Instructions; Sub-Clause 2.1; Sub-Clause 4.7 – Setting Out; 
Sub-Clause 4.12 - Unforeseeable Physical Conditions; Sub-Clause 4.24 – Fossils; Sub-Clause 7.4 – Testing; 
Sub-Clause 8.5 – Delays by Statutory Authorities; Sub-Clause 8.8 – Suspension; Sub-Clause 10.3 – 
Interference with Tests on Completion; Sub-Clause 10.2 Taking Over Parts of the Works; Sub-Clause 13.7 
– Adjustment for Changes in Legislation; Sub-Clause 16.1 – Contractor’s Entitlement to Suspend Work; 
Exceptional adverse climatic conditions and Sub-Clauses 19.2 and 19.4 – Notice of Force Majeure - 
FIDIC99; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, pp. 145-148; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 194-195; Baker, 
Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 460-464. 
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This allows the Employer to effectively manage time, cost, and other 
contractual requirements associated with the ERE319.  
This can include the Employer issuing a variation which addresses the 
ERE320. The procedure for this is set out under specific Sub-Clauses of 
FIDIC99321. The Employer, by doing this avoids delaying the Contractor 
and protects its right to deduct damages. If the Employer fails to issue 
such directive and the Contractor incurs a delay, he has to complete 
within a reasonable time322.   
Such investigation also allows the Employer to understand the type and 
level of compensation claimed by the Contractor323. 
In City Inn Ltd v. Shepherd Construction Ltd324 it was held that failure 
by the Contractor to give notice, where it was a provision precedent, 
barred the Contractor from its right to additional time to complete.  
In the cases of Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control 
Systems Ltd (No.2)325 and Steria v Sigma Wireless Communications 
Ltd326, the prevention principle was described as a rule of construction. 
The rule is that the Employer and Contractor can agree an express 
provision to address where an Employer’s act prevents delivery and 
causes the Contractor to suffer additional expense. If the provision 
obligates the Contractor to issue notice of the Employer’s preventative 
act to the Employer within a timeframe specified and the Contractor 
fails to do so, then the prevention principle will no longer have effect.  
The Judge in Steria v Sigma Wireless Communications Ltd stated in 
support of the Contractor’s obligation to abide by a notice that:  
                                      
319 Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 307; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, p. 239; Atkins 
Chambers op cit., n. 19, p. 527. 
320 Atkins Chambers op cit., n. 19, p. 527; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 317. 
321 Sub-Clauses 1.9, 2.1, 4.7, 4.12, 4.24, 7.4, 8.4, 8.5, 8.9, 10.3, 16.1, 13.7, and 19.4; Baker, Mellors, 
Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42 pp. 294-300; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 42, pp. 194-195; Totterdill, op 
cit., n. 43, p. 146.  
322 Hoskins, op cit., n. 265. 
323 Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 294-298; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 65-
67; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, p. 96.  
324 2003 SLT 885. 
325 [2007] EWHC 447 (TCC); [2007] B.L.R. 195. 
326 [2008] B.L.R. 79; 118 Con. L.R. 177 [2008] C.I.L.L 2544 QBD (TCC). 
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“…one can see the commercial absurdity of an argument which 
would result in the contractor being better off by deliberately 
failing to comply with a notice condition than by complying with 
it…” 
Hence, a notice clause can be described in a commercial sense as an 
agreement between two parties to protect their interests, and to 
apportion risks as they see fit327.  
It was also stated in Steria v Sigma Wireless Communications Ltd:  
“…The Employer’s entitlement to damages, it might be said, was 
caused not by the delay but by the delay coupled with the 
contractor’s failure to satisfy the condition precedent…” 
This approach for the interpretation and application of a notice 
condition was reflected in a number of subsequent cases328. 
The effect of this provision was that the Contractor, by failing to issue 
notice within the specified timeframe, loses all rights for compensation 
associated with the delay incurred329, and an increase to the contract 
sum thereby allowing riba to be present in the contract.  
Sub-Clause 20.1 can therefore be construed as a clause aimed at 
excluding a party’s liability for a breach of specific aspects of an 
obligation(s). Thus, it can be argued that such provision falls within the 
second distinct type of protective (exemption or exclusion) clause as 
cited by Donaldson J. in Kenyon Son & Craven Ltd v Baxter Hoare & Co 
Ltd330. 
When considered in this light Sub-Clause 20.1 is subject to the 
principles which EW Law applies to exemption clauses, which include 
                                      
327 Lewison op cit., n. 156, p. 447 - Tradigran SA v Intertek Testing Services (ITS) Canada Ltd [2007] I 
C.L.C 188 ; Peel op cit., n. 18, pp. 238 -239. 
328 Turner Corporation Ltd v Co-ordinated Industries Ltd (1997) 13 BCT 378; Turner Corporation Ltd v 
Austotel (Pty) Ltd (1995) 11 B.C.L. 202; Décor Ceiling Pty Ltd v Cox Construction Pty Ltd (no.2) [2006] 
CILL (March) p. 2311; Group Five Building Ltd v Ministry of Community Development [1996] 3 S.A. 629; 
Hsin Chong Construction (Asia) Ltd v Henble Ltd [2006] HKCU 1397; see commentary in Baker, Mellors, 
Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 320-322.  
329 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, pp. 907-909; Glover, & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, p. 376; Furst & Ramsey 
op cit., n. 42, p. 307. 
330 [1971] 1 W.L.R, 519. 
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the application of the contra proferentem rule and to a stricter form of 
interpretation. This is discussed in the next subsection 2.3.2 below.   
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2.3.2 Notice or exclusion of liability clause  
The analysis under subsection 2.3.1 demonstrates the present status of 
a notice clause in its application in a construction contract under EW 
Law, that is, if the Contractor fails in its obligation to issue notice within 
the specified timeframe it will lose its right to compensation. 
This subsection examines the principles in EW Law which determine if 
such a clause should be classed as an exclusion of liability clause in 
Law, or through current legislation such as the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977 (UCTA); and the doctrines of the gharar and riba prohibitions 
to see if there are similarities between such EW Law principles. It also 
considers the construction that such a clause shall take to give effect to 
the party seeking exclusion from liability. 
The rulings in City Inn Ltd, of Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd and 
Steria was that due to the Contractor failing to give timely notice to the 
Employer of an Employer’s breach the Courts accepted, prima facie, 
that the Contractor was responsible for the Employer’s act of 
prevention. This was despite the Contractor, under the prevention 
principle, having a right to compensation.  
Accepting that the Contractor, as the party obligated to building the 
structure should be responsible for determining whether the Employer’s 
act of prevention will delay delivery, therefore it is his decision when to 
issue a notice331. Thus, any delay in issuing could prejudice the 
Employer’s rights. However, this argument is limited in its application 
for two reasons: 1) the timing of the ERE; and (2) the form and extent 
of the ERE makes it apparent as to whether or not a delay to delivery 
will be suffered.  
To demonstrate this point an instruction to vary the partitioning layout 
issued well before work was to be carried out might not necessarily 
result in a delay. The reason is that the Contractor has the ability to 
manage (mitigate) the change but it may result in additional payment. 
Whereas, if such variation was issued when the partitioning works were 
                                      
331 City Inn Ltd V Shepherd Construction Ltd [2003] S.L.T. 885; East Ham Corporation v. Bernard Sunley 
& Sons Ltd (1965). 
Page 152 of 273 
 
well advanced, then a delay to completion will be incurred. A similar 
situation is that of, where the Employer fails to hand-over the Site at 
commencement, and where the Employer fails to issue instructions in a 
timely manner so as to correct a deficient design.  
Thus, in the circumstance where it is obvious that the ERE will delay 
delivery, then the Employer, through his agent, has the ability to 
evaluate the delay to delivery associated with the ERE. Vinelott J. 
demonstrates this in Hugh Stanley Leach v London Borough of 
Merton332.  
A construction contract is a contract of mutual obligations, so delivery 
of the structure is dependent on the parties performing their obligations 
in a timely manner so neither party prevents the performance of the 
other. Lord Blackburn333 and Vaughan Williams L.J.334 demonstrate this.  
A provision such as Sub-Clause 20.1, FIDIC99, aimed at releasing an 
Employer from liability due to the Contractor failing to give timely 
notification to the Employer of the Employer’s act of prevention for 
which the Contractor has a right in Law, as illustrated by the prevention 
principle, then such clause is in fact an exemption clause.  
In the circumstance where the liability excluded is to compensate for 
delaying the Contractor’s performance, then the liability excluded is for 
a breach of contract that goes to the root of the contract. This is 
demonstrated by Wells v Army & Navy Co-operative Society335 which 
recorded that not only is the Contractor to do the work within the 
agreed time, but he is also entitled to have such time in which to do the 
work.  
The loss by the Contractor of his right to claim additional time to 
delivery effectively gives the Employer a unilateral right to adjust a 
                                      
332 (1986) 32 B.L.R. 51 Vinelott J. recorded that the Architect is not a stranger to the work and will have a 
detailed knowledge of the progress of the work and the Contractor’s planning as to how the work will be 
executed; and that that although the Architect is not required to issue further instruction at a date which is 
unreasonably distant from when the Contractor needs such instruction he is responsible for the design so 
he will know when further instruction is needed to allow the Contractor to progress the works. 
333 Mackay v. Dick (1881) 6 A.C. 251. 
334 Barque Quilpé Ltd v. Brown [1904] 2 K.B. 264, at 274. 
335 (1902) 86 LT. 764. 
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fundamental element of the contract, the agreed period for delivery 
that a Contractor undertook to perform its obligation. This clearly goes 
against the aim of the prevention principle and the rules of justice336. 
By giving the right to the Employer to reduce the period for delivery, in 
turn necessitates the Contractor to revise his mode of performance to 
meet the agreed delivery date.  
If the Contractor fails to meet such date the Employer will have the 
right to deduct damages. This allows the Employer to benefit from his 
breach and so makes the damages provision a penalty or forfeiture 
clause in Law337. Moreover, the notice clause, by applying a strict 
timeframe, can be argued to be warning the Contractor to complete no 
matter what future contingency occurs which will delay completion. This 
is illustrated by Mance L.J.338 who referred to Colman J339 paraphrase of 
the concept of a penalty when Colman J. said that Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre340 showed that: 
 “…whether a provision is to be treated as a penalty is a matter 
of construction to be resolved by asking whether at the time the 
contract was entered into the predominant contractual function of 
the provision was to deter a party from breaking the contract or 
to compensate the innocent party for breach. That the contractu-
al function is deterrent rather than compensatory can be deduced 
by comparing the amount that would be payable on breach with 
the loss that might be sustained if breach occurred…”. 
This was confirmed in Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV341. 
There it was stated that the true test to determine if a contractual 
provision is penal, is whether it is a secondary obligation which imposes 
a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to the 
                                      
336 Construction Law International - December 2014 – Thomas, D., QC - Time-bars 
revisited  http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=9199af06-e541-4c36-a1a7-a5ad4de00c81 
337 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, p. 924; Alghussein Establishment v Eton College [1988] 1 W.L.R. 587 
– held that a party cannot benefit from his own wilful default; Elliot, op cit., n. 21.  
338 United International Pictures v Cine Bes Filmcilk VE Yapimclik [2003] EWCA Civ 1669. 
339 Lordsvale Finance Plc v. Bank of Zambia [1996] QB 752. 
340 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
341 [2015] UKSC 67. 
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innocent party’s legitimate interest in the enforcement of the primary 
obligation ( in this instance the issuing a notice).   
The same principle was set out in Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor 
Transport Ltd342 as to how an exemption clause operates in respect of 
the party who is subject to it. This principle is that an exemption clause 
is one which excludes or modifies an obligation, whether primary, 
general secondary or anticipatory secondary, that would otherwise arise 
by implication of Law. In this circumstance the implication is the effect 
of the prevention principle. Hence, although parties are at liberty to 
decide whatever exclusions they wish of these three types of 
obligations, in doing so they must not offend the rule against penalties. 
The rule is that failure by a party to perform a primary obligation (the 
issuing of the notice), must not impose on this party a secondary 
obligation to pay to the other a sum of money which is manifestly in 
excess of that which would fully compensate the other party for losses 
suffered.  
Lord Mance further expanded on such understanding343: 
“…What is necessary in each case is to consider, first whether 
any (and if so what) legitimate business interest is served and 
protected by the clause, and, second, whether, assuming such an 
interest to exist, the provision made for the interest is 
nevertheless in the circumstances extravagant, exorbitant or 
unconscionable…”   
Lord Wilberforce in Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime SA 
v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale344 determined that a time bar 
clause was an exemption clause: 
“…I treat the words ‘exceptions clause’ as covering broadly such 
clauses as profess to exclude or limit, either quantitatively or as 
to the time within which action must be taken, the right of the 
injured party to bring an action for damages…” 
                                      
342 [1980] A.C. 827. 
343 Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV [2015] UKSC 67. 
344 [1967] 1 A.C. 361.   
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To put these principles into the context of a construction contract, the 
Contractor’s failure to issue notice in the specified time allows the 
Employer to be released from liability. Therefore, such provision does 
not protect a legitimate business interest of the Employer but consents 
to the Employer profiteering from his own breach as its operation is 
extravagant and unconscionable.  
The reason is the Contractor has to absorb additional costs to complete 
within the time stated and/or to pay the Employer damages for late 
completion, despite the Employer being responsible for preventing the 
Contractor’s performance. Such payment, in either circumstance, does 
not reflect the losses suffered by the Employer from the Contractor 
failing to meet the specified timeframe to issue notice345.  
Coupled to this, as determined in Dorset County Council v Southern Felt 
Roofing Ltd346, a provision that expressly provides that one party bear 
the loss of certain perils/risks was held to be an exemption clause. A 
provision that allows the Employer to benefit from his own breach 
clearly is an example of this. 
In Mitchell (George) (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd347 Lord 
Denning M.R. concluded that reliance on such clauses was only 
permitted at common Law where it was fair and reasonable to do so348. 
Thus, a party wishing to gain relief from a breach of contract cannot do 
so where it can be considered that the provision was unfair and 
unreasonable.  
Consequently, a notice clause that excludes liability by limiting the time 
to claim a right for compensation, particularly where it allows an 
Employer the right to change the time in which a Contractor has to 
complete a fundamental element of the contract, is clearly penalising 
the Contractor for the Employer’s breach and so is unfair and 
unreasonable.  
                                      
345 Elliot, op cit., n. 21 cites these reasons.    
346 [1989] 48 BLR. 96, CA. 
347 [1983] 2 A C 803. 
348 Lewison op cit., n. 160, p. 448. 
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This is supported by the first of Lord Dunedin’s349 four tests to 
determine if a clause is penal:  
“…if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and unconscionable in 
amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could be 
conceivably be proven to have followed from the breach…”350  
[i.e. the Contractor’s failure to issue notice with 28 days of an 
Employer’s delay] when considered with Mason and Deane JJ351 dicta:  
“…A penalty, as its name suggests, is in the nature of a 
punishment for a non-observance of a contractual stipulation; it 
consists of the imposition of an additional or different liability 
upon breach of the contractual stipulation…” that of the 
Contractor being liable for the Employer’s delay.   
The principles stated in the above cases illustrate that: 
1) The notice clause operates to release the Employer from liability 
to compensate the Contractor for delaying the Contractor’s 
performance; and 
2) The Employer is allowed to benefit from his breach.  
Thus it can be said that such a provision falls within the definition of the 
second distinct type of protective (exemption or exclusion) clause as 
cited by Donaldson J. in Kenyon Son & Craven Ltd v Baxter Hoare & Co 
Ltd352, a condition aimed at excluding a party’s liability for a breach of 
specific aspects of an obligation(s).  
A reason that the above has not been advanced in the EW Courts is 
that the argument falls within the concept of relief from forfeiture. This 
concept is considered restricted to land law and so consideration has 
not been given as to whether it should apply to damages clauses where 
                                      
349 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
350 This test is confirmed in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2015] FCAFC 50; 
Cine Bes Filmclik ve Yapimill v United International Pictures [2003] EWCA Civ 1669; Murray v Leisurelay 
[2005] EWCA Civ. 963. 
351 Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 , 445, 
352 [1971] 1 W.L.R, 519. 
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they can (due to the circumstances in which the damages are applied) 
become a penalty clause353.  
The legislation that governs the classification of exemption/exclusion of 
liability clauses is the UCTA. Section 3 of the Act is the one considered 
in this thesis as it applies where the contract is a standard form 
contract issued by one party for the other to sign. In St Albans City and 
District Council v International Computers Ltd354, it was held that not all 
terms had to be standard as there were certain provisions that would 
apply to the specifics of a particular contract, such as unit prices, 
quality etc.  
What the Act does apply to is a situation where standard terms remain 
unchanged, or despite negotiations are effectively unchanged.  
Consequently, where the term in question is an exclusion or exemption 
clause, then the contract entered into is on written standard terms for 
the purposes of the Act355.  
The reason is as stated by Lord Dunpark, in that section 3:  
“…is designed to prevent one party to a contract from having his 
contractual rights, against the other party who is in breach of 
contract, excluded or restricted by a term or condition which is a 
number of fixed terms or conditions invariably incorporated in 
contracts…”356   
This circumstance arises where the contractual relationship is 
Contractor – Subcontractor as Contractors have their own standard 
forms of Subcontract. It would also apply where a large developer has 
the ability to adopt a “take it or leave it” approach towards a 
Contractor357, then section 3 can apply358, or where a standard form of 
contract provisions is recommended to an Employer by an organisation 
                                      
353 Elliot, op cit., n. 21. 
354 [1995] F.S.R. 686. 
355 Pegler Ltd v Wang (UK) Ltd (2000)) EWHC 137 TCC. 
356 McCrone v Boots Farms Sales [1981] S.L.T. 103 Lord Dunpark dicta was followed in Chester Grosvenor 
Hotel v Alfred McAlpine Management 56 B.L.R. 115. 
357 Lawson R., A.O. (2008) Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract terms 9th Edn., Sweet & Maxwell – 
Thomson Reuters (Legal) Ltd, London, UK, pp. 155-156.  
358 Op cit., n. 343. 
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whose business it is to administer construction projects on behalf of an 
Employer. 
As recorded above, there is a presumption that neither party will give 
up its rights in Law to claim compensation where the other commits a 
breach. Consequently, a clause aimed at excluding liability for a breach 
to be effective in its objective has to be unequivocal in its intention359. 
Lord Diplock demonstrated this in Modern Engineering Ltd v Gilbert-Ash 
Ltd360 when he stated: 
“…So when one is concerned with a building contract one starts 
with the presumption that each party is to be entitled to all those 
remedies for its breach as would arise by operation of Law…To 
rebut that presumption one must be able to find in the contract 
clear and unequivocal words in which the parties have expressed 
their agreement that this remedy shall not be available in respect 
of breaches of that particular contract…” 
Similar statements as to the explicitness of the express provision, 
where a party wishes to rely on it to release itself from liability were 
made in earlier and subsequent cases361. The reason for this is to 
ensure the party accepting that it loses its right for compensation does 
so with it’s ‘eyes open’. 
As recorded in subsection 2.3.1, the form of the opportunism, which 
results from a notice clause acting as an exclusion provision, is that the 
Employer can release himself from liability towards the Contractor 
where:  
1) An Employer delays the Contractor’s performance and so delivery 
of the Works;  
2) Has breached the contract which gives the right to the Contractor 
to claim additional payment; and  
                                      
359 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 898. 
360 [1974] A.C. 689. 
361 Dodd v. Churton [1897] 1 Q.B. 562; Bremer Handelsgesellschaft Schaft M.B.H. v Vanden Avenne 
Izegem P.V.B.A. (1978) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109; Alghussein Establishment v Eton College [1988] 1 W.L.R. 587. 
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3) The Employer, despite being responsible for the delay by 
releasing himself from liability, still has the right to apply 
damages for late completion. 
Moreover, the ability to change the period for delivery demonstrates 
exploitation. 
As recorded, a clause whose aim is to exclude a party’s liability has to 
be unequivocal in its intention. To ensure this unequivocal intention is 
demonstrated, EW Courts will subject the provision to the following 
tests: 
1) The words used to construct the text of the provision must be 
clear, to demonstrate that the right for compensation is lost362;  
2) That the aim of the exclusion clause does not go against the 
natural rules of justice, particularly that of the prevention 
principle, which is not an implied Law but a positive rule of 
Law363 to ensure fairness. The application of this test 
demonstrates, that although the EW Courts will ensure freedom 
of contract, they can act as legislator if they feel certain terms 
are unfair, or as illustrated earlier, when examining what 
constitutes an unconscionable bargain. Such action is a clear 
intention to ensure fair dealing364 and prevent acts of bad faith; 
and 
3) Be construed strictly contra proferentem365, which as recorded is 
the principle, not just of Law but of justice, taking account of its 
relationship with other provisions of the Contract to ensure there 
are no inconsistencies with other provisions366. 
                                      
362 Lord Bingham - Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 
898; Hollier v Ramble Motors (AMC) Ltd [1972] 2 Q.B. 71.  
363 Brooking J. SMK Cabinets v Hili Modern Electrics Pty Ltd (1984) V.R. 391. 
364 Mitchell (George) (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 A C 803; Photo Productions Ltd v 
Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] A.C. 827; Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime SA v NV 
Rotterdamsche Kolen [1967] 1 A.C. 361. 
365 Atlantic Shipping & Trading Co. Ltd v Louis Dreyfus & Co [1922] A.C. 250; Dodd v. Churton [1897] 1 
Q.B. 562 at p. 566; Peak Construction (Liverpool) v McKinney Foundations Ltd (1970) 1 B.L.R. 114.  
366 Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v. Malvern Fishing Co. Ltd [1983] 1 W.L.R. 964. 
Page 160 of 273 
 
This is demonstrated in the case of Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her 
Majesty’s Attorney General for Gibraltar367 in that Akenhead J. stated  
“…I see no reason why this clause should be construed strictly 
against the Contractor and can see no reason why it should not 
be construed reasonably broadly, given the serious effect on 
what otherwise be good claims for instance for breach of contract 
by the Employer…”  
He further stated, when applying this provision in the context of an 
extension of time that regard must be had to Clause 8.4, FIDIC99. The 
consequence of his decision, in the operation of Sub-Clause 20.1 when 
taking account of the text of Sub-Clause 8.4, was that there is a clear 
suggestion:  
“…that the extension of time can be claimed either when it is 
clear that there will be a delay (a prospective delay) or when the 
delay has been at least started to be incurred (a retrospective 
delay)…” and that 
“…The notice must be given as soon as practicable but the 
longstop is 28 days after the Contractor has become or should 
have become aware. The onus of proof is on the Employer… here 
to establish that the notice was given late…” 
The above decision reflects that of Lord Bingham of Cornhill368: 
“…The clause must be construed in the context of the contract as 
a whole. The general rule should be applied that if a party, 
otherwise liable, is to exclude or limit liability or rely on an 
exemption condition, he must do so in clear words; unclear 
words do not suffice; any ambiguity or lack of clarity must be 
resolved against the party…”  
A further point for consideration in the operation of a notice clause 
which excludes an Employer from liability by operation of a strict 
timeframe, is that it has been argued that the Contractor’s failure to 
                                      
367 [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC). 
368 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R 898. 
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meet the timeframe for giving notice prevents the Employer from 
granting a Contractor additional time to meet delivery, thereby invoking 
the prevention principle369. 
Consequently, such a provision in EW Law can be argued to be invalid 
where the Employer has delayed the Contractor, giving the right to the 
Contractor to be granted additional time for delivery. Although such 
assertion is contrary to the Judge’s decision in Steria, the logic is 
arguably sound. However, this may not operate in the same way when 
it comes to additional payment370.  
It also raises the question, in order to ensure fairness on behalf of the 
Employer, why the Contractor’s right for damages does not run once 
the notice has been issued. This, as illustrated, is the case in UAE Law. 
The above analysis illustrates that the reason for restricting the effect 
of an exclusion of liability clause in EW Law is similar, in nature, to the 
aims of the gharar and riba prohibitions.  
This is demonstrated by the principle set out in Makdessi v Cavendish 
Square Holdings BV and Photo Productions v Securicor Transport Ltd371, 
in that a failure to issue a notice allows the Employer to force the 
Contractor mitigate the Employers breach. To do this the Contractor 
has to engage additional resources to address the reduced time to 
complete that the Employer does not pay for, i.e. an unfair gain of 
services. Where the Contractor fails to achieve delivery by the agreed 
date the Employer can deduct damages leading to unfair gain, allowing 
riba to infect the contract.  
 
 
 
 
                                      
369 Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 320-322. 
370 Ellis Baker, James Bremen, Anthony Lavers, The Development of the Prevention Principle in English 
and Australian Jurisdictions [2005] ICLR 197; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 321. 
371[2015] UKSC 67; [1980] A.C. 827. 
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2.3.3 EW Law and Discretionary Clauses  
Discretionary clauses are included in a contract as a mechanism to 
handle some future contingency as it allows for a party’s obligation to 
be adjusted to take account of such eventuality372. Such contingency in 
a construction contract is compensation in the form of granting 
additional time to complete where the Employer has delayed the 
delivery, or additional payment associated with the same or some other 
breach by the Employer373.  
The principal clause for this is Sub-Clause 3.5, FIDIC99 that grants this 
power to the Employer’s agent, the Engineer. The clause requires that 
the Engineer agree or determine any matter between the Employer and 
the Contractor374. As illustrated by the text of Sub-Clause 20.1, such 
matters include a claim for an extension of time to complete and any 
form of additional payment.  
Where no agreement can be reached the Engineer shall make a fair 
determination. There is no timeframe in which the Engineer has to 
reach an agreement or to make a determination375.  
The Engineer’s duty to agree or make a determination for an extension 
of time or additional payment only arises if the Contractor has complied 
with Sub-Clause 20.1. Where the Contractor has satisfied the 
requirements of this clause, the Contractor still has to convince the 
Engineer that the amount of additional time to complete, and additional 
payment that has been requested, is correct.  
The fact that: 
1) There is no timeframe for the Engineer to make a determination 
demonstrates there is potential for opportunism on the part of 
the Employer. This illustrates that gharar is intrinsic to the 
contract and so the potential for riba to manifest; and  
                                      
372 Campbell, D., Collins H., & Wightman, J., A.O. (2003) Implicit Dimensions of Contract Discrete, 
Relational and Network Contracts, Hart Publishing Oxford and Portland Oregon, USA, p. 226. 
373 See Sub-Clause 8.4 FIDIC99 as an example. 
374 Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 294-298; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 65-
67; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, p. 96. 
375 Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 329; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, p. 67; 
Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, p. 96. 
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2) The Engineer has to negotiate with the Employer to agree 
compensation due to the Contractor reinforces this. The reason 
is, the Engineer, as he is the Employer’s agent, can be influenced 
by the Employer to disapprove the Contractor’s claim for 
opportunistic grounds376.  
Coupled to this is that the Engineer’s duty to approve or disapprove a 
claim involves different considerations, suggesting that previous 
determinations can be revised under the guise that the Engineer can 
retrospectively change his decision to reflect a fair determination377. 
This being despite the obligation of fair dealing and good faith as 
demonstrated by the use of implied terms in EW Law378.   
Consequently, Sub-Clause 3.5 can be described as a clause aimed at 
limiting the extent to which a party is bound to indemnify the other in 
respect of consequences of a breach of that obligation. Thus, such 
clause falls within the third distinct type of protective (exemption or 
exclusion) clause as cited by Donaldson J. in Kenyon Son & Craven Ltd 
v Baxter Hoare & Co Ltd379. 
When considered in this light Sub-Clause 3.5 is subject to the principles 
which EW Law applies to exemption clauses, which includes the 
application of the contra proferentem rule, strict rules of interpretation 
and rules against penalties/forfeiture. This is discussed in subsection 
2.3.4 below.     
        
 
                                      
376 The reason is that Engineer has no power to make a determination, this can only be decided by the 
Employer see Engineers powers in the following contracts - Roads and Transport Authority of Dubai 
Standard Form of Construction Contract (2006); Emaar Standard Form of Construction Contract; Dubai 
Municipality Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil Engineering Construction: Dubai Properties PSJC 
Conditions of Contract.    
377 Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 329-331.  
378 Collins, op cit., n .19; Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, p. 223; see commentary under 
article 246 UCC above; Lord Bingham recorded in HIH Casualty v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 61 (HL) “…Parties entering into a commercial contract…will assume the honesty and good faith of the 
other; absent such assumption they would not deal…” Lord Kenyon in Mellish v Motteux (1792) Peake 156, 
157 (170 ER 113, 113-14): “…In all contracts of all kinds, it is of the highest importance that courts of law 
should compel the observance of honesty and good faith…” 
379 [1971] 1 W.L.R, 519. 
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2.3.4 Discretionary or exclusion of liability clause  
As stated in subsection 2.3.3, a discretionary clause such as Sub-
Clause 3.5, FIDIC99 can be considered to fall within the third distinct 
type of protective (exemption or exclusion) clause as cited by 
Donaldson J. in Kenyon Son & Craven Ltd v Baxter Hoare & Co Ltd380. 
As recorded, this type of clause is to compensate the Contractor for an 
Employer’s act of prevention which delays delivery and causes the 
Contractor to incur additional costs associated with the delay, including 
the ordering of additional/extra work of any form.  
As the right and level of compensation to be paid is to be decided at the 
sole discretion of the Employer’s agent, the Engineer, the clause can be 
operated in a biased manner in favour of the Employer, thereby 
allowing him to exempt himself from liability381.  
Thus, for the reasons recorded under subsection 2.3.2 there is potential 
for opportunism as the Employer can influence the Engineer to either 
release the Employer from liability as a whole, or only expose himself to 
a minimal level of compensation382.  
Hence, for the reasons set out in subsection 2.3.2, the principles as set 
out in United International Pictures383, Makdessi384, Photo Productions 
Ltd385 and Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime SA386 will 
apply in the application of this type of discretionary clause, in that the 
operation of the clause must not offend rules against 
penalties/forfeiture387. If it does then the party relying on the clause 
can only recover damages measured against the breach of the primary 
obligation, i.e. the failure to give notice388. 
                                      
380 [1971] 1 W.L.R, 519. 
381 Hoskins, op cit., n. 265. 
382 This being despite the obligation of good faith and to act in an honest manner, op cit., n. 325. 
383 [2003] EWCA Civ 1669. 
384 [2015] UKSC 67. 
385 [1980] A.C. 827. 
386 [1967] 1 A.C. 361.   
387 Elliot, op. cit., n. 21. 
388 Makdessi v. Cavendish Square Holdings BV [2015] UKSC 67. 
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Again, Lord Denning M.R. dicta in Mitchell (George) (Chesterhall) Ltd v 
Finney Lock Seeds Ltd389, see above applies.  
Consequently, where the Employer prevents the Contractor’s 
performance thereby reducing the time in which the Contractor has to 
deliver the structure, he has an obligation, as illustrated by the 
decisions in the above cases, to extend the delivery period and pay the 
costs associated with the same. 
For the reasons stated above, Sub-Clause 3.5 would also be subject to 
section 3 of the UCTA, as the aim of section 3 is to prevent a party in 
breach from restricting the other party’s rights. Thus, the construction, 
interpretation and application of Sub-Clause 3.5 will be subject to the 
same tests in EW Law as described in subsection 2.3.2. The operation 
of Sub-Clause 3.5 would also need to reflect the decision as in 
Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her Majesty’s Attorney General for 
Gibraltar390. Moreover, the construction of this Sub-Clause would be 
subject to the same tests as listed above, to demonstrate that it was 
unequivocal in its intention that the clause can limit or release the 
Employer from liability.  
The above demonstrates that the control imposed by the EW Courts in 
the application of a discretionary clause, if operated as an exclusion of 
liability clause, again has similar aims as that of the gharar and riba 
prohibitions as demonstrated in the last subsection.  
Such control would extend to ensuring that the Employer does not 
exploit the Contractor’s position with regard to enforcing a short period 
for completion, where the time necessary to complete was reduced by 
an act of prevention of the Employer.  
 
 
                                      
389 [1983] 2 A C 803. 
390 [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC). 
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2.3.5 Conflict with gharar and riba prohibitions 
The examination in subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3 above illustrates that 
Sub-Clauses 20.1 and Sub-Clause 3.5 can exclude or limit the 
Employer’s liability towards a Contractor where the Employer delays the 
Contractor’s performance, thereby committing a breach of Contract. 
Such operation classifies such clauses as aleatory in fiqh for the 
following reasons: 
1) The inclusion of an extension of time clause demonstrates that 
gharar is intrinsic to the contract. The reason is that it is an 
admission that parties acknowledge that delivery is subject to 
future contingencies which will affect their rights and obligations 
to allow the structure to come into existence;  
2) The issuing of a variation, defined as a future contingency in 
FIDIC99, demonstrates that the Employer’s design expectations 
as to quality, type and quantity of work are subject to change, 
thereby causing gharar to be intrinsic to the contract as to 
whether the design is complete391;  
3) Where there is gharar as to whether the Employer’s design 
expectations are final, causes gharar as to whether the 
Contractor’s mode of performance will allow it to complete the 
structure by the agreed delivery date; 
4) Sub-Clause 20.1, by fixing a specific time period to issue a 
notice, can be construed as an exemption clause as it falls within 
the second distinct type of exclusion clause cited by Donaldson 
J., thereby allowing riba to be present in the contract; 
5) The aim of Sub-Clause 20.1 is to prevent the Employer from 
liability for failing to meet its obligations that arise in UAE Law 
under article 874, UCC, to provide a comprehensive design. It 
also attempts to negate the right granted to the Contractor 
under article 247, UCC to suspend work when the Employer 
prevents the Contractor’s performance, and 387, UCC, to be paid 
                                      
391 Coulson op cit., n. 7, p. 44. 
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compensation when the Employer prevents the Contractor’s 
performance, thereby allowing riba to infect the contract; 
6) The objective of Sub-Clauses 20.1 and 3.5 is to allocate the 
additional cost associated with gharar infecting the mode of 
performance, and so delivery to one of the party’s, which as a 
result of the subjective nature of these clauses is analogous to 
playing roulette which allows riba to infect the contract;   
7) The effect of Sub-Clause 3.5 is, that although it provides the 
mechanism for removing gharar it allows opportunism to be 
introduced into the contract as: 1) the Contractor is dependent 
on the Engineer acting in an equitable manner, and the Employer 
does not influence the Engineer to disapprove the Contractor’s 
right to compensation; and 2) the Employer, through the 
Engineer, does not act in an opportunistic manner to limit the 
level of compensation due to the Contractor – both instances 
allow riba to infect the contract;  
8) As Sub-Clause 3.5 can be operated in an opportunistic manner, 
such clause falls within the third distinct type of exclusion clause 
cited by Donaldson J., thereby allowing riba to be present in the 
contract; and 
9) The operation of these clauses removes the ability of the 
Contractor to control obligations that go to the root of the 
contract, i.e. its ability to control the mode of performance and 
delivery, which in turn causes gharar as to whether the price is 
correct.   
The above reasons illustrate there is great potential for the inducement 
of an unfair gain in the form of acquiring goods and services by the 
Employer for which he does not pay, where the Contractor’s right for 
compensation is denied for opportunistic grounds. This in turn allows 
the Employer to increase its profit illicitly by being able to apply 
damages.  
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Consequently, where the Contractor does not achieve the anticipated 
profit, dependent on the level of losses, can lead to a dispute between 
the parties.  
As stated, although the aim of Sub-Clauses 20.1 and 3.5 is to allocate 
additional costs associated with the speculation to one of the party’s, 
the fact that: 
1) These clauses remove the Contractor’s ability to control its rights 
and obligations:  
2) The Contractor has to convince the Employer that the Employer 
has breached the Contract; and  
3) The Contractor is dependent on the Employer’s agreement as to 
the level and type of compensation due, and is subject to the 
negotiating position adopted by the Employer or the 
determination made by the Engineer, although this can be 
challenged later,  
puts the Contractor in a weak position and exposes him to exploitation, 
which again, as stated, such circumstances are analogous with 
gambling.  
The above analysis illustrates the principle differences between the 
operation of Sub-Clause 20.1 and 3.5, FIDIC99 under EW and UAE Law. 
The difference is, these clauses can be operated to prevent the 
Employer from being liable for breaches of contract, in EW Law, which 
conflict with the rights and obligations which UAE Law, through the 
UCC, places/grants such rights and obligations on the parties. 
These rights and obligations are to ensure that each party’s 
expectations are achieved by preventing any incentive to gain an illicit 
profit caused by the speculative nature of these provisions. 
From the analysis in subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.4, it is clear there are 
differences in how the principles established in EW Law control the 
operation of exemption clauses, although their aim is very similar to 
that of the gharar and riba prohibitions.  
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EW Law allows autonomy of contract. Parties to contracts are interested 
in their commercial aims and so their agreement is highly influenced by 
this. Thus, where there is potential for a good return, then, as recorded 
above, there is an incentive to make an excessive profit.  
This is dependent on what EW Law refers to as “risk” which attaches 
itself to the obligations to be performed. Where a future contingency 
occurs, exposing a party to losses which are greater than anticipated, 
the party still has to perform.  
At this point, the provision that places the obligation on the party is 
examined to see if there is room for redress. The form of the methods 
to claim redress is through implied terms, application of the contra 
proferentem rule, rules against penalty/forfeiture clauses, or the UCTA 
to rebalance the contract to ensure the equity of the contract. This 
would include taking account of an obligation to issue notice where the 
other party accepted the risk. 
The EW Courts, by the tools they have, will, as stated by Bowen LJ, 
place the ‘perils’ or cause of the monetary loss with the party which is 
considered as having accepted the contemplated risk. 
The gharar and riba prohibitions, by not allowing speculation, achieves 
the same goal of an equitable contract as it minimises speculation, the 
primary cause of an incentive to make an excessive profit in both 
jurisdictions. To achieve this there must be precision in the obligations 
and restrictions on party autonomy by not allowing any form of 
opportunism. 
To enforce this, UAE Law, through the UCC, takes a very strong 
approach through the following articles: 
1) 106 (2)(b) which prevents the exercising of a right which 
contravenes the rules of fiqh and the morals of the UAE; 
2) 106(2)(c) which prevents the exercising of a right which results in 
disproportionate harm to the other party; and 
3) 206, that no provision must contravene the morals of fiqh.    
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The effect of article 106 is comparable to the doctrine of abuse of 
rights, where either a legal or a contractual right are used for an 
improper purpose. The improper use is the exercise of a power for 
damaging the other party’s interests, not for serving the interests of the 
party holding the power. The difference between this principle and that 
of the obligations placed on the parties by article 106, is that the 
doctrines behind these articles are to ensure equivalence of a 
transaction by preventing gharar or riba being intrinsic to a contract. 
The next section considers how equivalent benefits can be maintained 
despite provisions that can operate to exempt or limit liability, or give 
one party the right to decide the rights and obligations of the other 
party to the contract. 
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2.4 Fair Dealing, Good Faith, Parties’ Expectations and Relational 
Contracts 
The freedom of contract doctrine applied in EW Law can lead to a harsh 
or unfair financial burden being placed on one of the party’s to a contract 
of mutual obligations where the terms of the contract are strictly 
enforced.    
Consequently, EW Courts can assign the ‘perils’ or ‘risk’ (gharar) 
associated with a contractual obligation where it has not been expressly 
assigned. They do this by the use of implied terms. Coupled to this there 
are other approaches that parties to a contract of mutual obligations can 
adopt when exercising their rights to perform their obligations. These 
approaches are parties’ expectations and relational contracts.  
The use of implied terms and the effect of the approach adopted through 
parties’ expectations and relational contracts lead to fair dealing and 
good faith being applied in the performance of the contract, which in turn 
allows the parties to achieve their anticipated profit. Thus, this section 
examines and establishes in: 
Subsection 2.4.1 - Implied duty of fair dealing and good faith – 
that EW Law, despite its allegiance to the doctrine of freedom of 
contract, the Courts recognise an implied duty of good faith in the 
performance of a contract392;  
Subsection 2.4.2 - Parties’ expectations – when this approach is 
applied to a construction contract, with particular regard to the equitable 
operation of notice and discretionary clauses;  
Subsection - 2.4.3 - Relational contracts – that a construction 
contract, when classified as a relational contract is to achieve the parties’ 
common aim, to complete by the agreed date at the correct price. This 
requires fair dealing and good faith in the performance of the parties’ 
obligations, particularly the act of cooperation393. Consequently, it can be 
argued that to operate a notice or discretionary clause as an exemption 
                                      
392 Leggett J. Yam Seng v. International Trade Corporation [2013] EWHC 111 (QB). 
393 Vaughan Williams L.J. Barque Quilpé Ltd v. Brown [1904] 2 K.B. 264, at 274; Mona Oil Equipment & 
Supply Co Ltd v. Rhodesia Railways Ltd [1949] 2 All E.R. 1014. 
Page 172 of 273 
 
or limitation clause is contradictory to the principles of fair dealing and 
good faith394; and 
Subsection - 2.4.4 - Similarities between the parties’ 
expectations, relational contracts and UAE Law – the approaches 
adopted in parties’ expectations and relational contracts as defined in EW 
Law assimilate the aim of the gharar and riba prohibitions. Thus, it can 
be said that UAE Law enacts these approaches into Law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
394 Vaughan Williams L.J. Barque Quilpé Ltd v. Brown [1904] 2 K.B. 264, at 274; Mona Oil Equipment & 
Supply Co Ltd v. Rhodesia Railways Ltd [1949] 2 All E.R. 1014; Good faith and fair dealing requires both 
parties to respect the reasonable expectations of the other provided they are not excluded by some express 
term, Collins, op cit., n. 19; It also implies a duty on each party to do what, within reasonable powers 
necessary to permit the other party to enjoy the benefit of the contract, - C Mitchell, ‘Leading a Life of its 
own? The Role of reasonable expectations in Contract Law’ (2003) OJLS, Vol. 23, No. 4 2003, pp. 639-665. 
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2.4.1 Implied duty of fair dealing and good faith 
As recorded in subsection 1.3.3, EW Law, prima facie does not 
recognise the principle of good faith395. In saying this, EW Law does not 
accept acts of bad faith. This is demonstrated by the approach 
developed by EW Courts to control acts of bad faith396. This is a 
fundamental difference between EW and UAE Law as the latter enacts 
the notion of good faith into Law. The result in reality is that EW Courts, 
in controlling acts of bad faith, implement fair dealing and good faith 
into the performance of contractual obligations. The Courts do this by 
implying terms to the parties’ rights and obligations that arise from the 
type of transaction they have entered into. This allows the Courts to 
assign risk (gharar) where it has not been expressly assigned, thereby 
rebalancing the contract397.  
As illustrated in the case of The Moorcock398 when Bowen LJ stated that 
the Law desired to give effect, by implication, to the business efficacy of 
a transaction so as: 
“…not to impose on one side all the perils of the transaction, or 
to emancipate one side from all chances of failure, but to make 
each party promise in law as much, at all events, as it must have 
been in the contemplation of both parties that he should be 
responsible for in respect of those perils or chances…”  
In BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings399 it was 
recorded that an implied term must: 
1) Be reasonable and equitable; 
                                      
395 Mckendrick, op cit., n. 23, p. 542, records “…While English contract law is influenced by notions of good 
faith, it does not, as yet recognize the existence off a doctrine of good faith…”; M. Bridge, Doubting Good 
Faith (2005)11 NZBLQ 430, 450 “…There is no general duty of good faith and fair dealing in English 
contract law and there is no reason why there should be…” 
396 Mckendrick, op cit., n. 23, pp. 379-380; 
397 Mckendrick, op cit., n. 23, pp. 379-380; Collins, op cit., n. 19; Peel, op cit., n. 18, pp. 223-237; 
Steyn. J Contract Law: Fulfilling the reasonable expectations of Honest Men Law, QR, 1997.  
398 (1889) L.R. 14 P.D.64; H.H. Edgar Faye QC in Henry Boot Construction Ltd v Central Lancashire New 
Town Development Corp (1980) 15 B.L.R. 1. 
399 (1977) 180 CLR 266, 283. 
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2) Be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract (in that 
without it the contract would lack commercial or practical 
coherence); 
3) Go without saying; 
4) Be capable of clear expression; and  
5) Not contradict any express term.  
In Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman400 Lord Steyn recorded 
that a term will be implied if it is “essential to give effect to the 
reasonable expectations of the parties” which involved diluting the 
previous test of necessity. This statement suggests it was not a 
question of whether the contract would work without the implied term, 
but whether the contract would work in the way the parties reasonably 
expected it to without the implied term401.   
Lord Neuberger confirmed Lord Steyn’s observation in Marks and 
Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) 
Limited and another402.  
The above extracts demonstrate that there is a need for commercial 
and practical rationality to be implied into a contract in order to give 
effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties as to how the 
contract will achieve its aim. Whilst such commercial and practical 
rationality to be implied into a contract must not conflict with the 
express terms, the effect of such express terms can be tempered to 
ensure the overall aim of the transaction is achieved.  
These requirements, when taking account of Bowen LJ dicta, illustrates 
the term business efficacy implies that to achieve parties’ reasonable 
expectations, considering the need for practical coherence, it would be 
impractical and unreasonable, in order to achieve the aims of the 
transaction, to place all the perils/risks on one party, but instead the 
parties share the ‘perils’/risk (gharar) of the transaction.  
                                      
400 [2002] 1 AC 408. 
401 Lewison, op. cit., n. 156, p. 210. 
402 [2016] A.C. 742, 130. 
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Consequently, implied terms can be said to apply whether or not the 
parties had them in mind, or would have expressed them if they had 
foreseen the difficulty. The reason is that the EW Courts will imply 
terms to a contract for reasons of fairness or policy, or in consequence 
of the rules of Law403. 
This view of fairness or policy is reflected in the prevention principle, in 
that the Obligee cannot insist on performance of the Obligor when the 
Obligee has prevented the Obligor’s performance. This implied term 
was formulated by Cockburn C.J404.  
“…I look on the law to be that if a party enters into an 
arrangement which can only take effect by reason of continuance 
of a certain state of circumstances, there is an implied 
engagement on his part that he shall do nothing of his own 
motion to put an end to that state of circumstances, under which 
alone that arrangement can be operative…” 
This expression has been applied in a number of cases405 with Vaughan 
Williams L.J. recording in Barque Quilpue Ltd v Brown406:  
“…that generally such a term is by law imported into every 
contract…”   
The principle has also been described as a respectable principle with 
it’s:  
“…proposition of law and common sense is undoubted; like any 
other such proposition in law of contract, it needs to be read in 
context of the particular contract, interpreted against the factual 
matrix in which it was made…” 407  
                                      
403 Professor Williams G., Language and the Law (1945) 61 L.Q.R. 71 at 401. 
404 Sterling v Maitland (1864) 5 B. & S. 841; Cory (Williams) & Sons Ltd v London Corp [1951] 2 K.B. 476.  
405 Ogdens Ltd v Nelson [1903] 2 K.B. 287, affirmed by the HL [1905] A.C. 109; Southern Foundries 
(1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] A.C. 701; Schindler v Northern Raincoat Co., Ltd[1960] 1 W.L.R. 1038. 
406 [1904] 2. K.B. 264. 
407 Schindler v Northern Raincoat Co., Ltd [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1038. 
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Based on the above, the duty placed on each party is not to prevent the 
performance of the other. This is a positive rule of law of contract408. 
The reason is that the conduct of either party, which can be seen as an 
act to bring about the impossibility of performance [and so delayed 
performance] of the other party, is in itself a breach of contract409.   
The factual background in respect of a construction contract is that the 
subject matter of the contract is placed on land controlled by the 
Employer. The structure to be supplied is for the Employer’s use so only 
he knows what his expectations are as to functional requirements, 
quality, quantity and aesthetics. Consequently, for the structure to be 
built he has to provide the necessary design information to the 
Contractor so he can build it. 
Bowen LJ’s statement and the associated analysis as presented in the 
dicta of the said cases above, taken in context of the said factual 
background of a construction contract, illustrates that:  
1) For a contract to be workable there is an implied obligation to 
remove the peril of late completion; 
2) Neither party will prevent the other from discharging its 
obligations410;  
3) To satisfy the implied obligation of reasonableness and fairness in 
the form that one party is dependent on the other for its 
performance, then such party will not delay in performing that 
obligation upon which the other is dependent411; and 
4) The implied obligation of reasonableness and fairness, in that one 
party will not delay the other in performing its obligation, includes 
the necessity of co-operation to make the contract workable as 
illustrated by Devlin J412 and Cooke J413. It also obligates the 
                                      
408 SMK Cabinets v Hili Modern Electrics Pty Ltd (1984) V.R. 391. 
409 Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] A.C. 701 – Lord Atkin; Thompson v ASDA-MFI Plc 
[1988]. 
410 Vaughan Williams L.J. Barque Quilpé Ltd v. Brown [1904] 2 K.B. 264, at 274. 
411 Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, pp. 96 Lord Blackburn Mackay v. Dick (1881) 6 A.C. 251. 
412 Mona Oil Equipment & Supply Co Ltd v. Rhodesia Railways Ltd [1949] 2 All E.R. 1014 [1949]. 
413 James E McCabe Ltd v Scottish Courage Ltd [2006] EWHC (comm). 
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parties to work together honestly, endeavouring to achieve the 
obligation of good faith and cooperation414. 
The first of these implied terms may not be apparent to the parties to a 
construction contract but it is clear from Leggatt J. dicta in Yam Seng 
Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation415 that parties need to 
cooperate to achieve the mutual benefit of timely completion to ensure 
the business efficacy of the contract. Without the requisite co-operation 
of the Employer to assist the Contractor in addressing the peril of late 
completion, the Contractor takes on the full responsibility of the 
contract, which is not the objective of contracts of mutual obligations as 
illustrated by Devlin J416 and Cooke J417.       
Moreover, cooperation cannot be imposed on a party to compel him to 
do something that he cannot in fact do418. Thus, an obligation placed on 
the Contractor to co-ordinate his work with other Contractors where 
such other Contractors refuse to cooperate, then there is an implied 
term that the Contractor has the right to be granted relief.  
Based on the above examination, the express terms of a construction 
contract which grants the right to the Contractor for an extension of 
time for delivery and/or additional payment, demonstrates that the 
reason for granting the Contractor an extension of time is a breach of 
contract by the Employer. Consequently, where the Employer delays 
the Contractor’s performance, then this positive rule of law is that the 
Employer has to compensate the Contractor by granting additional time 
to complete and additional payment.  
This is particularly important in respect of discretionary clauses. The 
reason for the inclusion of such clauses is to make provision to adjust 
contractual obligations where some future contingency occurs. Such 
events in respect of a construction contract are those as defined in the 
                                      
414 Compass group UK and Ireland Ltd v Mid Essex Hospital Services HNS Trust [2013] EWCA Civ 2000; 
[2013] B.L.R. 265. 
415 [2013] EWHC 111. 
416 Mona Oil Equipment & Supply Co Ltd v. Rhodesia Railways Ltd[1949] 2 All E.R. 1014 [1949]. 
417 James E McCabe Ltd v Scottish Courage Ltd [2006] EWHC (comm). 
418 North Sea Energy Holdings NV v Petroleum Authority of Thailand [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 483, CA. 
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contract provisions419. Consequently, EW Courts have the ability to 
exercise judicial discretion, through business efficacy, to take account 
of obligations of cooperation, fairness and unconscionability420 where a 
discretionary clause is operated in an opportunistic manner. 
This is demonstrated by Wells v Army & Navy Co-operative Society421, 
in that if the time in which a Contractor is to do the work is limited, 
then not only is the Contractor to do the work within that time, but he 
is also entitled to have such time in which to do the work.  
Hence, EW Courts can act as a legislator under the guise of identifying 
terms of the contract to which the parties have not expressly agreed, 
but must apply to make the contract workable, taking account of the 
perils/risks of the transaction while considering the questions of 
reasonableness and fairness422. This prevents exploitation and 
opportunism423 such as the Employer applying damages for late 
completion for which the cause is an Employer’s act, and by implication 
can satisfy the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties424. 
These implied obligations mirror the strong ethical and moral stance 
that influences obligations in fiqh, by making sure the parties adhere to 
the principles of good faith and fair dealing so the parties’ benefits or 
profits to be derived from the contract can be met.  
There are similarities concerning these two prohibitions and the parties’ 
expectations in contract law in EW Law425 as illustrated in the next 
subsection. 
 
 
 
                                      
419 Clause 8 of FIDIC99. 
420 Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, p. 223, pp. 187 to 192; Collins, op cit., n. 19; Peel, op 
cit., n. 18 pp. 224-237; Lawson, op cit., n. 357, pp. 106-110. 
421 (1902) 86 LT. 764. 
422 Op cit., n. 337.  
423 Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372pp. 219 to 254; Collins, op cit., n. 19.  
424 McKendrick, op cit., n. 23, pp. 401-402. 
425 Mitchell, op cit., n. 394; Steyn, op cit., n. 397. 
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2.4.2 Parties’ expectations 
The aim of parties’ expectations is to apply fairness and justice as to 
how rights and obligations are to apply to a transaction in lieu of a strict 
application of the rules of contract law, taking account of the contextual 
scene of the particular contract such as the fundamental need to 
cooperate, or what is termed necessary to allow business efficacy426. 
When examining parties’ expectations, consideration should be given to 
the concept of implicit understandings as to the legal relationship, and 
so how rights and obligations that arise in a construction contract are to 
be exercised and or performed427.  
The aim of the investigation is not to modify the rights and obligations 
as set out in the express terms of the contract428, but to understand 
what a party’s implicit understanding is as to how terms would operate. 
The grounds for this is that the express terms may not accurately 
record the party’s intention/understanding429. Then, based on this 
understanding, determine whether such party’s expectations (profit) 
were in fact fair and reasonable. This ensures good faith and fair 
dealing where a discretionary clause allows party A to decide the rights 
of party B430 because of a future contingency. 
To put this into context of a construction contract, Contractors price 
subsurface work based on a geotechnical report provided by an 
Employer. Such report is limited in its scope, as to prepare a detailed 
report takes time and requires extensive equipment. Coupled to this is 
that the aim of the contract clause that gives a Contractor the right to 
claim where subsurface conditions are different from that expected, is 
to place the gharar associated with additional work with the Employer 
to encourage Contractors to offer competitive prices for the structure.  
                                      
426 Mitchell, op cit., n. 394; Steyn, op cit., n. 397.  
427 Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, pp. 25-49;  
428 Collins, op cit., n. 19; Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, pp. 25-49. 
429 Lord Hoffmann recorded in Mannai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co. [1997] AC 749, 
779 “… The fact that the words are capable of a literal application is no obstacle to evidence which 
demonstrates what a reasonable person with knowledge of the background would have understood the 
parties to mean, even if this compels one to say they used the wrong words…”. 
430 Collins, op cit., n. 19; Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, pp. 25-49.  
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The Contractor commences foundation works and discovers the ground 
conditions are not what was expected. Consequently, the Contractor 
has to do more work, i.e. he loses control of his obligation to build the 
foundation element of the structure. This results in the anticipated 
profit to be made from the contract being reduced. The Contractor 
believes that a certain contract provision takes account of this future 
contingency. Thus, investigation is needed to ascertain whether the 
Contractor’s implicit understanding of the provision(s) that the 
Contractor believes allows it to maintain its anticipated profit in such 
circumstance was fair and reasonable431.  
To determine this, the questions to be answered are432:  
1) Whether it would be fair and reasonable to operate such 
provision(s) in accordance with the implicit understanding that 
the reasonable expectations of the Contractor are to be 
achieved;  
2) If such implicit understanding is fair and reasonable, would it be 
fair and reasonable to operate such provision(s) in the manner 
understood by the Contractor; and  
3) Whether, based on the operation of such provision(s), the 
anticipated profit was justified.  
Where the answer to all three questions is yes then the anticipated 
profit level should be maintained433. Where the answers are a 
combination of yes and no then the anticipated profit should be 
adjusted accordingly, with the Contractor having to accept some of the 
loss434. Such an approach will keep the level of gharar to that which 
was accepted at the time of contract formation and so prevent riba.  
                                      
431 Steyn, op cit., n. 397 this would align with the requirement of business efficacy to operate the 
discretionary power which the Employer has to grant the Contractor the requisite relief in such 
circumstances. It would also satisfy the good faith requirement of honesty and satisfy the primary objective 
of the contract to build the structure – Mason, op cit., n. 258.  
432 Mitchell, op cit., n. 394; Steyn J, op cit., n. 397. 
433 Mitchell, op cit., n. 394; Steyn J, op cit., n. 397. 
434 Such a situation is where, although there is an limitation clause in the written contract it is not 
necessary applied – Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, pp. 38-40 – Mitchell (George) 
(Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seed Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803. 
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As stated, parties’ expectations require the parties to a transaction to 
perform their rights and obligations in a manner of fairness and justice, 
which in turn requires the parties to discharge their rights and 
obligations in a manner consistent with fair dealing and good faith. This 
includes:  
1) Allowing the other party to achieve a fair level of profit where 
such party has genuinely under-assessed its obligations, 
particularly where an implied term allows for the re-
apportionment of risk;  
2) Exercising discretionary clauses in a manner that avoids 
preventing the other party achieving its anticipated profit. This 
being despite this party failing to meet a precondition so it can 
be granted relief where the prevailing circumstances would make 
him liable for some matter beyond his control; and  
3) Not to operate discretionary clauses in an unconscientious 
manner that exploits the position of the party who is subject to 
the operation of such clauses.  
An example of these three points in respect of a construction contract is 
that there is speculation as to whether or not a future contingency will 
occur delaying the Contractor’s performance. This is demonstrated by 
the inclusion of an extension of time clause in the contract provisions. A 
Contractor, based on the implied term that the Employer will not delay 
the Contractor’s performance will have an implicit understanding that 
such an occurrence will not materialise. Despite this, the Employer does 
commit an act that delays the Contractor’s performance, causing the 
Contractor’s profit to be adversely affected.  
The reasonable expectation of the Contractor is that the Employer, 
despite any notice clauses that can exclude it from liability, has an 
obligation, through the requirement of fair dealing and good faith, to 
work with the Contractor to assess the compensation due.  
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Such expectation reflects the implicit understanding435 of the 
Contractor, that such an approach by the Employer is necessary to 
avoid a dispute arising and satisfies the need for justice which is a core 
aim of parties’ expectations436.  
Parties’ expectations reflect the aim of the gharar and riba prohibitions 
in that parties, when discharging their rights and obligations, accept 
their responsibilities and act in a manner consistent with fair dealing 
and good faith. This includes where the Contractor has failed to fully 
appreciate its obligations, and so it has to accept the losses where it is 
demonstrated that his reasonable expectations where incorrect.  
To determine this, the questions to be asked437 by the Employer to 
understand the Contractor’s reasoning are:  
1) Whether the data provided to the Contractor was detailed enough 
to give certainty as to what the obligation entailed. The Contrac-
tor, to comply with the requirement of good faith, has to accept 
the loss which results from his error;  
2) Taking account of 1) above, if the Contractor was not compen-
sated for the additional services/goods provided, would this re-
sult in an unfair gain for the Employer. To do this consideration 
should be given as to whether additional cost incurred by the 
Contractor is a direct result of the Contractor’s error, or whether 
the Employer contributed to such loss by delaying the Contractor. 
If the latter, then the Employer needs to reimburse the Contrac-
tor accordingly. 
Conversely, where the Contractor can demonstrate to the Employer 
that the cause was a genuine misunderstanding which led to his 
reasonable expectation not being achieved, the Employer should accept 
some of the losses in order to prevent an unfair gain. This will allow the 
Contractor to make some of the anticipated profit. Furthermore, the 
                                      
435 Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, pp. 38-40; Steyn, op cit., n. 379. 
436 Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, pp. 38-40. Steyn, op cit., n. 379. 
437 Mitchell, op cit., n. 374; Steyn J, op cit., n. 379. 
Page 183 of 273 
 
Employer shall not exclude itself from liability where he delays the 
Contractor’s performance. Moreover, the Employer, to avoid making an 
unfair profit from the transaction, should not operate a discretionary 
clause in an opportunistic manner. This requires the Employer to make 
a conscious decision as to whether or not it is fair and reasonable to 
operate such a clause, as it will adversely affect the Contractor’s 
interests. 
These requirements reflect a core aim of fiqh to ensure that the 
circulation of usufruct is for the benefit of the community, and 
demonstrates why opportunism and exploitation are considered as 
riba438.  
If parties agree to follow parties’ expectations then they have to 
conduct contract negotiations in a manner consistent with good faith, 
regardless of such concept being described as ‘inherently repugnant’ to 
the adversarial positions of the parties when involved in 
negotiations’439.  
This, also being despite the rationale that parties should be free from 
any obligations until the contract comes into existence, and that 
adversarial negotiations are fundamental to contract formation in that it 
is impossible to impose an alternative system. As recorded above, it 
has been argued that transparent negotiations would serve the party’s 
long term interests440. As construction contracts are dependent on a 
thorough knowledge, where such knowledge is lacking then gharar can 
manifest leading to a dispute as one of the party’s will feel cheated if it 
suffers substantial financial losses.  
Hence, to prevent gharar that leads to the unfair apportionment of the 
perils/risks that arise in a contract, a clear and comprehensive 
understanding of what the Employer’s expectations are is necessary. If 
the Employer has still to finalise a certain aspect, then it is requisite 
that the Contractor be fully informed of the same during negotiations. 
                                      
438 Comair-Obeid, op cit., n. 2, p. 40; Shalabi, al-Iqtisad fil-fikr al-islami, 2nd ed., an Nahda al-islamiya, 
Cairo, 1990, p. 21. 
439 Lord Ackner – Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128. 
440 Hoskins, op cit., n. 265. 
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Moreover, to minimise gharar which can manifest in the contract, the 
parties should agree a mechanism which is to be included within the 
contract as to how such aspect or future contingency is to be dealt 
with.  
For grounds of fairness and reasonableness, this mechanism should be 
over and above the provisions that standard forms of construction 
contracts have to address contingencies, which fall within the 
classification of Employer’s acts of prevention to remove the possibility 
of the gharar and riba prohibitions being contravened. This will allow 
the necessary flexibility to adjust parties’ rights and obligations (time 
for completion and countervalue) which are affected by perils/risks 
which arise from the uncertainty of an aspect or future contingency 
which the Employer is still to finalise.  
Such an approach is necessary to satisfy the obligations of fair dealing, 
reasonableness and justice that parties’ expectations require.   
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2.4.3 Relational contracts 
Construction contracts have been referred to as ‘Relational Contracts’ 
due to the integral nature they now take in that:  
1) Projects have become more complex technically, such as fully 
automated building management systems, security, energy 
saving requirements, fire life-saving systems etc.; and  
2) The location of the project demands a complex structure design 
or innovative methods of construction; or  
3) Due to the size of the project the Employer engages a number of 
contractors to perform different elements of the project to 
achieve his time for completion.  
Consequently, there is greater reliance on each party performing his 
obligation in the manner expected by the other, inclusive of time 
constraints which includes the input of other stakeholders necessary to 
achieve the Employer’s expectations. This requires extensive 
cooperation between the Employer, his Engineer, different tiers of the 
Employer’s design and management staff and his selected 
contractors/suppliers.  
All of these factors generally make the time to achieve completion 
considerable441.  
This results in a need to accommodate future contingences to be 
addressed such as changes to the Employer’s requirements, unforeseen 
events, design changes caused by the complex nature of the project, or 
changes to statutory requirements governing the type of structure to be 
built, in that what should have been a straightforward exercise of 
building the structure is not so straightforward. Hence, there is a high 
                                      
441 Chan, Chan, Yeung, op cit., n. 23, pp. 10-15, the form that relational contracts take has been 
described as strategic partnering, project alliance, strategic alliancing, Build Own Operate and Transfer 
(BOOT) and Joint venture. Despite all these terms the main the main aim of relational contracts is that the 
parties co-operation. This creates trust and an understanding by each of the parties what the other party’s 
interests are. The interests of the Employer is that he wants the structure to meet his expectations, that it 
is delivered by the agreed date for a fair price. The Contractor’s interest is that his anticipated profit 
materialises. 
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level of personal interaction between the individuals who are charged 
with building the structure442. 
This was confirmed in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade 
Corporation443 in which it was stated that contracts which involve long-
term relationships:  
“…may require a high degree of communication, cooperation and 
predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence 
and involve expectations of loyalty [this word with regard to a 
construction contract should be interpreted as reliability] which 
are not legislated for in express terms of the contract but are 
implicit in the parties understanding and necessary to give 
business efficacy to the arrangements…” 
These aspects, when in the context of a construction contract, requires 
that parties must readily offer data or knowledge to each other to assist 
them achieve their obligations under the contract444. This also requires 
the placing of the other party’s interests, i.e. the Contractor, before a 
party’s own interests, i.e. the Employer, or as Leggatt. J stated, “…the 
essence of contracting is that parties bind themselves in order to co-
operate to their mutual benefit…”445   
Long-term contracts often create supplementary duties for the parties 
involved in them in order to ensure the business efficacy necessary for 
such contracts to operate446. As illustrated, by extension of time and 
discretionary clauses to decide the Contractor’s scope of work, standard 
contract provisions, such as FIDIC99, have to make allowance for 
future contingencies.  
Although Employer acts of prevention such as the issuing of a variation 
or late issuing of instructions can be argued to be unforeseen at the 
                                      
442 Rowlinson. S., & Cheung, F., A review of Concepts and Definitions of Various forms of Relational 
Contracting, pp. Preface, Executive summary and pages 1-22; Campbell D., and Harris D., “Flexibility in 
Long-term Contractual Relationships” (1993) 20 J Law Soc, pp. 166-191.  
443 [2013] EWHC 111. 
444 Bakri, Ingirige, Amaratunga, op cit., n. 23; Campbell and Harris, op cit., n. 442.  
445 Whittaker. S., Case Comment - Good, faith implied terms and commercial contracts, L.Q.R. (2013) 129 
(Oct), 463-469. 
446 Collins, op cit., n. 19; Rowlinson & Cheung, op cit., n. 442. 
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time of contract formation, an Employer and his agent will have 
knowledge of the potential for such acts to manifest before the 
Contractor will have such knowledge447. This is illustrated in section 3.2 
below, which demonstrates that a cause of dispute in construction 
contracts in Dubai is the late issuing of instructions, such as detailed 
drawings required for the construction of the structure. 
Thus, it is clear that these supplementary duties in a construction 
contract includes the prompt issuing of design data required for the 
construction, or to correct deficiencies to the design. Where the 
issuance of the same delays the Contractor’s performance, the contract 
provisions may prove to be too crude to appropriately deal with 
adjustments to the Contractor’s rights and obligations caused by such 
delays as illustrated by Sub-Clause 20.1 of FIDIC99. Flexibility is then 
necessary as to how terms of a contract are operated to avoid a 
dispute448.       
As illustrated in section 2.3, provisions which act to exempt an 
Employer from liability where he prevents the performance of the 
Contractor by operation of a strict timeframe, and which inter alia 
makes the Contractor liable for the Employer’s breach, clearly goes 
against the principles set out in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade 
Corporation449.  
The fundamental principles set out in this case are extremely important 
where a contract is for building a structure, as without them the whole 
concept of teamwork is lost. Teamwork is a prerequisite for establishing 
efficient relations necessary to avoid delays in the production of a 
structure450. Without such atmosphere there is no trust, a fundamental 
requirement to removing barriers which in turn encourages maximum 
                                      
447 Vinelott., J. - Hugh Stanley Leach v London Borough of Merton(1986) 32 B.L.R. 51.  
448 Rowlinson & Cheung, op cit., n. 442; Campbell and Harris, op cit., n. 442; Collins, op cit., n. 19 – this 
is particularly important as the role the Employer, through his Engineer is that of a fiduciary, and any 
failure to act in a fair, reasonable and just manner is an act of bad faith; Also see Whittaker, op cit., n. 445.     
449 [2013] EWHC 111; Campbell and Harris, op cit., n. 442.    
450 Collins, op cit., n. 19. 
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contribution to allow the parties to achieve success451, i.e. achieve their 
anticipated profits referred to as a win-win scenario.  
This is demonstrated in the case of Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd452 
where Shell, the franchiser of a tied petrol station discriminated against 
Lostock as to rebates offered to other garages in the area forcing 
Lostock to run its business at a loss. This lack of predictable 
performance, cooperation and reliability denied the teamwork that 
Lostock expected, to the extent that it could drive Lostock out of 
business. The decision in this case was that there was an implied term 
in that there were constraints on Shell’s power to discriminate which 
imposed a duty of loyalty (reliability).  
Laggett J. in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation 
highlighted an important point to be considered in contracts that 
created a greater duty of cooperation and other principles that were 
considered to fall within the ambit of good faith. The principle, put into 
context of a construction contract is, where an Employer is heavily 
investing in a capital project for his own use or public service, and a 
Contractor is investing heavily in production resources to ensure 
delivery, then the greater the cooperation or teamwork that takes 
place, the greater potential for expected returns to be achieved. This 
demonstrates that parties to a construction contract owe a duty to the 
project, the subject matter of the contract, to prevent unnecessary 
costs from delays and so the claims they generate453.     
Consequently, it can be said that there are three aspects which parties 
have an obligation to do: 1) assist the other party in its performance of 
the contract so benefits which are derived from the contract are 
maximised, i.e. the Employer has early or on time delivery and the 
Contractor is not delayed. This requires prompt sharing of data, or in 
the circumstance of the Contractor, keeping the Employer informed of 
problems; 2) avoid harming the interests of the other party unless 
there is a compensating benefit to oneself; 3) act reliably to protect the 
                                      
451 Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, pp. 26-49. 
452 [1976] 1 WLR 1187 (CA); Whittaker, op cit., n. 445.  
453 Collins op cit., n .19; Campbell and Harris, op cit., n. 442. 
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system of production and so the joint interest of the parties, as stated 
above, against adverse interference454.     
These factors are akin to the objectives of parties’ expectations. Such 
factors are that parties, in order to avoid a party failing to meet its 
obligations, have to act in a fair and reasonable manner. This means 
they must cooperate with each other over and above the implied 
obligation of not doing anything to prevent the other party from 
discharging its obligations under the contract.  
In a construction contract this translates into each party assisting the 
other party in achieving its obligations by transferring relevant data 
without having to be asked. It also requires the Employer to 
compensate the Contractor, despite having the option to limit or release 
himself from liability under the contract, where he delays the 
Contractor’s performance. By doing this the joint interests are 
achieved, i.e. delivery of the structure on the agreed date to the 
expectations of the Employer. This ensures that the profits achieved are 
those anticipated and ensures circulation of wealth, thereby satisfying a 
primary requirement of fiqh and article 3, UCC.   
Thus, in the scenario under article 246 above concerning a deficient 
drainage design, an Employer, to satisfy the fair and open dealing 
requirement as defined in EW Law, and that parties must readily 
transfer data when considering the aim of relational contracts, should 
promptly issue the corrected design without waiting for the Contractor 
to issue a notice.  
Moreover, when it comes to the use of exemption of liability clauses 
there has to be fairness in the application of such clauses in order not 
to take advantage of the Contractor’s weaker bargaining position, 
thereby exploiting the Contractor into agreeing to forego his right to 
compensation where the Employer has committed a breach of contract. 
As discussed in subsections 1.3.3 and 2.4.2, major differences between 
the concept of good faith in EW and UAE Law arises during the 
                                      
454 Collins op cit., n .19; Whittaker, op cit., n. 445; Campbell and Harris, op cit., n. 442. 
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formation of the contract when negotiations are carried out. For the 
same reasons as set out in the said subsections, the approach adopted 
in EW Law for such is contrary to the requirements of relational 
contracts as demonstrated by the fundamental aims of such contracts. 
Consequently, during negotiations parties hold back information as their 
aim is to get something as cheap as possible at the expense of the 
other. This in turn leads to uncertainty as to what an obligation entails, 
or pressure to agree aleatory provisions, i.e. notice and discretionary 
clauses. 
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2.4.4 Similarities between the parties’ expectations, relational con-
tracts and UAE Law 
As recorded, EW Law applies the doctrine of freedom of contract. The 
provisions that the parties have agreed to apply to their bargain are 
sacrosanct. Rights and obligations that arise from these provisions can 
only be challenged where they fall foul of a statutory obligation(s), 
where the bargain can be demonstrated to be unconscionable or where 
the Courts can re-balance the risk through implied terms. Hence, 
achieving the objectives of parties’ expectations and relational contracts 
is only possible where the parties discharge their rights and obligations 
in a manner consistent with good faith, fair dealing and justice.    
The above analysis demonstrates that the objectives of parties’ 
expectations and relational contracts, when applied to a contract of 
mutual obligations such as a construction contract, comes close to that 
of what UAE Law obligates parties to do in Law.  
The effect ensures precision in parties’ rights and obligations, so when a 
future contingency intervenes it obligates the parties to act in a manner 
that serves the best interest of both parties. The form that the 
obligation takes is that of legislation which can be split into two forms.  
The first is that parties conduct their transaction in a manner consistent 
with good faith as to the type of contract which the parties have 
entered into. The definition of good faith, in a construction contract in 
UAE Law, is as determined in the above analysis for parties’ 
expectations and relational contracts.   
The second is articles of the UCC that are express in their requirements 
by giving effect to the gharar and riba prohibitions, or that the article is 
specific in the obligations or rights. 
This is a major difference between EW and UAE Law, in that where 
these rights and obligations are not abided by and gharar and/or riba 
manifests, if the parties do not take steps to negate the effect then the 
contract will be void in UAE Law. Consequently, it can be said that UAE 
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Law enacts parties’ expectations and relational contracts as defined in 
EW Law.  
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Part 3 – How gharar and riba are being neglected in UAE construction 
contracts 
3.1 Introduction  
Part 3 examines how the gharar and riba prohibitions are neglected in 
the formation and administration of construction contracts in the 
Emirate of Dubai and the consequences thereof, and establishes in: 
Subsection 3.2 – Gharar, riba and construction contracts - that 
gharar becomes intrinsic to a construction contract due to an 
incomplete design, ambiguities in the Employer’s requirements, late 
instructions/variations proving the design was deficient, and Employer’s 
acts which impede the Contractor’s mode of performance thereby 
causing disputes to arise in a construction contract; and 
Subsection 3.3 – Articles of the UCC that are not being complied 
with – and the effect the non-compliance has on the contract. The 
examination takes cognizance of the definitions for the gharar 
prohibition as proposed by the author, and sets out: 
1) The obligations that the Employer is failing to perform, and how 
this allows gharar to manifest in the contract;  
2) What rights and obligations the Employer and the Contractor 
have; and  
3) Illustrates that a more practical and cooperative approach such 
as parties’ expectations or relational contracts, as defined in EW 
Law, need to be adopted to manage the inherent uncertainty of 
what the Employer requires.  
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3.2 Gharar, riba and construction contracts 
As recorded in the Preamble and further expanded upon here, the main 
causes of disputes in construction contracts in the Emirate of Dubai 
are: 
1) Poor ‘front-end’ engineering design in the form of incomplete 
drawings and contract documentation to execute the project; 
2) Unclear Employer’s objectives resulting in Employer’s interfering 
in the detailed design; 
3) Late instructions or approvals in respect of: (i) design 
corrections; (ii) method statements; and (iii) goods/material; 
4) Variations in respect of: (i) extra/additional work; (ii) quality; 
(iii) layout; (iv) aesthetics; and  
5) Employer acts of prevention: late payment, late access, design 
migration causing the quantity/quality of work to be done to be 
greater than specified, and late appointment of nominated 
subcontractors/suppliers455.  
Points one to four above illustrates that gharar was present in the 
design causing a lack of control as to quantity, quality, form and type of 
work to be done and therefore mode of performance, the period for 
delivery and countervalue.   
The fifth point demonstrates that gharar manifested because of the 
Employer’s delayed performance of an obligation. This includes 
corrections to the design as demonstrated by design migration and the 
increase of quantity/quality because of the Employer’s unclear 
objectives. The term “design migration” is used to describe where the 
design, provided by the Employer is improved upon/further developed 
by informal directives by the Employer, when he comments on the 
Contractor’s submittals for working drawings for finishes, specialised 
                                      
455 Zaneldin, op cit., n. 38; Ren, Atout & Jones J., op cit., n. 38; Shaikh Asif Abdus Saeed, Delays to 
Projects – cause, Effect and Measures to Reduce /Eliminate Delay by Mitigation /Acceleration, Institute of 
Business, The British University, Dubai (2009). 
Page 195 of 273 
 
installations such as MEP, security systems (all of which are referred to 
as shop drawings), and material approvals.  
The main reasons for this is that it has become customary (influenced 
by practices used in the UK), that elements of the design necessary to 
create certainty as to the Contractor’s technical obligations are 
provided during the building of the structure456. An example in respect 
of structural requirements is the steel reinforcement design for columns 
from the ground floor up. These are only required once the Contractor 
is due to finish the sub-structure, whilst for joinery the final detailed 
design for moulds or fire doors are only required as the structural works 
come to an end. 
As demonstrated under section 1.2 above, a construction contract is 
classed as a nominate contract. Consequently, both the general 
obligations of articles 202, 203 and those that apply specifically as set 
out in article 874, UCC have to be complied with for a valid construction 
contract to come into existence. The aim of these articles is to prevent 
contravening the gharar/riba prohibitions so that the anticipated profits 
are achieved. 
Hence, based on the reasons cited above, it is clear that there are two 
primary reasons as to why disputes arise in a construction contract. 
These are: 
1) The Employer is not complying with the obligations placed on 
him by articles 202, 203, 874, 886 or 887 UCC to provide a 
comprehensive design in the form of drawings, specifications, 
and quantity of work to be performed in the form of a BoQ to a 
level to allow the Contractor to decide its mode of performance, 
and so build the structure within the agreed period; and 
                                      
456 Hugh Stanley Leach v London Borough of Merton (1986) 32 B.L.R. 51. – The commentary on the use of 
a Programme of Works illustrates that date reflected in by which the Architect was to provide data to the 
Contractor shall not be neither unreasonably close to nor unreasonably distant from the dates when such 
was in fact required. The reasonableness being determined by actual circumstance of the work to be done – 
Powell-Smith, V., & Sims, J., A.O. (1983) Building Contract Claims 2nd Ed., Blackwell Scientific Publications 
Oxford UK, p. 72. 
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2) The relevant articles of the UCC that regulate a construction 
contract during its performance as set out in section 1.3 above 
are not being adhered to.  
This in turn leads to a dispute as to457: 
1) Whether the Employer or the Contractor was responsible for the 
delay; 
2) Where the Employer caused the delay, what additional time the 
Contractor has a right to deliver the structure; and 
3) What increase in countervalue the Contractor has a right to for 
the delay suffered, and any additional/extra work done. 
The result is that gharar is intrinsic to the contract in the form of 
speculation as to458: 
1) When delivery will be achieved because of an Employer’s act that 
delayed the performance of the Contractor; and  
2) Whether the countervalue takes account of costs incurred by the 
Contractor caused by changes in condition, Employer’s changes to 
the scope of work and so it is equivalent to the work done. 
The way a dispute manifests is, that although the Contractor has the 
right to have the time for delivery adjusted through the contract 
provisions, there is, from the author’s experience, disagreement as to:  
1) Whether or not the Contractor has met the obligations of the 
notice clause; and  
2) The operation of the discretionary clause that gives the right to 
the Employer to decide the compensation due to the Contractor.  
                                      
457 Atkins Chambers op cit., n. 19, pp. 893-904; Holme v Guppy (1838) 3 M. & W 387.; Wells v Army & 
Navy Co-operative Society (1902) 86 LT 764; Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd. V Mckinney Foundations 
Ltd. (1970) 69 L.G.R; Trollope & Colls v NW Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 1 W.L.R. 601 HL. 
458 Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 320-323; Atkins Chambers, op cit., n. 19, pp. 
904-910; City Inn Ltd v. Shepherd Construction Ltd 2003 SLT 885; Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v 
Honeywell Control Systems Ltd (No.2) [2007] EWHC 447 (TCC); B.L.R. 195.; Steria Limited v. Sigma 
Wireless Communications Limited [2008] B.L.R. 79; 118 Con. L.R. 177 [2008] C.I.L.L 2544 QBD (TCC). 
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In this second instance there is uncertainty as to: 1) whether or not 
any compensation will be agreed to by the Employer; and 2) whether 
the compensation agreed to by the Employer will be fair.  
Consequently, there is potential as to whether or not the Employer will 
deduct damages for late delivery of the structure, which if the 
Contractor fails to give timely notice and/or the Employer acts in an 
opportunistic manner when deciding the time element of the 
compensation due, then riba can infect the contract. 
The next section analyses how the relevant articles of the UCC are not 
being complied with. 
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3.3 Articles of the UCC that are not being complied with 
This section examines, by considering the causes of a dispute as set out 
in the previous section, what articles of the UCC are not being complied 
with, along with the consequences of non-compliance. 
All of the causes of a dispute as set out in section 3.2 demonstrate that 
the Employer has failed to meet the obligations placed on him by 
articles 202, 203 and 874 UCC. This in turn prevents the precision as 
required by articles 886 and 887, UCC as to what the Contractor’s 
obligations are to perform the physical work not being achieved 
through the BoQ.  
This allows gharar to be present in the mode of performance and so the 
period for delivery, an essential element of a construction contract 
which goes to the root of the contract. Hence, the period agreed for 
delivery lacks the precision necessary to minimise gharar.  
Thus, where the delivery is too short then an Employer’s unfair gain is 
in two forms, in that he does not pay for: 
1) Work which was not measured, services associated with design 
migration and changes in quality and type of goods; and  
2) Administrative costs required to manage the mode of 
performance, in that such costs will be incurred for a longer 
period than the planned duration, or will not be sufficient to 
cover the selected mode of performance.  
Where the period is too long there will be no unfair gain as Contractors 
will reduce the resources required to optimise their administration 
costs. In the circumstance of the delivery period being too short, then 
Contractors will not meet the agreed delivery date and Employers will 
deduct damages, thereby contravening the riba prohibition. These 
circumstances also contravene the obligations placed on Employer’s by 
article 42 UCC, in that neither party will cause harm to the other.  
The effect of the non-compliance with articles 202, 203, 874, 886 or 
887 UCC (the ‘design articles’), is further compounded where an 
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Employer corrects the design deficiency which delays the Contractor’s 
performance, and then relies on the exclusion of liability (notice) clause 
to avoid compensating the Contractor. This being despite his failure to 
obey the requirements of the ‘design articles’. The reason, as 
demonstrated, is that a provision of this nature is aleatory as the 
Employer now decides the Contractor’s rights and so furthers enhances 
the effect of gharar that has infected the mode of performance, delivery 
and countervalue, and allows riba to infect the contract. For this reason 
it is contrary to the requirements of article 206, UCC.  
In both instances the provisions of articles 3, 31, 32, 42, 52, 106(2)(b) 
and (c), UCC will be contravened, as the Employer is causing the 
Contractor to suffer financial harm for the reasons stated. This allows 
the Employer to increase his profit unfairly, which as stated is 
repugnant to the morals of fiqh and so the morals of the UAE. 
Consequently, as provided for under article 210, UCC the contract is in 
effect void or defective.     
For the above reasons the five (5) causes for a dispute stated in section 
3.2 demonstrate that the contract entered into did not comply with 
article 243, UCC. This article provides that the rights and obligations 
that arise from that type of contract must be performed. Put simply, 
the Employer must comply with the obligations placed on him by the 
design provisions; and no clause of the contract can be aleatory as it 
contravenes article 206, UCC and the morals of the UAE. The overall 
effect is the contravention of article 3, UCC as the circulation of wealth 
is impeded.  
These five (5) causes also illustrate that the requirements of articles 
246(2) and 263, UCC are being disobeyed. These articles, when 
construed together, obligates the Employer, where the description (the 
design) of a thing is incomplete, to correct the deficiency in the design.   
As recorded above, an Employer’s reliance on an exclusion of liability 
clause furthers the effect of gharar that is intrinsic to a contract. An 
Employer, by relying on such provision and exercising the right 
granted, contravenes the obligation placed on the parties by articles 
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106(2)(b) and (c), UCC not to exploit the Contractor, and 246(1), UCC 
to act in a fair and open manner, both procedurally and with 
substantive fairness.  
Such action by the Employer is contrary to article 386, UCC that makes 
the defaulting party responsible for compensating the other party, and 
article 387, UCC, that the injured party can make a claim against the 
defaulting party. This obligation to compensate the Contractor for a 
breach of contract only arises once the Contractor has issued notice as 
obligated by article 380, UCC. Moreover, such provision(s) is in direct 
conflict with article 476, UCC and article 95 LCT, both of which are 
mandatory. 
The five (5) causes of a dispute stated in section 3.2 demonstrate that 
parties are not complying with the broader effect of obligations placed 
on them by article 246(1), UCC.  
The obligations placed on the Employer by the above articles require 
that he take responsibility for his breaches of contract. Thus, no 
exclusion of liability clause should be incorporated in the provisions of 
contract as they detract from these obligations. Where an exclusion of 
liability clause is included in the contract provisions, although an 
Employer will consider it a right to apply the provision, it should only be 
used to protect his interests. It should not be used in a manner to 
undermine the reasonable expectations of the Contractor.  
Put in the words of Bowen LJ459, the perils/risk which result in a loss 
should not be the burden of one party to the contract, nor should a 
party be ‘emancipated’ from all chances of failure. This is because EW 
Courts view of fairness is a rule of Law.  
As illustrated, article 247, UCC gives the right to the Contractor to 
refrain from performance where the Employer fails or delays in 
performing an obligation that the Contractor is reliant on to perform his 
obligation. Thus, as stated, the prevention principle is enacted in UAE 
Law.  
                                      
459 The Moorcock (1889) L.R. 14 P.D.64; This is supported by H.H. Edgar Faye QC in Henry Boot 
Construction Ltd v Central Lancashire New Town Development Corp (1980) 15 B.L.R. 1. 
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The obligations that an Employer will not delay in performing with 
regard to a construction contract in EW and UAE Law are the same. 
These are460: 
1) That he promptly performs all administrative obligations he has 
under the contract;  
2) To appoint all parties which the provisions of the contract oblige 
him to do;  
3) Pay the Contractor in accordance with the provisions of the 
contract; not to interfere with any certificate;  
4) Not to misrepresent the physical state of the Site;  
5) Give adequate undisturbed possession of the Site against other 
parties engaged by the Employer;  
6) That such possession shall be of good title against third party’s; 
and  
7) That the Employer shall promptly issue all necessary instructions 
in respect of deficiencies in the design, and issue all variations in 
a timely manner.  
The five (5) causes cited in section 3.2 demonstrates that the Employer 
is failing to perform these obligations and so is disobeying the 
requirements of article 246, UCC. Moreover, these five (5) causes 
illustrate that the parties are failing to take cognizance of the right 
granted under article 247, UCC to the Contractor.  
Such circumstance demonstrates again non-compliance with the ‘design 
articles’, article 243, UCC and the requirements of 246 (2), UCC that 
requires parties to embrace matters that accompany the primary 
obligation; and that all other articles previously stated are being 
contravened.        
The first and second causes of a dispute in section 3.2 demonstrates 
that the Employer was failing in his obligation of cooperation, placed on 
                                      
460 Atkins Chamber’s, op cit., n. 19, p. 532.  
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him by article 246(2), UCC, to ensure his agent, the Engineer, performs 
his duty to issue instructions promptly to the Contractor.   
The second cause for a dispute to arise, “unclear Employer objectives 
resulting in the Employer’s interference”, demonstrates that gharar was 
present during pre-contract negotiations. The reason is that the 
Employer’s uncertainty as to what his expectations are results in the 
Employer adopting a defensive approach during such negotiations461. 
Such approach is analogous to the adversarial position that EW Law 
considers the only way parties can negotiate and conclude a contract. 
This leads to the same outcome of that in EW Law, to get something as 
cheap as possible. Such circumstance contravenes all articles as 
referenced above for the reasons previously stated. However, it 
seriously undermines the obligation placed on the parties by article 
246, UCC, as the seed for not dealing in a fair manner has already been 
planted. 
As recorded in subsection 1.3.3, such instance contravenes the 
obligation placed on the Employer by article 186, UCC. Unlike EW Law 
which has adopted the principle that it is fundamental at contract 
formation that parties during pre-contract negotiations take adversarial 
positions, UAE Law requires full disclosure. The reason for this, as 
recorded throughout this thesis, is to avoid an unfair gain (gharar) and 
so exploitation (riba) of a party, as such circumstances lead to the illicit 
gain from a transaction. This concept is understood in EW Law as 
demonstrated by the words of Bowen LJ, “…not to impose on one side 
all the perils of the transaction…” and reflected by Lord Steyn in his 
dicta in Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman462.     
All of the causes cited in section 3.2 demonstrate that the parties, when 
attempting to resolve a controversy between them, were failing to 
comply with article 266, UCC. This article, as recorded in subsection 
1.3.4, enacts what is comparable to the contra proferentem rule in EW 
                                      
461 Zaneldin, op cit., n. 38; Ren, Atout & Jones J., op cit., n. 38. 
462 [2002] 1 AC 408. 
Page 203 of 273 
 
Law, which is a principle of justice in EW Law and so clearly aligns itself 
with the precepts of fiqh.  
Incomplete drawings and contract documentation illustrate that the 
design is not fully developed, demonstrating that there are ambiguities 
in the same. Employer’s uncertainties as to his expectations support 
this, which, as illustrated above, will prejudice the Employer to comply 
with his obligation of fair and open dealing. This obliges him to accept 
that his failure to provide a design, to the precision of that required by 
the ‘design articles’, has allowed gharar to be intrinsic to the contract 
as to the attributes of mode of performance, delivery and countervalue. 
This demonstrates that the requirements of the ‘design articles’, and 
articles 243, 246(2), UCC and all other articles previously stated are 
contravened.   
This is supported by the third and fourth causes of a dispute arising, 
and the fifth with regard to design migration that results in the 
quantity/quality of work to be done to be greater than that specified.  
The above circumstances also demonstrate the parties have failed to 
comply with article 249, UCC where some intervening contingency has 
occurred, causing the Contractor to lose control over its mode of 
performance, resulting in the Contractor facing grave financial losses. 
Such losses include economic impracticability as illustrated by the 
commentary under subsection 1.3.3.  
The third and fourth causes for a dispute to arise illustrates that the 
Employer was not abiding by this obligation placed on him by article 
354, UCC to consent to a change in design where he failed to comply 
with the obligations placed on him by the ‘design articles’. This failure 
contravenes article 52, UCC, as any delay in consenting to a necessary 
design change increases the effect of gharar caused by an incomplete 
design. This increases the level of unfair gain and allows riba to be 
present.  
An example would be the Employer failing to revise the design when 
unsuitable grounds are discovered, and makes the Contractor 
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responsible for changes to his mode of performance463 by operation of a 
provision that allows him to decide the rights of the Contractor. 
If the Employer is released from being liable to compensate the 
Contractor for the delay suffered and the change in the mode of 
performance, the Employer will gain an excessive benefit by exploiting 
the Contractor’s contractual position. The right of the Employer to 
deduct damages for late delivery will further exasperate this.  
The requirements of article 886, UCC, where the contract is M&V 
support this argument as the Employer has the right to cancel the 
contract where there is a significant increase in countervalue. Whereas, 
article 887 obligates the Employer to initiate a variation where there is 
any change in the ‘agreed plan’.  
Thus, where the ground conditions are not as expected, the Employer, 
to avoid contravening articles 52, 106 (b) and (c), UCC, should 
promptly issue a revised design. Such action is in line with the broader 
obligations placed on the Employer by article 246, not to operate a 
condition to undermine the reasonable expectations of the other party.    
As discussed above, article 386, UCC obliges a defaulting party to pay 
compensation to the other party. This obligation only arises where: 1) 
the injured party issues a notice as required by article 380, UCC; and 
2) upon the injured party making such a claim, refer article 387, UCC. 
Article 386, UCC obligates the Employer to compensate the Contractor 
where the Employer prevents or delays the Contractor’s performance. 
Thus, all five (5) of the causes of a dispute stated in section 3.2 give 
the right to the Contractor to be compensated for both time and 
money. Hence, any exclusion of liability clause will have no effect 
unless the Contractor has failed to give notice. 
As illustrated above, when considering the broader obligations that 
arise under article 246, UCC, the Employer, where the Contractor has 
failed to give notice can rely on the exclusion of liability clause. 
However, once notice is issued then such exclusion clause shall no 
                                      
463 Rayner S, (1991) ‘A note of Force Majeure’ in Islamic Law (ALQ), pp. 86-89. 
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longer apply as it detracts from the Employer’s obligations, namely 
those that are set out by the ‘design articles’; and that such provision 
should not be operated to undermine that of the Contractor. 
The above demonstrates there is a serious lack of understanding of how 
the UCC regulates parties’ rights and obligations that arise from a 
construction contract. The primary reason is that parties see the 
contract provisions as the key source as to what rights and obligations 
arise from a construction contract. Parties relying on EW Law to 
interpret and understand such rights and obligations as illustrated in 
section 2.2 compound this allowing gharar and riba to be inherent to 
the contract. This in turn causes the countervalue not to be equivalent 
to the work done, leading to a dispute between the Employer and the 
Contractor.  
This is particularly obvious at the formation stage of the contract as the 
design and precision expressed by Jurists has not been complied with.  
The five (5) causes for a dispute to arise stated in section 3.2 illustrate 
this. There is also a complete lack of cooperation that is necessary as 
obligated by article 246, UCC, to ensure that the structure built is to 
the Employer’s expectations and delivered by the agreed date for the 
corresponding value. The reason is that the Employer has not defined 
his objectives, leading to a defensive approach adopted in negotiations.  
The result is negotiations not being conducted in a transparent manner. 
This lack of the Employer’s objectives leads to uncertainty as to what 
the Employer’s expectations are, and so a desire on the part of the 
Employer to minimise the amount to be invested. Thus, there is 
potential for an immoral incentive to gain an undue benefit from the 
transaction, e.g. get a Rolls Royce whilst paying the price for a Ford 
Mondeo.    
Consequently, parties to a construction contract need to adopt a more 
practical and cooperative spirit to correct the inherent flaws at contract 
formation and the delivery phase of the structure. The aim of the 
gharar and riba prohibitions, as demonstrated by the contemporary 
definitions determined by the author, is to remove the cause of a 
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dispute at contract formation. This in turn allows parties to the contract 
to make the anticipated profit from the contract, thereby satisfying 
their commercial aims.  
Approaches which can allow such a practical and cooperative spirit to 
be adopted are parties’ expectations and relational contracts. A more 
formal approach is that of Alliance Contracting. Again, this approach is 
aimed at promoting a collaborative working environment using 
techniques aimed at encouraging cooperation between the parties. The 
contractual relationship can vary widely, in that the agreement can be 
nothing more than a statement of the commons gaols the parties wish 
to mutually meet, or can be a fully integration of management systems, 
including open book keeping and sharing of all data including access to 
all stakeholders, the design team and supply chain. The objective is to 
create a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation. This includes the 
sharing of cost overruns and savings regardless of how the overruns or 
savings occur464. 
The basic principles which Alliance Contracting wish to create is the 
elimination of ‘blame culture’ by creating an atmosphere of teamwork, 
cooperation and mutual trust, and that the parties understanding of 
each other interests so they can identify and minimise areas which can 
lead to a dispute465. 
Such approach will allow parties to comply with a primary objective of 
fiqh, which, as recorded in this thesis, is to allow the circulation of 
wealth.   
Applying the proposed definitions of the gharar and riba prohibitions, 
taking account of the obligation placed on the parties by article 2, UCC 
when interpreting the relevant articles of the UCC that regulate a 
construction contract, there are clear analogies in the principles and 
aims of the parties’ expectations, particularly that of a win-win scenario 
                                      
464 Bailey, J. A.O. (2016) Construction Law (Construction Practice Series), Informa law from Routledge, 
Abingdon, Oxon, UK pp. 37-39; Chappell, Marshall, Powell-Smith, Cavender, op. cit., n. 51,pp. 388-389. 
465 Chappell, Marshall, Powell-Smith, Cavender, op. cit., n. 51, p. 389. 
Page 207 of 273 
 
of relational contracts. This is particularly clear in the application of the 
provisions that apply to the contract.  
Consequently, parties to a construction contract would be better off if 
they adopted either of these approaches during the building stage of a 
construction contract. The reason is that they minimise the potential for 
gharar and riba as they ascribe to the requirements of UAE Law.    
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Part 4 – How to fix the neglect of the effect of these prohibitions 
4.1 Introduction  
As illustrated in Part 3, parties to a construction contract are neglecting 
how the gharar and riba prohibitions are to be applied to parties’ rights 
and obligations in both the formation and administration of the 
contract. Such neglect, if not addressed, makes the contract void or 
defective as the requirements of articles 52, 202, 203, 243 and 874, 
UCC, amongst others, have not been complied with.  
Taking cognizance of the author’s novel proposed definitions of gharar 
and riba, this part examines how standard forms of contract provisions 
such as FIDIC99 are to be interpreted and applied in order to prevent 
such neglect, allowing the contract to remain valid.   
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4.2 Certainty of obligations 
This section identifies what the parties must do, during the life cycle of 
their contract, to avert gharar becoming intrinsic to their construction 
contract.  
Thus, this section examines, using FIDIC99 as an example where 
applicable, and establishes in: 
Subsection 4.2.1 - Certainty of the Employer’s design – the 
primary ways in which gharar infects a contract is the Employer’s failure 
to prepare a comprehensive design and his acts of prevention. The 
method to address this is by operation of the agreed contract 
provisions;     
The Contractor’s Programme of Works – the Contractor’s 
Programme of Works in UAE Law forms part of the contract 
documentation as it is an essential ingredient for a valid contract to 
come into existence; 
Subsection 4.2.3 - The Contractor’s right to insist on the 
Employer’s performance – which, as such notice under UAE Law is a 
notice for specific performance makes the Employer liable to 
compensate the Contractor; and  
Subsection 4.2.4 - Mechanism for compensating the Contractor 
– how the parties agreed contract provisions can negate gharar 
infecting the contract.  
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4.2.1 Certainty of the Employer’s design 
This section examines how gharar can be removed from the two types 
of permitted construction contracts under UAE Law, M&V and LS, when 
gharar becomes intrinsic to a contract because of a deficient design or 
some other act by the Employer impeding the Contractor’s 
performance.   
Although this goes against the gharar prohibition, such circumstance is 
accepted on the basis of istihșān466 as long as the consequences of 
gharar are removed467.  
In order to address such consequences, or what can be termed 
‘legitimate gharar’ in UAE Law, parties to a construction contract are 
obligated to operate the contract provisions such as FIDIC99 in a 
manner that satisfies the obligations placed on them by the UCC, so the 
effect of gharar infecting the contract is removed. The principle ways 
this is achieved is set out in the following subsections: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
466 Changes in legislation and more efficient or optimisation of function needs could not be accommodated 
without the Employer having this right cite whichever case in EW law.  
467 Kamali, M, H., A.O. (2005) Equity and Fairness in Islam, Islamic Text Society, Cambridge, UK, p. 43. 
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4.2.2 The Contractor’s Programme of Works 
FIDIC99 obligates that the Contractor issues a Programme of Works to 
the Employer468. The form that FIDIC99 requires the programme to 
take is that it sets out the order in which the Contractor shall execute 
the different elements required to build the structure, along with 
associated durations to perform the same.  
The elements presented in the programme are469:  
1) The actual construction work (structural/architectural/MEP), 
inclusive of the testing and commissioning and the sequence of 
execution;  
2) Deliverables (method statement describing the work to be done, 
health and safety, Subcontractor selection and appointment), 
material approval submissions, manufacture of plant to be 
incorporated into the structure; and 
3) Expenditure of Provisional and Prime Cost Sums. 
As stated in subsection 1.2.2 above, these elements, through a critical 
path methodology, determines the most economical or cost efficient 
period over which the structure can be delivered.  
The reason is that this approach allows the Contractor to identify 
resources necessary to achieve the agreed delivery date. This produces 
certainty as to how the mode of performance will be performed, 
thereby satisfying the precision called for by Jurists to minimise gharar.  
By using critical path methodology to determine the optimum period in 
which the structure can be built it identifies how gharar can infect the 
contract, resulting from a deficient design, any other Employer’s act of 
prevention, or some default of the Contractor as it470:  
                                      
468 Sub-Clause 8.3; FIDIC99; Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 224; Glover & Hughes, 
op cit., n. 43, p. 191; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, pp. 143. 
469 Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 224-226; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 
191-192; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, pp. 143-144. 
470 Baker, Mellors, Chalmers & Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 224-226; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 
191-192; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, pp. 143-144. 
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1) Highlights what activities must be done by a specific date if the 
delivery date(s) is to be met;  
2) Provides certainty that the structure will come into existence; and  
3) Illustrates what critical elements have to be satisfied if gharar is to 
be avoided. 
Consequently, a primary role of the programme is to inform the 
Employer of the obligations he has to perform in order not to 
hinder/delay the Contractor’s planned mode of performance. Such 
obligations are when the Employer is to provide471:  
1) Approvals for deliverable submissions – method statements, goods 
and materials;  
2) Instructions as to expenditure of Provisional and PC Sums and the 
appointment of nominated Subcontractors;  
3) Further design data which will clarify ambiguities; and  
4) When the Employer’s participation is required so that the 
Contractor can discharge his obligations such as testing, 
Employer’s manufacturers visits, etc.  
The programme also allows the Employer to: 1) monitor the 
Contractor’s progress; and 2) identify when the Employer’s lack of 
action prevents the Contractor’s performance472. This causes the 
Contractor to lose control of his ability to manage his mode of 
performance and his obligation to deliver the structure by the agreed 
date.  
Where such circumstances occur, the Programme of Works, as it was 
compiled using critical path methodology, can be readily analysed to 
identify the extent gharar has infected delivery and countervalue473.  
                                      
471 Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 226; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, p. 144; Hugh Stanley 
Leach v London Borough of Merton (1986) 32 B.L.R. 51. 
472 Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 227; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, p. 192; 
Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, p. 144. 
473 Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her Majesty’s Attorney General for Gibraltar [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC). 
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To do this the duration of the delay associated with the Employer’s act 
of prevention is simply inserted at a suitable point into the programme, 
and then by use of the relevant software the delay to delivery will be 
predicted. This in turn allows the increase in countervalue to be 
calculated.   
The Programme of Works, unless specifically incorporated does not 
form part of the contract in EW Law, and so any changes in the inter-
relationship of activities as to how the mode of performance is to be 
achieved, and any delays that manifest, do not amend the party’s 
obligations474. 
The obligation placed on the Contractor by FIDIC99 mirrors two of the 
essential elements that have to be satisfied for a valid contract to come 
into existence as required by article 874, UCC:  
1) There must be a statement of the type and extent of the 
structure, along with the mode of performance; and  
2) The period over which the structure is to be built.  
Consequently, the Programme of Works that FIDIC99 obligates the 
Contractor to issue to the Employer, in UAE Law forms part of the 
contract.  
The effect of this is that any future contingency categorised by FIDIC99 
as an Employer’s act of prevention that delays delivery, then such act 
of prevention constitutes a variation under the contract. This obligates 
the Employer to issue a variation order to cover the additional time and 
associated cost required to accommodate the delay to delivery475.    
This is further demonstrated by the effect of the following obligations 
placed on the Employer by the UCC when taking account of the 
proposed gharar definition:  
                                      
474 Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, p. 227. 
475 Yorkshire Water Authority v Sir Alfred McAlpine & Son (Northern) Ltd, 32 B.L.R; Havant BC v South 
Coast Shipping Ltd (No.1), (1998) 14 Const. L.J. 420.  
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1) Article 31 - furnish the design to the Contractor to prevent gha-
rar;  
2) Article 32 - perform the act(s) set out in the Programme of 
Works;  
3) Article 42 - discharge the obligations placed on him by the Pro-
gramme of Works to prevent harming the Contractor;  
4) Articles 52, 202 and 203 - prevent gharar becoming intrinsic to 
the contract;  
5) Article 243 - perform the obligations that derives from the con-
tract; and 
6) Article 246 - do what is necessary so as not to delay the Contrac-
tor, which includes the issuing of a substitute design where any 
element of the initial design is deficient.  
The overall effect of these articles is that the Employer has to perform 
all matters that require his participation within the timeframes set out 
in the Programme of Works.  
This includes ensuring the Engineer fully coordinates and cooperates 
with the Contractor in respect of such matters that requires the 
Employer’s participation. 
Moreover, as a result of the effect of article 246(1) and (2), UCC the 
Employer has an obligation to assist the Contractor to perform his 
obligations so the Contractor can maintain progress against that set out 
in the Programme of Works. This is on the proviso that such assistance 
does not go against the interests of the Employer, which it does not as 
it is in the Employer’s interest to have the structure delivered by the 
agreed date and to his expectations.  
Consequently, the Employer is obligated to ensure the Engineer 
supports the Contractor where submissions for deliverables, method 
statements and materials maybe considered deficient as a result of 
misinterpretation or lack of clarity.  
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Two principles which define good faith in the performance of a contract 
in EW Law illustrate this:  
1) That something which cannot be done unless both parties concur 
to do it, then each party will do what is necessary to do it476; and  
2) That party’s to a contract have a substantial investment in the 
contract, the parties will cooperate/coordinate so that the 
maximum benefit can be derived from the transaction by each 
party477.   
This creates an atmosphere of teamwork as mutual trust develops 
between the parties, resulting in predictability and reliability and so 
certainty as to how the Employer and Contractor will meet the common 
objectives. The common objectives are those of the structure coming 
into existence by the agreed delivery date, to the expectations of the 
Employer and at the agreed countervalue. It also removes gharar as to 
delivery and countervalue so that there is no unfair gain, and the 
benefits obtained are those anticipated and equivalent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
476 Lord Blackburn Mackay v. Dick (1881) 6 A.C. 251. 
477 Laggett J., Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation [2013] EWHC 111. 
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4.2.3 The Contractor’s right to insist on the Employer’s performance 
Notice clause(s) in standard forms of construction contract such as 
FIDIC99 gives the right to the Contractor to:  
1) Insist on the Employer performing an obligation to avoid gharar 
becoming intrinsic to the contract; or  
2) Request the Employer to take measures to negate the effect of 
gharar where it has become intrinsic to the contract due to a 
failure of the Employer to perform an obligation.   
FIDIC99 has categorised the application of this right as to when:  
1) The Employer fails to perform an act which he is directly 
responsible, e.g. the provision of additional design data or where a 
third party delays the Contractor for which the Employer has 
accepted responsibility, i.e. his agent, a statutory authority or 
another contractor engaged by the Employer478;  
2) The Employer varies the Contractor’s scope of work, including 
hindering the Contractor’s performance479; or  
3) The Employer has accepted responsibility for matters that are 
beyond either party’s control480.  
Category 1) Right – The Employer’s failure to perform an act 
FIDIC99, where the circumstance of a Category 1) Right arises, 
obligates the Contractor to notify the Employer of an Employer’s act 
that will delay or is delaying the Contractor’s performance. The 
obligation to give notice arises under a specific clause of FIDIC99 that 
specifies the circumstance under which the Contractor’s right to give 
                                      
478 Sub-Clause 1.9 - Delayed Drawings or Instructions; Sub-Clause 4.12 - Unforeseeable Physical 
Conditions; Sub-Clause 4.24 – Fossils; Sub-Clause 7.4 – Testing; Sub-Clause 8.4 (d) – Extension of Time 
for Completion - Unforeseeable shortages of personnel or goods caused by epidemic or governmental 
actions; Sub-Clause 8.4(e) – Extension of Time for Completion - Any delay which the Employer is 
responsible; Sub-Clause 8.5 – Delays by Statutory Authorities; Sub-Clause 13.7 – Adjustment for Changes 
in Legislation and Sub-Clause 16.1 – Contractor’s Entitlement to Suspend Work FIDIC99.   
479 Sub-Clause 13 (b) – Variations; Sub-Clause 8.8 – Suspension; Sub-Clause 10.3 – Interference with 
Tests on Completion and Sub-Clause 10.2 Taking Over Parts of the Works - FIDIC99. 
480 Sub-Clause 8.4 (c) – Extension of Time for Completion - Exceptional adverse climatic conditions and 
Sub-Clauses 19.2 and 19.4 – Notice of Force Majeure, FIDIC99. 
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notice arises, and what action the Employer is to take to address the 
matter.  
This right reflects the right granted to the Contractor by article 380(1), 
UCC, and provided the Contractor has issued notice in accordance with 
article 380(1), article 387, UCC gives the right to the Contractor to 
claim compensation, with article 386, UCC obligating the Employer to 
compensate the Contractor.  
Article 386, UCC excuses the Employer from compensating the 
Contractor where the Employer can demonstrate the cause of his 
inability to perform was a result of an external cause. Where the parties 
agree between themselves who will be liable for an external cause, the 
right to be excused will not apply.  
Where gharar manifests in any of the forms determined by FIDIC99 
under Category 1), the Contractor has a right to compensation in Law. 
FIDIC99 obligates the Contractor, when notifying the Employer, to 
identify the form of gharar. This provides certainty as to how gharar is 
to be avoided or negated and allows the parties to establish the extent 
of compensation due.  
Where the Employer fails to provide specific performance causing a 
breach, then FIDIC99 provides a mechanism to compensate the 
Contractor, refer Sub-Clause 8.4. The mechanism operates by adjusting 
the Contractor’s obligation as to the time the Contractor has to deliver 
the structure and amends the countervalue so it is equivalent. This 
reinstates certainty in respect of these attributes. This in turn negates 
the effect of gharar and the potential for riba.  
Under FIDIC99 the mechanism to trigger the right for compensation is 
also conditional on certain notice requirements being met. These are 
discussed in section 4.3 below.      
There are fundamental differences as to how FIDIC99 provisions are to 
be interpreted and applied in EW and UAE Law. The reason is the effect 
of the articles of the UCC that apply to a construction contract, taking 
cognizance of the prohibition test, obligating the parties to ensure 
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certainty in the operation of FIDIC99 where Category 1) Right arises. 
These differences are: 
Firstly, in EW Law where there is a lack of definition as to what an 
obligation entails, then the Contractor must be able to demonstrate 
that the ignorance that resulted from such lack of definition was 
something that an experienced Contractor could not have foreseen. 
Failure to do so results in EW Law classifying such ignorance as an 
accepted risk481. In UAE Law it is the opposite as demonstrated in 
subsection 1.1.3. All a Contractor has to demonstrate is that gharar is 
intrinsic, caused by a lack of definition as to what an obligation entails. 
This in turn results in him losing control of his mode of performance, 
and so his ability to comply with his obligation to complete by the 
agreed date. Once proven the Contractor has a right to compensation in 
Law. Consequently, the argument advanced in EW Law that an 
accepted risk associated with any lack of definition is not valid in UAE 
Law; 
Secondly, where an Employer fails to comply with the Contractor’s 
notice directing specific performance, causing gharar to infect the 
contract, then the Employer is liable under the UCC, refer article 387, 
to compensate the Contractor; 
Thirdly, in addition to the Contractor’s right in Law to be compensated, 
article 247, UCC allows the Contractor to cease performing his 
obligations. Consequently, the Employer’s right to insist on 
performance can only be reinstated once the Employer has agreed the 
compensation due to the Contractor. The effect of article 247, UCC is 
that it enacts the prevention principle as defined in EW Law into UAE 
Law; 
Fourthly, for the reasons stated above, unlike EW Law, the Programme 
of Works [which includes supplementary documentation that supports 
how the Programme of Works was compiled] in UAE Law is a contract 
document as it demonstrates how the essential element, the mode of 
                                      
481 Atkins Chambers Ltd op cit., n. 19, pp. 875-877. 
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performance, will be achieved, providing certainty that the structure 
will be delivered by the agreed date. Where gharar infects the mode of 
performance caused by an Employer’s act of prevention (such as loss of 
productivity, change of working methods or resources), this constitutes 
a variation in UAE Law to the agreed mode of performance and period 
of delivery. Consequently, the Employer is obliged to order a variation 
confirming such change, and by doing so allows the Contractor to be 
compensated for time and money for such variation; and 
Fifthly, where an Employer’s act of prevention reduces the period for 
delivery, which the Employer fails to acknowledge but instructs the 
Contractor to maintain the agreed delivery date. As the Programme of 
Works is a contract document in UAE Law, then such instruction will 
constitute a variation if the Contractor has to alter its mode of 
performance to maintain the agreed delivery date.  
The certainty of the above rights and obligations prevent any dispute 
arising as to how gharar contaminating the contract can be negated.  
In addition to these rights and obligations, the Employer and the 
Contractor have an obligation to comply with the requirements of 
articles 32, 52, 263 and 354, UCC. The primary requirement of all of 
these articles where gharar infects the design is that it must be 
removed, otherwise the Contractor’s obligation to deliver has no force; 
and article 42, UCC - that parties are not to harm one another, and 
where a party causes harm he will remove it.  
Category 2) Right – The Employer varies the Contractor’s scope 
Under FIDIC99 the Employer has the right to vary the Contractor’s 
scope of work which the Contractor has no right to refuse to do482. 
Compensation – time and money - can be dealt with as follows:  
By agreement between the parties483. This approach applies to M&V and 
LS contracts. The process allows the Contractor, as part of the variation 
                                      
482 Sub-Clause 13 – Variations and Adjustments; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 
116-129; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 263-269. 
483 Sub-Clause 13.3 – Variation Procedure; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 116-129; 
Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 263-269. 
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process to accommodate varied work, to propose modifications to the 
Programme of Works and the time to deliver, with the varied work 
being valued in accordance with Sub-Clause 12 - Measurement and 
Evaluation. Where the time for delivery increases then the above 
process allows the Contractor to recover time related costs.  
Where the contract is M&V, then the Contractor’s right for payment of a 
variation to measured work is through the measurement and valuing 
process set out in Sub-Clause 12.3 – Evaluation, i.e. the increase in 
work is measured and the contract rate applied484. The right for this 
additional payment is automatic by operation of Sub-Clause 14.1 – 
Contract Sum485. 
Where the contract is LS then the Contractor’s right for payment of a 
variation to measured work, again is by operation of Sub-Clause 12. 
However, the right for payment requires documentary evidence 
demonstrating that the Employer instructed the varied work.   
Payment for extra work for M&V and LS contracts, i.e. work for which 
there was no measured item of work, then such work is measured and 
valued based on existing rates for similar work, or a new fair rate is 
calculated. Again, the right for payment requires documentary evidence 
demonstrating that the Employer instructed the varied work.   
Compensation as to additional time to deliver for both M&V and LS 
contracts, caused by the Employer instructing a variation, is by 
operation of Sub-Clause 8.4486. This clause obligates the Contractor to 
give notice where the ordering of a variation will delay delivery. The 
issuing of a notice triggers the Contractor’s right for compensation – 
time and payment associated with the delay. The operation of such 
notice is conditional on certain requirements being met. These are 
discussed in section 4.3 below. 
                                      
484 Sub-Clause 12.3 – Evaluation; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 157-174; Glover & 
Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 255-260. 
485 Sub-Clause 14.1 – The Contract Price; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 157-174; 
Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 279-281. 
486 Sub-Clause 8.4 – Extension of Time for Completion; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, 
pp. 457-464; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 194-204. 
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These rights and obligations reflect the requirements of articles 886(2) 
and 887(2), UCC for payment of additional work over and above that 
measured and itemised in the contract; and the right for valuing extra 
work not measured and itemised in the contract.   
The method set out by FIDIC99 to value additional work reflects that of 
the requirements of article 888, UCC but sets out a specific process as 
to how extra work is to be valued. This provides certainty in the 
operation of this article in order to ensure the equivalence of the 
contract. This in turn satisfies the obligations placed on the parties by 
the gharar and riba prohibitions.   
There are again fundamental differences as to how FIDIC99 provisions 
are to be interpreted and applied in EW and UAE Law for the same 
reasons as above, to ensure certainty in the operation of FIDIC99 
where Category 2) Right arises. The differences are: 
Firstly, article 886, UCC obligates the Contractor to notify the Employer 
where there is a significant increase in quantity, as illustrated in 
subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.4, to ensure the equivalence of the contract. 
The elements, which can cause a significant increase, are not limited to 
additional/extra work. It includes all attributes agreed by the parties 
that allow the Contractor to establish precision in respect of the same 
as expounded by the Jurists. This includes the number of days needed 
to deliver the structure. The Employer, upon notice of such significant 
increase has the right to cancel the contract. The Employer’s right to 
cancel demonstrates that the Employer has control of the Contractor’s 
obligation to complete. Failure by the Employer to cancel the contract 
obligates the Employer to compensate the Contractor time and money. 
This obligation ensures that the equivalence demanded by the gharar 
and riba prohibitions are satisfied. Consequently, there is no basis in 
UAE Law for the Employer to deny the Contractor’s claim for 
compensation. This is further demonstrated that the Contractor’s right 
for compensation only arises once he has notified the Employer of a 
significant increase; and  
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Secondly, article 887, UCC obligates the parties to comply with the 
variation clause incorporated into the contract. As recorded above, a 
party agreed variation clause can be for an increase in countervalue, 
with a separate clause for the additional time to complete. The 
important point is, that the level of precision demanded by article 874, 
UCC that a variation, be it additional/extra work or some other form 
agreed by the parties, will be readily distinguished thereby avoiding any 
dispute. Thus, again there is no basis in UAE Law for the Employer to 
deny the Contractor’s claim for compensation. Consequently, the 
Employer, in order to satisfy the effect of the gharar and riba 
prohibitions, has to operate the relevant clauses of FIDIC99 in a 
manner that ensures the equivalence demanded by the said 
prohibitions.  
The certainty that the above rights and obligations establish prevents 
any dispute arising as to how gharar has contaminated the contract. 
This in turn satisfies the obligations that the Employer and the 
Contractor have to comply with as set out under articles 32, 52, 42, 
263 and 354 UCC. 
Category 3) – Force Majeure    
Under FIDIC99 where force majeure or intervening contingencies occur, 
then the Contractor is obligated to notify the Employer of the form of 
the intervening contingency487. Note, Sub-Clause 19 - Definition of 
Force Majeure provides a definition as to what constitutes Force 
Majeure.  
If the Contractor is prevented from performing his obligations as a 
result of Force Majeure and wishes to claim compensation - time and 
money, then FIDIC99488 obligates him to issue a further notice. The 
operation of such notice is conditional on certain requirements being 
met. These are discussed in section 4.3 below. 
                                      
487 Sub-Clause 19.2 Notice of Force Majeure; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 497-
504; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 361-374. 
488 Sub-Clause 19.4 Consequences of Force Majeure; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 
497-504; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 361-374. 
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FIDIC99489, where the intervening contingency has a continuing effect, 
and provided the notice requirements have been complied with, then 
there is an option for the contract to be terminated. 
There are specific differences as to how EW and UAE Law defines Force 
Majeure. This is illustrated under the commentary of article 249, UCC. 
The differences are, that in UAE Law a party suffering unfair loss/harm 
as performance has become impossible or unreasonably burdensome, 
then the Courts can rebalance the parties’ rights and obligations. The 
cause of the impossibility or unreasonable burden in UAE Law includes 
the suspension by the Employer and unforeseeable obstructions, which 
FIDIC99 classifies as an Employer’s act of prevention.  
Coupled to this, UAE Law recognises economical impracticability. EW 
Law does not. In saying this, FIDIC99 does define force majeure to 
include an exceptional event or circumstance.  
Force majeure falls within the doctrine of frustration in EW Law. For 
parties to invoke the doctrine of frustration under EW Law there must 
be some unforeseen intervening contingency that goes to the root of 
the contract; and the event must not have been brought on by one of 
the parties. Without these circumstances being satisfied, no relief in EW 
Law can be granted. Hence, without the rights and obligations as stated 
in FIDIC99, then the parties cannot resolve the effect of the intervening 
contingency. The problem faced is that the force majeure must fall 
within the causes set out in Sub-Clause 19 and so can be restrictive in 
its application.  
Whereas under UAE Law, article 249, UCC states what the parties’ right 
and obligations are determined in Law, and includes any circumstance  
that causes unfair loss/harm as performance is impossible or has 
become unreasonably burdensome490, threatening grave financial 
losses. Consequently, the definition of an intervening contingency, and 
                                      
489 Sub-Clause 19.6 Optional Termination, payment and Release; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op 
cit., n. 42, pp. 497-504; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 361-374. 
490 Whelan, op cit., n. 6, Art. 273(1), provides that where Al-Qūwat Al-Qāhira intervenes when a 
corresponding obligation which makes performance impossible, the contract will be automatically cancelled; 
Art. 273(2) releases the Obligor from performance where the impossibility of performance is of a temporary 
nature, although the Obligee can cancel the contract by notice to the Obligor during the period of 
temporary impossibility. This circumstance would correspond to partial or full suspension of the Works.   
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as illustrated under the commentary for article 249, UCC, covers 
circumstances that FIDIC99 does not. Thus, the aim of this article is to 
prevent an excessive financial burden on parties, as the effect can be 
negative to the circulation of wealth, thereby conflicting with the 
requirements of article 3, UCC.  
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4.2.4 Mechanism for compensating the Contractor 
As illustrated in this thesis, there are specific differences in how the 
provisions in standard forms of contract, using FIDIC99 as an example, 
are to operate under EW and UAE Law. The core difference is where 
gharar is inherent to a contract then the parties have an obligation to 
remove it. Coupled to this, the party, which as recorded is generally the 
Employer who is responsible for allowing gharar to manifest, is 
obligated in Law to compensate the Contractor. 
As indicated in subsections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3, standard forms of 
construction contract such as FIDIC99 are to complement the relevant 
articles of the UCC that apply to a construction contract. The 
fundamental way this is achieved is by providing a mechanism for 
compensating the Contractor where gharar has manifested in order to 
negate its effect.  
The mechanism starts with the Contractor putting the Employer on 
notice, informing him of his act of prevention causing gharar to 
manifest. The act will fall within one of the three (3) categories for 
which the Employer takes responsibility. This effectively legalises the 
breach by the Employer as there is provision in the contract clauses to 
adjust the effects of the breach - the time to complete and 
countervalue.  
This, as recorded, the notice clause in FIDIC99 complements article 
380, UCC as it requires the Contractor to state the form of gharar 
infecting the contract, so the parties have an understanding as to what 
elements of the mode of performance will be delayed. This gives 
certainty as to why the Contractor has a right to be compensated. 
This being understood, the loss of time suffered is impacted into the 
Programme of Works. This period is then valued along with any 
additional/extra work done. The basis for the right of the Contractor to 
claim additional time to complete is through Sub-Clause 8.4, FIDIC99. 
The right to be granted additional time to complete is through the 
different Sub-Clauses of FIDIC99 that obligates the Contractor to notify 
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the Employer of the specific performance491 required. The right for 
additional payment is either through Sub-Clause 12 or 13.  
The level of compensation is subject to negotiations between the 
Employer and the Contractor, with the Engineer acting as mediator, 
refer Sub-Clause 3.5, FIDIC99. Once agreement is reached a formal 
instruction is issued citing the Sub-Clause under which the 
compensation is due. 
Thus, FIDIC99 complements articles: 
1) 386, 387, 886 and 887, UCC by specifying the acts of an 
Employer that allows gharar to become intrinsic to a construction 
contract; and  
2) 32, 42, 52, 202, 203 and 243, UCC as it provides a mechanism 
for how the effect of gharar is removed.  
It also complements article 3, UCC by ensuring circulation of wealth.   
As illustrated earlier, the Employer has full right to decide the level of 
compensation, both additional time to delivery and increase in 
countervalue492. This Employer’s right is examined in section 4.3 below.     
The obvious form for which the Contractor will suffer financial harm will 
be Site administration costs associated with the longer period the 
Contractor will have to remain at Site. However, as discussed in 
subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.4, the BoQ translates the design into an 
accurate measurement of work to be done. The rates for the work 
items are subject to the inclusive price principle. Where the Employer 
delays in furnishing missing data or issues it in a dysfunctional manner, 
then the Contractor’s mode of performance suffers disruption. The form 
of the disruption is that: 1) the Contractor is unable to purchase goods 
                                      
491 Sub-Clause 1.9 - Delayed Drawings or Instructions; Sub-Clause 2.1; Sub-Clause 4.7 – Setting Out; 
Sub-Clause 4.12 - Unforeseeable Physical Conditions; Sub-Clause 4.24 – Fossils; Sub-Clause 7.4 – Testing; 
Sub-Clause 8.5 – Delays by Statutory Authorities; Sub-Clause 8.8 – Suspension; Sub-Clause 10.3 – 
Interference with Tests on Completion; Sub-Clause 10.2 Taking Over Parts of the Works; Sub-Clause 13.7 
– Adjustment for Changes in Legislation; Sub-Clause 16.1 – Contractor’s Entitlement to Suspend Work; 
Exceptional adverse climatic conditions and Sub-Clauses 19.2 and 19.4 – Notice of Force Majeure - 
FIDIC99; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, pp. 145-148; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 38, pp. 194-195; Baker, 
Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 460-464.  
492 Sub-Clause 3.5, FIDIC99; Baker, Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 294-298; Glover & 
Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 65-67; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, p. 96. 
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in a timely manner, including necessary incidentals; 2) uncertainty 
manifests as to the type, number and duration of resources needed to 
perform work activities.  
These circumstances undermine the Contractor’s productivity rates, 
causing the Contractor to suffer unnecessary additional expense and 
delays in performing work activities as the optimisation of production 
costs are lost. Thus, gharar not only infects delivery, but also 
contaminates measured work activities causing the Contractor to suffer 
financial harm. 
The right for the Contractor to claim compensation in this circumstance 
is the same as described above.    
The method for calculating compensation as to the delay suffered is 
recorded in subsection 4.2.2. That is, to assess the period of delay 
associated with gharar infecting the mode of performance by inserting 
the duration of the delay into the Programme of Works. The dynamics 
of the software used to create the Programme of Works demonstrates 
the additional time the Contractor is entitled to in order to negate 
gharar that has infected the contract. 
As the Programme of Works is a contract document, the supplementary 
documentation that demonstrates how the Programme of Works was 
compiled forms the basis for calculating the cost associated with such 
disruption, and any additional time needed to achieve delivery. The 
method for calculating the increase to the countervalue is the additional 
days that the Contractor is required to remain at Site, multiplied by the 
daily administrative costs for the Site.  
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4.3 Operation of Notice clauses 
 
This section examines the notice clauses, using FIDIC99 as an example, 
that obligates the Contractor to notify the Employer of his acts of 
prevention and establishes in:  
Subsection 4.3.1 - Legality of a Notice Clause – that obligates the 
Contractor to notify the Employer of an Employer’s act of prevention, 
delaying the Contractor, is ambiguous in its interpretation and 
operation, thereby making it aleatory. Consequently, the ambiguities 
are to be interpreted so gharar and riba are not intrinsic to the 
contract, thereby giving certainty to its operation, and that such 
operation is fair in that it complies with the relevant articles of the Law. 
Such a clause, which prima facie exempts or excludes the Employer 
from liability, is to be interpreted and operated so that it does not 
contravene the riba prohibition and complies with the relevant articles 
of the Law; and 
Subsection 4.3.2 - Content of a Notice - the form and content in 
which a valid notice must take to satisfy both the UAE and EW Law, and 
those that complement this Law using FIDIC99 as an example, based 
on case precedents as determined in EW Law.  
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4.3.1 Legality of a Notice Clause 
As recorded, the reason FIDIC99 has been used as an example as the 
standard form of construction contract to be analysed in this thesis, is 
that at the time this research commenced it was the contract provisions 
to replace the most common contract provisions in Dubai, FIDIC4. 
However, the analysis that follows is to be taken in a general context, 
as it demonstrates the importance of the correct construction of a 
notice clause when taking account of parties’ obligations not to 
contravene the gharar and riba prohibitions. 
The following examination illustrates, using the notice clauses of 
FDIC99 that obligate the Contractor to notify the Employer of an 
Employer’s act of prevention delaying the Contractor’s performance, are 
ambiguous in their construction.  
To define ambiguity reference is made to the EW Law case of Burns 
Philip Hardware Ltd v Howard China Pty Ltd493 in which Priestly J.A. 
stated that words are ambiguous if they have, 
“…two or more plausible meanings when the context of the 
document is taken into account in the light of any knowledge any 
ordinary intelligent reader of the document would bring to the 
meaning of it…” 
FIDIC99 obligates the Contractor to give notice, prima facie, under two 
separate clauses. The first is a clause494  that defines the form that the 
Employer’s act of prevention takes, which gives the right for the 
Contractor to claim compensation – time and money. The second is a 
clause [Sub-Clause 20.1] which is a common clause, referred to in the 
text of the first clause, that the Contractor has to comply with in order 
to have a right to compensation – time and money.  
                                      
493 (1987) 8 N.S.W.L.R. 642.  
494 Sub-Clause 1.9 - Delayed Drawings or Instructions; Sub-Clause 2.1; Sub-Clause 4.7 – Setting Out; 
Sub-Clause 4.12 - Unforeseeable Physical Conditions; Sub-Clause 4.24 – Fossils; Sub-Clause 7.4 – Testing; 
Sub-Clause 8.5 – Delays by Statutory Authorities; Sub-Clause 8.8 – Suspension; Sub-Clause 10.3 – 
Interference with Tests on Completion; Sub-Clause 10.2 Taking Over Parts of the Works; Sub-Clause 13.7 
– Adjustment for Changes in Legislation; Sub-Clause 16.1 – Contractor’s Entitlement to Suspend Work; 
Exceptional adverse climatic conditions and Sub-Clauses 19.2 and 19.4 – Notice of Force Majeure - 
FIDIC99; Totterdill, op cit., n. 43, pp. 145-148; Glover & Hughes, op cit., n. 43, pp. 194-195; Baker, 
Mellors, Chambers, Lavers, op cit., n. 42, pp. 460-464. 
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The following text found in the first clause demonstrates this:  
“…the Contractor shall give notice to the Engineer and shall, 
subject to Sub-Clause 20.1 [Contractor’s Claims] to…” – an 
extension of time to complete under Sub-Clause 8.4 and/or 
additional payment.  
Sub-Clause 20.1 states:  
 “…If the Contractor considers himself to be entitled to any 
extension of the Time for Completion and/or any additional 
payment, under any Clause of these Conditions…the Contractor 
shall give notice to the Engineer, describing the event or 
circumstance giving rise to the claim. The notice shall be given 
as soon as practicable, and not later than 28 days after the 
Contractor became aware or should have become aware, of the 
event or circumstance…”  and 
“…The Contractor shall also submit any other notices which are 
required by the Contract…” 
The text “…subject to Sub-Clause 20.1…” and the text “…the Contractor 
shall give notice to the Engineer, describing the event or circumstance 
giving rise to the claim …” being the cause of the ambiguity. The 
ambiguity is the Contractor’s right to claim compensation subject to: 
1) Complying with the requirements of the first Sub-Clause that 
defines the act of prevention which is to be issued within the 28-
day timeframe; or  
2) Issuing notice under Sub-Clause 20.1 describing the event and 
issuing such notice within the 28-day timeframe.  
Coupled to this the text “…The Contractor shall also submit any other 
notices which are required by the Contract…” clearly adds to the 
confusion, in that is the Contractor to issue two notices for the same 
act of prevention? 
Moreover, the text of Sub-Clause 20.1, states:  
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“…The notice shall be given as soon as practicable, and not later 
than 28 days after the Contractor became aware or should have 
become aware, of the event or circumstance…” otherwise the 
contractor forfeits his right to compensation  
creating further uncertainty in the operation of Sub-Clause 20.1 as a 
result of the subjective nature of this extract as to what circumstance 
determines the meaning of “...as soon as practicable…” and that of 
“…the Contractor became aware or should have become aware…”. 
Is it when the circumstance giving rise to the claim has started delaying 
the Works and/or causing additional cost to be incurred; or is it when 
the Contractor discovers that a circumstance has potential to cause a 
delay and/or additional cost. 
The text of these clauses result in speculation as to how these clauses 
can operate which allows gharar to become intrinsic to the contract. 
The form gharar takes is: 1) which clause is the clause that allows the 
Contractor the right to claim compensation; and 2) what determines 
when the notice is to be given, and so as to when the 28-day timeframe 
starts to run. 
Consequently, these points bring the legality of these clauses into 
question. The reason is twofold.  
1) The first is which clause does the Contractor gamble on to obtain 
his right for compensation?  
2) The second is what circumstance decides when the 28-day period 
runs from? 
Consequently, the whole mechanism of the notice clauses is aleatory in 
nature, as the ambiguity has potential to create an immoral incentive 
for the Employer to increase unfairly its profitability from the contract. 
Thus, the Contractor’s profitability is contingent on the operation of this 
Sub-Clause. 
Hence, the interpretation of all notice clauses are subject to the 
requirements of article 266, UCC, that such ambiguity should favour the 
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Contractor. This rule, as recorded in EW Law, is seen as a rule of 
justice. Such rule embraces the principle that the gharar and riba 
prohibitions enforce.   
In order to clarify how such ambiguity is to be addressed, reference is 
made to the EW Law case of Australian Broadcasting Commission v 
Australian Performing Right Association Ltd495, in which Gibb J. stated: 
“… if the language is open to two constructions, that will be 
preferred which will avoid consequences which appear to be 
capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust, even though 
the construction is not the most obvious, or grammatically 
accurate’, to use the words from earlier authority cited in Locke v 
Dunlop496, which although spoken in relation to a will, are 
applicable to the construction of a written instruments generally; 
see also Bottomley’s Case497. Furthermore, it will be permissible 
to depart from the ordinary meaning of the words of one 
provision so far as is necessary to avoid inconsistency between 
the that provision and the reason of the instrument…” 
The last sentence is important as, where the instrument is that of an 
article of the legislation498 that regulates the contract, then the text of a 
clause, or clauses that operate together in their construction, must be 
construed in a manner that reflects the obligations placed on the parties 
by such legislation.  
Moreover, again, as illustrated by this extract, where there are two 
constructions then the one to be selected is the construction which 
avoids consequences that appear to be unjust.   
                                      
495 (1973) 129 C.L.R. 99. 
496 (1888) 39 Ch.D. 387. 
497 (1880) 16 Ch.D. 681. 
498 As stated by Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Schuler (L) AG v Wickman Machine Tools Sales Ltd [1974] 
A.C. 235 although parties are free to make whatever contracts they want such freedom is subject to any 
legal requirements.  
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The requirement for a “fair result” was reaffirmed in the EW Law case 
Cargill international SA v Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corp499 
when Potter L.J. stated, 
“…On the other hand, modern principles of construction require 
the court to have regard to the commercial background, the 
context of the contract and the circumstance of the parties, and 
to consider whether, against that background and in that 
context, to give the words a particular or restricted meaning 
would lead to an apparently unreasonable and unfair result…” 
The above cases demonstrate again that the aim of EW Law is that 
contract provisions should be fair in their operation. This further 
demonstrates, that despite the interpretation of how a notice clause 
operates as set out in: City Inn v. Shepherd Construction Ltd 500, 
Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v. Honeywell Control Systems Ltd 
(No.2)501 and Steria v. Sigma Wireless Communications Ltd502, EW Law 
does seek to enforce the principles of good faith, fair dealing and 
justice.   
As demonstrated by the analysis of article 380(1), UCC, this article 
allows a party to give notice to the other party in a contract of mutual 
obligations, compelling the other party to give specific performance of 
an obligation where such party is failing to do so. Where the defaulting 
party fails to give performance, then article 386 obligates such party to 
pay compensation – time and money. For the obligation to arise for the 
defaulting party to pay compensation, article 387, UCC makes it a 
condition precedent that notice must be issued in accordance with 
article 386, UCC. This obligation illustrates, through the statement 
made by the Judge in the Steria503 case:  
                                      
499 [1998] 1 W.L.R. 461, CA; also see Laura Investments v Havering [1993] 1 E.G.L.R. 124. 
500 2003 SLT 885. 
501 [2007] EWHC 447 (TCC); B.L.R. 195. 
502 [2007] EWHC 3454 (TCC); 2008 B.L.R. 79. 
503 Steria Limited v. Sigma Wireless Communications Limited [2008] B.L.R. 79; 118 Con. L.R. 177 [2008] 
C.I.L.L 2544 QBD (TCC). 
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“…The Employer’s entitlement to damages, it might be said, was 
caused not by the delay but by the delay coupled with the 
contractor’s failure to satisfy the condition precedent…, 
that UAE Law considers a delay by the Contractor in issuing a notice 
prejudices the rights of the Employer, and so any compensation due to 
the Contractor should only run from when the Employer becomes aware 
of his breach.    
The 28-day timeframe that the Contractor is obligated to give notice, as 
illustrated in the analysis in subsection 2.3.2, demonstrates that in UAE 
Law it acts as a provision exempting the Employer from liability that 
causes the Contractor financial harm, thereby contravening the gharar 
and riba prohibitions. Consequently, this part of Sub-Clause 20.1 is 
illegal and so shall be ignored as it has no effect. This circumstance is 
acknowledged under Qatari Law, for which the author has first-hand 
knowledge as he now works in Qatar. Although this argument was 
raised under Qatari Law, the Qatari Civil Code is analogous to that of 
the UCC. 
Moreover, it is in conflict with the mandatory periods in UAE Law that a 
party has a right to make a claim, which is within two (2) years or ten 
(10) years dependent on whether the contract is civil or commercial. 
This obligation also conflicts with the following rights and obligations 
placed on the parties by article 886 in respect of a M&V contract. These 
are: 
Firstly, the Contractor’s right to claim compensation only arises when 
he has notified the Employer of a significant increase. This reflects the 
obligation placed on the Contractor by article 246, UCC, that it would 
be unfair to expect the Employer to be liable if he has no knowledge of 
such liability;  
Secondly, the Employer has the right to cancel the contract once 
notified of a significant increase. This right demonstrates that the 
Employer has control of the Contractor’s obligation to perform; and the 
obligation placed on the Employer by article 246, UCC, that it would be 
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unfair to let the Contractor continue to work if the Employer cannot pay 
the increase; and  
Thirdly, the Contractor’s right to notify the Employer to prevent gharar 
becoming intrinsic to the contract; or the directing of the Employer as 
to what he must do where gharar has infected the contract is in the 
interest of the Contractor. The reason is that it protects the 
Contractor’s profitability by allowing him to regain control over his 
obligation of performance; and satisfies the obligation of good faith that 
the parties must do all that is necessary on their part for the thing, a 
structure in this circumstance, to be completed.    
Coupled to this is the effect of article 31, UCC, that articles of the Law 
take precedence over party provisions; and the effect of article 206, 
UCC, contract provisions are to supplement the relevant articles of the 
Law that apply to the type of contract the parties have entered into.  
The above examination illustrates that: 
1) There is ambiguity in the provisions that obligate the Contractor to 
notify the Employer of his obligation to perform, and grants the 
right to the Contractor to claim compensation; 
2) Such ambiguity, when considering the construction of the 
provision, should apply the fairer requirement; and 
3) Although parties to a contract can agree provisions to apply to 
their contract, it is a requirement of the Law that such provisions 
supplement the Law. Where there is ambiguity in the construction 
of the provisions, allows them to be operated in an aleatory way 
by allowing gharar to become intrinsic to the contract, then they 
have no legal effect as there is potential for unfair gain.  
Thus, for there to be certainty as to how the notice clauses will operate 
in a manner that reflects the requirements of UAE Law is: 
Firstly, clauses that define the form of the Employer’s act of prevention 
are clauses that satisfies the obligation placed on the Contractor by 
article 380(1), UCC, as these clauses state the specific performance 
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that the Employer is compelled to do. Coupled to this, as the 
Employer’s liability to compensate the Contractor only arises once he 
has been notified of the late performance, the compensation only 
becomes due from that date. These rights and obligations apply to both 
M&V and LS contracts where gharar manifests because of an 
Employer’s act of prevention; 
Secondly, in the circumstance of a M&V contract where there is a 
significant increase, the right for the Contractor to claim compensation, 
time and money, only arises once the Contractor has notified the 
Employer of the same. Until that point the Contractor is responsible for 
all losses incurred;  
Thirdly, the period for making a claim is as stated in UAE Law. 
However, the right to make a claim is dependent on the timing of the 
Contractor: 1) issuing notice to compel the Employer to perform an 
obligation, or 2) requesting the Employer’s instruction as to how 
gharar, infecting the contract, is to be addressed; and 
Fourthly, the combined effect of articles 380, 386 and 387, UCC are fair 
and reasonable and satisfies both sides of the prevention principle. The 
reason is that the Contractor’s right for compensation only arises once 
the Employer is put on notice. Any delay by the Contractor in issuing 
the notice is his responsibility, and so any financial harm he suffers is 
for his account. Thus, the notice clauses of FIDIC99 that obligate the 
Contractor to notify the Employer to perform an act to prevent gharar 
becoming intrinsic to the contract, or to take measures where gharar 
has manifested due to the Employer failing to perform an obligation, 
shall operate in accordance with these articles. This ensures 
equivalence of the contract. The period for making the claim once 
notice is issued will be that prescribed in Law, two (2) or ten (10) 
years. 
In summary, the notice clauses of FIDIC99 are ambiguous. 
Consequently, there is potential for these clauses to operate in an 
aleatory manner causing gharar to infect the contract. To satisfy the 
requirements of article 206 UCC, such clauses must be interpreted in a 
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manner that allows their application to prevent gharar and riba 
infecting the contract.  
Consequently, the requirements of articles 380 and 886 UCC are to be 
satisfied. Article 886 obligates the Contractor to notify the Employer of 
a significant increase in countervalue where the contract is M&V, and 
only one notice is to be issued. Where the Employer commits an act 
that will or has caused gharar to infect either form of contract 
permitted by the UCC, the Contractor has to issue one notice in 
accordance with article 380.  
The Contractor’s right for compensation starts from the date the notice 
was issued, whether it is issued in accordance with article 886 or 380. 
FIDIC99 categorises the different Employer’s acts of prevention and 
therefore supports the requirements of these articles as they bring 
certainty as to what is needed to negate gharar. 
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4.3.2 Content of a Notice 
To determine the content of a notice in respect of FIDIC99, guidance 
can be taken from the EW Law case Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her 
Majesty’s Attorney General for Gibraltar504 in which Akenhead J. stated: 
“…there is no particular form called for in (Sub-)Clause 20.1 and 
one should construe it as permitting any claim provided it is 
made by notice in writing to the Engineer, that the notice 
describes the event or circumstance relied on and that the notice 
is intended to notify a claim for extension (or additional payment 
or both) under the Contract or in connection with it. It must be 
recognisable as a “claim”. 
To further define this obligation as to the content of the notice, EW case 
Law is considered. This illustrates that the content needs to specify the 
circumstances as to the cause of the delay, and those that have caused 
the delay. The method for illustrating such circumstances is purposive 
construction or by process of necessary implication, otherwise the 
notice will not achieve its objective505.  
However, the notice need not explain how and why the relevant 
circumstances have caused the delay506, nor is it necessary to state the 
specific sub-provision of the EOT clause under which the cause falls507. 
The reason is because the intention of the notice is to warn the 
Engineer as to the current situation with regard to progress. Thus, the 
delaying event must be affecting progress (a past event but not 
necessarily a past delay), not a future delay, although a notice may 
refer to a future delay508. 
The information provided is to be as much as possible as to the cause 
of the delay to assist the Engineer perform his duty, i.e. to carry out a 
                                      
504 [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC). 
505 Steria Limited v. Sigma Wireless Communications Limited [2008] B.L.R. 79; 118 Con. L.R. 177 [2008] 
C.I.L.L 2544 QBD (TCC). 
506 Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her Majesty’s Attorney General for Gibraltar [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC). 
507 Merton London Borough v. Stanley Hugh Leach Ltd (1986) 32 Build L.R. 51. 
508 Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her Majesty’s Attorney General for Gibraltar [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC); 
Merton London Borough v. Stanley Hugh Leach Ltd (1986) 32 Build L.R. 51. 
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contemporaneous investigation and form an opinion as to whether a 
delay has occurred, and if such delay falls within the listed delaying 
events509. Consequently, the Contractor has not discharged this 
obligation until he has provided all relevant information510; and where a 
notice does not adequately explain, to the best of the Contractor’s 
knowledge the cause of the delay, is a breach of duty, notwithstanding 
the Contractor has to expand on the information contained in the initial 
notice511. 
The above requisites that define the form and content of a notice 
required by FIDIC99512 mirrors the obligations to be discharged to 
comply with the proposed gharar definition placed on the Contractor in 
UAE Law by the following articles of the UCC:  
1) Article 32 - obligates the Contractor to notify the Employer of the 
deficiency;  
2) Article 42 - failure to notify will harm the Employer;   
3) Article 52 - in order to prevent contradicting the gharar 
prohibition;  
4) Article 247 - to notify a party that failure to perform his 
obligation allows the other party to reframe from performing his 
obligations; and 
5) Article 380(1) - obligates the Contractor, where the Employer is 
failing to perform an act, to notify the Employer of the same to 
compel the Employer to give specific performance.   
                                      
509 Steria Limited v. Sigma Wireless Communications Limited [2008] B.L.R. 79; 118 Con. L.R. 177 [2008] 
C.I.L.L 2544 QBD (TCC); Merton London Borough v. Stanley Hugh Leach Ltd (1986) 32 Build L.R. 51. 
510 Merton London Borough v. Stanley Hugh Leach Ltd (1986) 32 Build L.R. 51. 
511 Merton London Borough v. Stanley Hugh Leach Ltd (1986) 32 Build L.R. 51. 
512 Sub-Sub-Clause 1.9 - Delayed Drawings or Instructions; Sub-Clause 4.12 - Unforeseeable Physical 
Conditions; Sub-Clause 4.24 – Fossils; Sub-Clause 7.4 – Testing; Sub-Clause 8.4 (d) – Extension of Time 
for Completion - Unforeseeable shortages of personnel or goods caused by epidemic or governmental 
actions; Sub-Clause 8.4(e) – Extension of Time for Completion - Any delay which the Employer is 
responsible; Sub-Clause 8.5 – Delays by Statutory Authorities; Sub-Clause 13.7 – Adjustment for Changes 
in Legislation and Sub-Clause 16.1 – Contractor’s Entitlement to Suspend Work FIDIC99.  Sub-Clause 13(b) 
– Variations; Sub-Clause 8.8 – Suspension; Sub-Clause 10.3 – Interference with Tests on Completion and 
Sub-Clause 10.2 Taking Over Parts of the Works - FIDIC99 Sub-Clause 8.4(c) – Extension of Time for 
Completion - Exceptional adverse climatic conditions and Sub-Clauses 19.2 and 19.4 – Notice of Force 
Majeure, FIDIC99 Sub-Clause 20.1, Contractor’s Claims. 
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These same requirements can also be applied to further the obligation 
placed on the Contractor by FIDIC99513, to provide fully detailed 
particulars of the compensation claimed.  
The other side of the said principle is that no party can take advantage 
of the non-performance of an obligation that delays the other party to 
the contract514.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
513 Sub-Clause 20.1, Contractor’s Claims. 
514 Roberts v Bury Commissioners (1870) L.R.5 C.P.310. 
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4.4 Operation of discretionary clauses 
 
This section examines the operation of discretionary clauses, using 
FIDIC99 as an example that allows the Employer to decide quantity and 
quality of work to be performed by the Contractor, but also the level of 
compensation due to the Contractor where the Employer delays the 
Contractor through an Employer’s act of prevention. Thus, this section 
examines and establishes in:  
Subsection 4.4.1 - Discretionary clauses in construction 
contracts - the two forms such clauses can take and how they 
operate;  
Subsection 4.4.2 - Controlling discretionary clauses in EW Law – 
how EW Courts control such clauses;  
Subsection 4.4.3 - Controlling discretionary clauses in UAE Law 
– how specific articles in the UCC control such clauses; and  
Subsection 4.4.4 - Discretionary clauses, parties’ expectations 
and relational contracts – how these forms of contractual 
relationships control the operation of these clauses.   
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4.4.1 Discretionary clauses in construction contracts 
The primary discretionary clause in FIDIC99 is Sub-Clause 3.5. This 
clause allows the Engineer, the Employer’s agent, to determine, in 
consultation with the Employer and the Contractor, the compensation, if 
any, due to the Contractor where the Employer prevents the 
Contractor’s performance for the reasons stated in subsection 2.3.4 
above. This clause therefore controls when the Contractor is to 
complete and any increase in countervalue. 
The reasons discretionary clauses are included in a contract is that they 
take account of some future contingency515. The primary contingency in 
construction contracts, as illustrated by Sub-Clause 8.4 FIDIC99, is that 
of an Employer’s act which delays the Contractor’s performance. The 
above consultation process ensures the key essential element, that of 
the date for delivery remains valid. This affords the Employer the right 
to apply damages where the Contractor fails to deliver by the 
contractual date. 
There are secondary tier discretionary clauses in FIDIC99. These 
clauses are the Employer’s rights, through his agent, to determine what 
constitutes unforeseeable ground conditions, instructing variations to 
the Contractor’s scope of work, evaluate quality and standards related 
to deliverables, materials to be supplied, and whether work done has 
met the requirements of the contract516.  
The secondary tier discretionary clauses are directly related to the 
primary discretionary clause. Thus, if the Employer delays the 
Contractor by failing to operate these other discretionary clauses in a 
timely manner, the Employer still has the right to decide the effect on 
the Contractor’s performance, and so any compensation due to the 
Contractor.  
A more serious problem arises with regard to the unilateral right of the 
Employer’s agent, the Engineer, as he decides whether or not the 
                                      
515 Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, p. 225. 
516 This includes deciding the extent of work the Contractor has contracted to do see Sub-Clause 4.12 
FIDIC99 as an example and whether the required level of quality has been achieved see Sub-Clause 7.3 
and 7.4 FIDIC99 as a example. 
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standard of a deliverable has satisfied the requirements set out in the 
contract. This right can delay the Contractor’s performance and result 
in ‘scope migration’, in that goods or services provided are of a higher 
standard than that called for in the contract, caused by ambiguities in 
the design as illustrated in section 3.2.  
As the Contractor has no control as to how the Employer will act where 
unforeseen ground conditions are found, nor as to when the Employer 
may issue a variation or how competent the staff of the Engineer will 
be, the only hope the Contractor has is that the Employer understands 
how these circumstances allow gharar to manifest in the Contractor’s 
mode of performance as reflected in the Programme of Works.  
The inclusion of a clause, as that of Sub-Clause 3.5, demonstrates that 
it was in the contemplation of the parties that the Employer would 
delay the Contractor. It also demonstrates that, despite delaying the 
Contractor the Employer wants to control the right granted to the 
Contractor in EW Law, through the prevention principle and principally 
articles 247 and 386, UCC in UAE Law, to suspend work and be paid 
compensation. 
The rights granted by these types of discretionary clauses, particularly 
that of Sub-Clause 3.5, allows gharar to be intrinsic to the contract as 
they create an immoral incentive to exploit the speculative nature of 
the matter to be determined, allowing unfair profit. Put simply, the 
Employer can act in an opportunistic manner by influencing the 
Engineer to find spurious grounds for not granting due compensation, 
exploiting the Contractor’s position. 
To summarise, there are two forms these clauses take in a construction 
contract. The first is primarily one which allows the Employer, through 
the Engineer, to decide the level of compensation to be granted to the 
Contractor. The second allows the Employer to determine the quantity 
and quality of work to be done by the Contractor. These ‘secondary tier’ 
clauses are directly linked to the primary discretionary clauses, as the 
exercising of a right under these clauses are a cause for gharar to infect 
the contract. 
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4.4.2 Controlling discretionary clauses in EW Law 
In EW Law, due to the principle of autonomy of contract there is a 
presumption that parties will act in their best interest, and so without 
any controls parties shall be free to exercise such powers as they see 
fit517. This would include operating the right granted by the 
discretionary clause in an opportunistic manner. The way the EW Courts 
address this potential is by the use of implied terms518.  
Subsection 2.3.4 illustrates that the rules that apply exemption clauses 
in EW Law can be used to prevent such clauses being operated in an 
opportunistic manner.  
Coupled to this is that the rights granted to the Employer by these 
discretionary clauses through his Engineer are akin to that of a 
fiduciary519, in that the Contractor is forced to trust the Employer (the 
fiduciary) to exercise his rights in an equitable and moral way.  
This analogy illustrates that the Employer would have an obligation to 
exercise the power to decide the compensation due in a manner that 
reflects fair and open dealing required for both procedural and practical 
fairness. There would also be the test of reasonableness to be satisfied. 
Thus, the question to be asked, taking account of a party’s 
expectations, is what are the Contractor’s reasonable or implicit 
expectations as to how the clause would operate.  
Where the compensation is for additional time, which this thesis 
illustrates is a breach that goes to the root of the contract, then a 
provision will be limited in its use to enable the provision to give effect 
to the main objective and intent of the contract520. In this circumstance, 
it is for the Contractor to complete within a reasonable time, taking 
account of the Employer’s acts of prevention.   
                                      
517 Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, p. 222. 
518 Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, p. 225. 
519 Campbell, Collins & Wightman, op cit., n. 372, p. 222. 
520 Anglo-Continental Holidays Ltd v Typaildos Lines (London) Limited [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61 CA 
Although this case is applying the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the principle is analogous; Karsales v 
Wallis [1956] 1 WLR 936, CA – although the effect of this case was form in error through Photo Productions 
Ltd v Securicor Ltd [1980] A.C. 827, it still resounds with Wells v Army and Navy Co-operative Society 
(1902) 86 L.T. 764. 
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The reasonable expectation of the Contractor would be subject to the 
irrationality principle, to justify that the Contractor’s expectations were 
reasonable. Thus, if it can be demonstrated that the discretionary 
clause has been operated in a manner not to reflect reasonableness, 
i.e. in a perverse, arbitrary or capricious manner, then it would 
constitute an act of bad faith521.   
The discretionary clauses that grant the power to the Engineer to 
evaluate standards or quality, and deliverables as to whether the same 
have met the requirements of the contract, is similar to power granted 
to a certifier. Thus, the criteria applied to test if the certifier has acted 
fairly is that as set out in the Investor’s Compensation Scheme v West 
Bromwich Building Society522.  
It is the same criteria as above, that the evaluation process is 
reasonable, taking account of how the contracting parties anticipated 
the process would operate in the circumstances it was meant to be 
used.  Thus, where the evaluation is to determine that the quality or 
deliverable is to the required level, then provided the Contractor can 
demonstrate his intention to meet or has met that standard, there is no 
grounds to withhold approval. Failure to do so would invoke the 
irrationality principle523.  
Reference is also made to the commentary under article 246, UCC in 
subsection 1.3.3 above, which further illustrates how implied terms can 
be operated to ensure fairness in the use of such provisions. A primary 
one is that the operation of such a provision is to be consistent with the 
overall objective of the contract, and takes account of the other party’s 
interests. 
As illustrated, the control of discretionary clauses is subject to how the 
EW Law will exercise its approach to ensure good faith and fair dealing, 
and the rules that apply to exemption clauses.  
                                      
521 Paragon Finance plc v Nash [2001] EWCA Civ 1446; [2001] WLR 685, 703. 
522 [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896. 
523 Paragon Finance plc v Nash [2001] EWCA Civ 1446; [2001] WLR 685, 703. 
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4.4.3 Controlling discretionary clauses in UAE Law 
This freedom to exercise such a right, in a manner that a party sees fit, 
clearly aligns itself with the Jurists understanding of how a right to 
decide the other party’s rights will create an immoral incentive to 
exploit the speculative nature of this type of clause.    
As illustrated, parties to a construction contract are, by article 246, UCC 
obligated to perform their rights and obligations that arise from a 
contract in a manner consistent with good faith. However, UAE Law, as 
recorded in subsection 2.3.5, has a much stronger approach of 
enforcing that a party does not act in an opportunistic manner through 
articles: 
1) 106(2)(b) which prevents the exercising of a right which 
contravenes the rules of fiqh and the morals of the UAE; and 
2) 106(2)(c) which prevents the exercising of a right which results in 
disproportionate harm to the other party.  
The specific aim of these articles is to protect the party to the contract 
bound by the discretionary powers that the other party has a right to 
exercise. In addition to this, the operation of the discretionary clauses 
by the holder of the right is obligated to adhere to articles of the UCC 
that regulate parties’ rights and obligations which apply in a general 
nature. These are:  
1) Article 42 - obligates the Employer not to harm the Contractor. In 
this circumstance where the Employer caused gharar to manifest, 
then the Employer will compensate the Contractor for a harm 
suffered resulting from any Employer’s acts of prevention; 
2) Article 52- obligates the Employer, where gharar is intrinsic to a 
contract such as unforeseeable ground conditions, to remove 
gharar and so the potential for riba by re-establishing certainty 
and so equivalence of the countervalue;    
3) Article 206 - not to agree provisions which are of an aleatory 
nature, but reinforce the objectives of the articles which apply to 
Page 247 of 273 
 
their type of contract, which as illustrated by articles 203 and 874, 
is to ensure equivalence of the countervalue; 
4) Article 243 - parties will perform the obligations that arise from 
the contract. Thus, where a deficiency in the design is discovered, 
then the Employer has to correct the same, inclusive of 
compensation where such deficiency caused the Contractor harm;  
5) Article 246 - parties will perform the contract in a manner 
consistent with good faith. As this is an obligation in UAE Law, 
unlike EW Law, the force behind the obligation is a regulatory 
requirement. Thus, a party’s failure to operate any provision in an 
equitable and just manner in the prevailing circumstances 
disobeys the relevant articles of the UCC and the gharar and riba 
prohibitions; and  
6) Article 249 - obligates the Employer to rebalance the contract by 
reducing an onerous obligation to a reasonable one, reinstating 
the balance of benefits, namely profits. 
The approach to be taken with regard to the discretionary clauses 
concerning quality is the same as that stated in subsection 4.4.2 above. 
This approach is reinforced by the operation of the above articles.    
This, as illustrated, UAE Law has a much stricter control over such 
provisions causing gharar to be intrinsic to a contract which prevents 
the Contractor from losing control of his rights and obligations.  
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4.4.4 Discretionary clauses, parties’ expectations and relational con-
tracts 
The following analysis illustrates the approach adopted in parties’ 
expectations and relational contracts in EW Law and reflects the 
manner in which discretionary clauses are to be operated in UAE Law 
with regard to a construction contract.  
Parties, by selecting these approaches, accept that the concept of good 
faith plays a central role as to how they discharge their rights and 
obligations that arise from the contract. This reflects a fundamental 
requirement of keeping the contract balanced. Hence, an Employer 
should assist the Contractor meet the requirements of the contract 
provided it does not conflict with the interests of the Employer. As the 
interest of the Employer is to take delivery of the structure by the 
agreed delivery date, there should be no conflict. This allows the 
Contractor to maintain its anticipated profit. 
Consequently, where the discretionary clause is for quality and/or 
quantity, the Employer should afford the Contractor all the cooperation 
he can, including that of setting out clear parameters in respect of 
quality, and consciously understanding how an increase in quality 
and/or quantity manifested. This approach reflects the obligations 
placed on the Employer by the gharar prohibition, as it allows certainty 
as to how the structure will achieve the standard required by the 
contract, thereby satisfying the Employer’s expectations.  
Consequently, an Employer, by operating a discretionary clause in a 
manner that reduces the Contractor’s profit will prejudice the team 
spirit as trust will be lost, severely impairing the desire to cooperate. 
The Contractor’s implicit understanding would be that the Employer 
acted in bad faith. The reason is that the Contractor would be 
prevented from making his anticipated profit. 
To put this into context, an Employer, when exercising the right 
granted by a discretionary clause to decide the compensation due to 
the Contractor, should take account of Bowen LJ’s comment, that the 
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objective is not to burden all the ‘perils’/risks on to the Contractor. This 
objective reflects the aims, although not precisely, of relational 
contracts, parties’ expectations and that of the gharar prohibition, that 
‘perils’ that arise from the bargain are balanced524.  
The difference is that although the gharar prohibition requires certainty 
of an obligation through precision, there will always be some ‘peril’ 
inherent to a contract which should not all be placed with one party.  
An example of an Employer accepting ‘perils’ that, prima facie falls to 
the Contractor, is when the Employer exercises a right to decide if work 
is within the Contractor’s scope. The Employer, when reaching his 
decision should assess whether the level of data was sufficient enough 
for the Contractor to appreciate what the obligation entailed.  
Construction contracts such as FIDIC99, places the risk/gharar with the 
Contractor where unforeseeable ground conditions525 are discovered. At 
tender stage, the Employer provides geotechnical data to the 
Contractor. This allows the Contractor to establish his mode of 
performance, which in turn provides certainty of delivery. Where 
ground conditions are found to be different from that expected which 
requires changes to the Contractor’s mode of performance, this 
demonstrates that gharar was inherent to the contract. Thus, the 
Employer should accept some or the risk/gharar to ensure that work 
performed is equivalent to the countervalue.  
This would be a fair assumption on the Contractor’s part under a 
relational contract and parties’ expectations. The reason is that a 
Contractor’s implicit understating of how the mechanism in FIDIC99 
would operate in these circumstances, is that it would allow the 
Contractor to maintain his anticipated profit. The underlying logic is that 
any other interpretation would illustrate that the Employer, by the 
discretionary powers granted, had been motivated by such power to act 
in an opportunistic manner, unfairly increasing its profit.  
                                      
524 This is supported by H.H. Edgar Faye QC in Henry Boot Construction Ltd v Central Lancashire New 
Town Development Corp (1980) 15 B.L.R. 1. 
525 Rayner  op. cit., n. 277. 
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This demonstrates the conscious effort an Employer must make to 
operate the discretion granted to him in an equitable and just manner. 
This approach aligns itself to the ethical control that UAE Law enforces 
through the gharar and riba prohibitions. This effect is necessary to 
avoid such provisions being categorised into the third distinct type of 
exemption clause as determined in EW Law, and so being subject to the 
force of article 206, that the provision be severed from the contract 
provisions in order to maintain the balance of the contract.  
This would include the Employer waiving the right where the Contractor 
failed to issue the requisite notice under article 380, UCC. Conversely, 
where the Contractor has complied with this obligation then the 
Employer has to take account of the Contractor’s right, in UAE Law, to 
be compensated526.  
A further example is a variation clause that grants the Employer the 
right to vary the Contractor’s obligations. The exercising of such right 
automatically grants the Contractor the right for compensation. The 
reason is that the issuing of a variation demonstrates gharar was 
intrinsic to the contract as to certainty of design and so mode of 
performance and delivery. 
The similarity between parties’ expectations and relational contracts as 
to how discretionary clauses should be operated is reflected in article 
886, UCC. This article allows the Employer, where the contract is M&V, 
to terminate the Contractor’s employment where there is a significant 
increase. An Employer will have the same right in respect of a LS 
contract under UAE Law, as standard forms of contract provisions, such 
as FIDIC99, includes a provision that also grants such a right. 
The implicit understanding that such rights presented to a Contractor 
when entering into a contract under UAE Law, taking cognizance of 
                                      
526 The Contractor’s in order to satisfy the criteria to demonstrate it had been delayed by an external cause 
would have to demonstrate that during the tender period attempt to identify unforeseeable physical 
conditions by visiting the Site, local authorities and other contractors who have or are working in the 
vicinity of the Site to see what ground conditions they have experienced and have a geotechnical specialist 
review the data provided by the Employer in the tender documents.  
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article 246, UCC, is that the Employer will act in a fair and moral 
manner where he delays the Contractor, i.e. the Employer will 
compensate the Contractor accordingly.  
This is illustrated where the contract is a LS by the fact that under UAE 
Law the design and quantity of work to be done shall be prepared to a 
level of accuracy so that gharar is minimal. Hence, unless there is a 
necessary variation caused by an unforeseen event, then there is no 
reason why an Employer would need to include discretionary powers 
allowing him to control the Contractor’s rights. 
Such understanding, based on Bowen LJ’s requirement that all ‘perils’ 
are not to be imposed on one party, would be implied as a legal 
incident of a particular legal relationship in EW Law. Dyson L.J. 
illustrates this in his conclusion in Crossly v Faithful & Gould Holdings 
Ltd527 
“…It seems to me that, rather than focus on the elusive concept 
of necessity, it is better to recognise that, to some extent at 
least, the existence and scope of standardised implied terms 
raise a question of reasonableness, fairness and the balancing of 
competing policy considerations….” 
The policy considerations Dyson L.J. was referring to were those set out 
in an article by Elizabeth Peden528. She grouped these policy 
considerations into three broad categories: 1) how the implied term will 
sit with existing law; 2) how the implied term will affect the parties to 
the relationship; and 3) wider issues of fairness and society. 
Such legal incident in UAE Law is that an Employer has the ability, 
through the provisions of the contract, to release himself from the 
financial burden, caused by him allowing gharar to infect the contract 
where the contract is a LS. The same right is granted, in Law, in the 
UAE Law where the contract is M&V. Consequently, it is reasonable and 
fair considering the said policy considerations, that the Employer 
compensate the Contractor if he wishes to continue with the contract.  
                                      
527 [2004] 4 All E.R. 447. 
528 Peden E., Policy Concerns Behind Implications in Law (2001) 119 L.Q.R. 459. 
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Such implication would sit well with UAE Law as it prevents harm to the 
Contractor if the Employer does not have the finance to continue as he 
can terminate the contract. The effect to the relationship is catered for 
in the provisions of the contract in both EW and UAE Law, and in Law in 
the UAE where the contract is M&V.  
The wider issues of society are satisfied as no dispute should arise 
between the parties, and any potential for financial hardship to either 
party is avoided. Thus, both parties can pursue other commercial 
opportunities thereby ensuring circulation of wealth.  
Conversely, where the Employer compensates the Contractor then the 
contract remains balanced, as the goods/services provided correspond 
to the countervalue paid. The relationship can continue to meet the 
original objective, satisfying the issues of fairness and society, again as 
the circulation of wealth will be met.        
The above analysis illustrates that the approach adopted under parties’ 
expectations and relational contracts when the requirements of 
precision have been complied with, require the Employer to act in a 
manner that reflects business efficacy and cooperate with the 
Contractor where gharar manifests in the design. This is necessary to 
maintain the balance of the contract where, as a result in design 
changes, there is potential for disproportionate harm by operation of a 
discretionary clause. Such disproportionate harm should be prevented 
by the Employer by making a conscious decision how to operate the 
discretionary clause, taking account of reasonableness, fairness and the 
balancing of competing policy as discussed above.  
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Part 5 – Findings and Conclusion 
 
5.1 Findings 
The findings from the analysis presented in the above Parts is that 
there is a fundamental difference in the formation and performance of a 
construction contract under EW and UAE Law; and that parties’ 
expectations and relational contracts reflect the manner in which UAE 
Law obliges parties to perform a construction contract. The reasons for 
this are: 
The UCC, by enacting the gharar and riba prohibitions, namely articles 
202, 203 and 874, obligate the Employer to describe punctiliously the 
essential elements of a construction contract for it to be valid in the 
UAE, and that the parties act in a transparent manner in pre-contract 
negotiations. Coupled to this, during contract performance the parties 
have to abide by the articles which regulate their rights and obligations 
which arise from the contract so they do not contravene the said 
prohibitions. As the UCC enacts the doctrine of good faith into Law, 
parties to a contract have to abide by this doctrine in the broadest 
terms, to the extent that the Employer should assist the Contractor to 
perform his obligations, provided it does not conflict with the interests 
of the Employer. This includes not exercising a right which can result in 
opportunism harming the Contractor which the UCC has specific and 
supplementary articles in place to prevent such possibility. This requires 
the Employer, whose position is analogous to a fiduciary, to make 
conscious decisions when exercising rights granted by notice and 
discretionary clauses in standard forms of construction contract such as 
FIDIC99, to achieve both parties’ objective of the contract. UAE Law 
also includes the notion of the prevention principle and the contra 
proferentem rule which has been described as a rule of justice. 
EW Law adopts the doctrine of freedom of contract that allows parties 
to decide how they apportion risk/gharar which arises from a 
construction contract. This may result in speculation as to what is 
needed to perform an obligation. The consequence is that risk 
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distribution can result in an unbalanced contract, which is further 
exacerbated by the effect of notice and discretionary clauses; and that 
EW Law does not recognise the notion of good faith in the formation 
and discharging of a contract. This is somewhat confusing when there is 
extensive proof that EW Courts achieve this by use of implied terms 
such as that necessary for business efficacy, to apportion risk where it 
has not been expressly placed. In addition, EW Courts also use certain 
doctrines such as the contra proferentem rule and rules against 
penalties/forfeiture to prevent opportunism. Consequently, their aim 
can be said to be that of the gharar and riba prohibitions, but unlike the 
prohibitions in UAE Law they do not have the same weight in their 
enforcement. The reason is, that although there are strong similarities 
in the doctrines of an unconscionable bargain and that of unjust 
enrichment in EW Law, these doctrines are subject to certain 
restrictions that control the circumstances in which they can be applied, 
which in turn can result in the contract not being balanced or equivalent 
in the benefits gained. In UAE Law no restrictions apply to the gharar 
and riba prohibitions, therefore they have an obligation to ensure their 
contract is balanced. A major difference under EW Law is that parties 
have no obligation to attain the same level of precision at contract 
formation as in UAE Law.  
Therefore, EW Courts may be required to control risk and so 
opportunism which is inherent at contract formation, as well as 
manifesting itself during the performance of the contract. In saying 
this, it is interesting to note that the traditional methods of 
procurement under EW Law for a structure, that of a LS and M&W 
contract, attains the level of precision required under UAE Law. The 
problem lies in the operation of notice and discretionary clauses.    
The concept of parties’ expectations and relational contracts in EW Law 
oblige parties to adopt the doctrine of good faith, in the broadest terms, 
when discharging their rights and obligations which arise in the 
contract. It can therefore be said that a consequence of parties 
adopting either of these methods to procure a structure is that they 
should hold open and detailed negotiations during contract formation. 
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This will allow the parties to discuss frankly matters that would 
otherwise allow gharar to be intrinsic to the contract. Moreover, such an 
approach post contract ensures a high degree of communication, 
cooperation and predictable performance needed to create mutual trust 
necessary to give business efficacy to their contract. This is particularly 
important in a construction contract where a structure is to be built in 
an environment that parties do not control but where they are making a 
substantial investment.  
Consequently, it is fair to say the approaches adopted in parties’ 
expectations and relational contracts mirror the requirements which 
UAE Law places on the Employer when exercising rights granted 
through notice and discretionary clauses, that of consciously deciding 
whether to exercise such right, and if so, to what extent. Failure to 
exercise such right in a fair, reasonable and just manner will be 
considered an act of bad faith, particularly as the Employer’s position is 
analogous to a fiduciary. This would have a negative impact on the 
objective of the contract so the Employer has to understand the 
Contractor’s implicit understanding as to how such provisions will 
operate, thereby importing the morality which UAE Law requires. This is 
the reason these methods for contracting for a structure are suitable for 
use in the Emirate of Dubai, UAE.          
The author has first-hand experience in the resolution of disputes in the 
Emirate of Dubai and the State of Qatar. This experience being gained 
in negotiations through the Ruler’s Court in Dubai and acting as a 
tribunal appointed expert in arbitrations in Dubai. In these arbitrations 
the Arab arbitrators referred to the UCC throughout the arbitration 
process, resolving matters of the dispute based on the relevant articles. 
The author has also presented claims on behalf of an Arab client in 
Qatar who has confirmed that the aims of the gharar and riba 
prohibitions are consistent with the interpretation presented in this 
thesis. Moreover, the author has drafted a referral to the ICC based on 
the said interpretations which is now subject to arbitration. The lack of 
definition as to what obligations entail is the main cause of disputes in 
Dubai. This is particularly prevalent in design and build projects with 
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which the author is involved in resolving controversies at the time of 
this submission. 
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5.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are strong similarities in the control of risk/gharar 
in construction contracts in EW and UAE Law. However, as illustrated, 
UAE Law applies a strong moral approach in regulating gharar and riba. 
This is achieved by enforcing the gharar and riba prohibitions as 
defined by the author of this thesis through:  
1) The nominate contract system, which minimises the extent of 
gharar/risk that can be intrinsic to a contract when it comes into 
force, and so prevents riba; 
2) The relevant articles of the UCC, which, by application of the 
prohibition test as proposed by the author, obliges parties not to 
discharge their rights and obligations in a manner that disobeys 
the gharar and riba prohibitions, particularly in relation to notice 
and discretionary clauses; and  
3) The enforcement of morality into a contract, which requires a 
conscious effort by a party who has the power to control other 
party’s rights to be fair and just in the use of such right. Failure 
to do this results in a primary requirement of fiqh and UAE Law 
not being achieved - the circulation of wealth.    
It is also clear that in EW Law, parties’ expectations and the concept of 
relational contracts assimilates how UAE Law obliges parties to a 
contract to discharge their rights and obligations which arise from the 
contract. Consequently, parties to a contract, when they select a 
standard form of contract provisions such as FIDIC99, should adopt the 
approach advanced by parties’ expectations or relational contracts as 
they minimise the potential to disobey the gharar/riba prohibitions.  
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5.3 Further research  
This thesis demonstrates that as UAE Law is derived from the Holy Law 
of Islam, parties to a contract need to adopt a strong ethical approach 
to the formation and the discharging of the contract. The primary way 
that this is achieved is through precision in the obligations that arise 
from a construction contract, which in turn, if complied with, prevents a 
dispute from arising. 
Coupled to this, although the UCC enacts the precepts of Islam, UAE 
nationals are obligated to abide by these Laws as part of their religious 
beliefs.  
Traditional methods of procurement are Islamic compliant methods 
used as they provide precision as to how a structure will come into 
existence. However, due to notice requirements which can act as 
exemption and discretionary clauses which determine the Contractor’s 
rights and obligations, disputes can arise.  
Design and build contracts, prima facie, are not Islamic compliant. This 
is supported by the author’s informal survey in Qatar and personal 
involvement in the Doha Metro, North Orbital Road project, the new 
Doha Port Project and the new Doha international airport. The reason is 
ambiguities in the Employers requirements. These ambiguities comprise 
of: 1) unclear design requirements and approval process for design 
submissions; 2) lack of clarity as to the type and form of goods/ 
products for inclusion in the structure.  
This is further compounded by onerous contractual obligations in the 
contract provisions, such as cooperation clauses that obligate 
Contractors on such mega projects to cooperate with each other 
despite competing needs.   
This thesis demonstrates that parties’ rights and obligations which arise 
from a construction contract under EW and UAE Law are different. This 
is particularly apparent in the construction, interpretation and operation 
of notice and discretionary clauses, which unless operated in a manner 
consistent with the requirements of UAE Law require that such 
provisions be severed from the contract. 
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In order to bring forward and develop the methods for contract 
performance so contract provisions are Islamic compliant, and to 
ensure the level of precision for contract formation, there is a need for 
further research in the following areas as to how: 
1) The methods applied in parties’ expectations and relational 
contracts can be developed in a manner that ensures parties 
comply with these approaches to contracting, taking cognizance 
of the objectives of the gharar and riba prohibitions so a 
balanced set of contract provisions are used by the parties. This, 
in the opinion of the author, as a result of the different 
nationalities that work in the Arab Gulf, requires express 
statements defining how parties are to act; and    
2) Design and Build methods of procurement can be developed to a 
level of precision as to those of traditional methods of 
procurement as defined in this thesis to minimise the potential of 
a dispute arising. This, in the opinion of the author, requires a 
well-defined set of criteria such as design development 
requirements, approval procedures, and a measurement process 
that takes a fair approach to future changes to Employer’s 
requirements, including other stakeholder requirements. This 
was the recommendation of decision number 182(19/8) 
concerning Build, Operate and Transfer, a form of Design and 
Build for Public Sector projects of the International Council of 
Fiqh Academy, an offshoot of the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) held 26-30 April 2009 in the Emirate of 
Sharjah, UAE.  
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